KOESTLER & BURKE
ON SYMBOLING AND CONSCIOUSNESS
What are the effects of the human capacity to symbol and thus to speak?
As discussed in class, the symbol has peculiar powers (e.g., naming, negation,
self-reference) not found in other sorts of meaningful signs. Since we
seem to be the only animal that habitually makes and uses symbols, some
of the peculiar characteristics of human consciousness-of-the-world might
be found by thinking about them. Perhaps most notably, we can act on the
basis of what's imaginary as easily as we can act on the basis of direct
experience. We may not even be able to tell the difference.
KOESTLER ON THE IMAGINARY
AND THE REAL
Extract
from Arthur Koestler's discussion of illusion in his 1964 book The
Act of Creation. (Picador paperback: pp. 301-2.)
The oldest and most fundamental of all tricks is
to disguise people in costumes and to put them on a stage with masks or
paint on their faces; the audience is thereby given the impression that
the events represented are happening here and now, regardless of how distant
they really are in space and time. The effect of this procedure is
to induce a lively bisociated condition in the minds of the audience. The
spectator knows, in one compartment of his mind, that the people on the
stage are actors, whose names are familiar to him; and he knows that they
are "acting" for the express purpose of creating an illusion in him, the
spectator. Yet in another compartment of his mind he experiences
fear, hope, pity, accompanied by palpitations, arrested breathing, or tears
-- all induced by events which he knows to be pure make-believe.
It is indeed a remarkable phenomenon that a grown-up person, knowing all
the time that he faces a screen onto which shadows are projected by a machine,
and knowing furthermore quite well what is going to happen at the end--for
instance, that the police will arrive just in the nick of time to save
the hero-- should nevertheless go through agonies of suspense, and display
the corresponding bodily symptoms. It is even more remarkable that
this capacity for living in two universes at once, one real, one imaginary,
should be accepted without wonder as a commonplace.
KENNETH BURKE: WORDS ACROSS
THE ABYSS OF EXPERIENCE
Extract
from critic Kenneth Burke's 1963 paper "Definition of Man", which
was reprinted in his Language as Symbolic Action.
Burke proposes this (typically quirky) definition: "Man is the symbol-making
animal, inventor of the negative, separated from his natural condition
by instruments of his own making, moved by the sense of order, and rotten
with perfection." This is from his discussion of the first phrase.
The "symbol-using animal", yes, obviously.
But can we bring ourselves to realize just what that formula implies, just
how much of what we mean by "reality" has been built up for us through
nothing but our symbol systems? Take away our books, and what little
do we know about history, biography, even something so "down to earth"
as the relative position of the seas and continents? What is our "reality"
for today (beyond the paper-thin line of our own particular lives) but
all this clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things
we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers and the like about the
present? In school, as they go from class to class, students turn
from one idiom to another. The various courses in the curriculum
are in effect but so many different terminologies. And however important
to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced firsthand,
the whole overall "picture" is but a construct of our symbol systems.
To meditate on this fact until one sees its full implications is much like
peering over the edge of things into an ultimate abyss. And doubtless
that's one reason why, though man is typically the symbol-using animal,
he clings to a kind of naive verbal realism that refuses to realize the
full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality.
In responding to words, with their overt and covert modes of persuasion,...
we like to forget the kind of relation that really prevails between the
verbal and the nonverbal. In being a link between us and the nonverbal,
words are by the same token a screen separating us from the nonverbal --
though the statement gets tangled in its own traces, since so much of the
"we" that is separated from the nonverbal by the verbal would not even
exist were it not for the verbal (or for our symbolicity in general, since
the same applies to the symbol systems of dance, music, painting, and the
like.) A road map that helps us easily find our way from one side
of the continent to the other owes its great utility to its exceptional
existential poverty. It tells us absurdly little about the trip that
is to be experienced in a welter of detail. Indeed, its value for
us is in the very fact that it is so essentially inane.
Language referring to the realm of the nonverbal
is necessarily talk about things in terms of what they are not -- and
in this sense we start out beset by a paradox. Such language
is but a set of labels, signs for helping us find our way about.
Indeed, they can even be so useful that they help us to invent ingenious
ways of threatening to destroy ourselves. But even
accuracy of this powerful sort does not get around the fact that such
terms are sheer emptiness, as compared to the substance of the things they
name.