Boas:
"The Methods of Ethnology"
Franz Boas published
this short essay in 1920 in the American
Anthropologist 22:311-22, but I have given
the pagination from its reprint in his Race,
Language and Culture (1940).
Though his review of the state of play between evolutionist and diffusionist
grand theories is valuable, pay special attention to his use of "history"
and of "psychology." For the most part, the anthropologists whose work
he refers to favourably are his students. There are no citations in the
original.
THE METHODS OF ETHNOLOGY
D URING the last ten years
the methods of inquiry into the historical development of civilization
have undergone remarkable changes. During the second half of the last century
evolutionary thought held almost complete sway and investigators like Spencer,
Morgan, Tylor, Lubbock, to mention only a few, were under the spell of
the idea of a general, uniform evolution of culture in which all parts
of mankind participated. The newer development goes back in part to the
influence of Ratzel whose geographical training impressed him with the
importance of diffusion and migration. The problem of diffusion was taken
up in detail particularly in America, but was applied in a much wider sense
by Foy and Graebner, and finally seized upon in a still wider application
by Elliot Smith and Rivers, so that at the present time, at least among
certain groups of investigators in England and also in Germany, ethnological
research is based on the concept of migration and dissemination rather
than upon that of evolution.
A critical study of these two directions of inquiry
shows that each is founded on the application of one fundamental hypothesis.
The evolutionary point of view presupposes that the course of historical
changes in the cultural life of mankind follows definite laws which are
applicable everywhere, and which bring it about that cultural development
is, in its main lines, the same among all races and all peoples. This idea
is clearly expressed by Tylor in the introductory pages of his classic
work "Primitive Culture." As soon as we admit that the hypothesis of a
uniform evolution has to be proved before it can be accepted, the whole
structure loses its foundation. It is true that there are indications of
parallelism of development in different parts of the world, and that similar
customs are found in the most diverse and widely separated parts of the
globe. The occurrence of these similarities which are distributed so irregularly
that they cannot readily be explained on the basis of diffusion, is one
of the foundations of the evolutionary hypothesis, as it was the foundation
of Bastian's psychologizing treatment of cultural
282
phenomena. On the other hand, it may be recognized that the hypothesis
implies the thought that our modern Western European civilization represents
the highest cultural development towards which all other more primitive
cultural types tend, and that, therefore, retrospectively, we construct
an orthogenetic development towards our own modern civilization. It is
clear that if we admit that there may be different ultimate and co-existing
types of civilization, the hypothesis of one single general line of development
cannot be maintained.
Opposed to these assumptions is the modern tendency
to deny the existence of a general evolutionary scheme which would represent
the history of the cultural development the world over. The hypothesis
that there are inner causes which bring about similarities of development
in remote parts of the globe is rejected and in its place it is assumed
that identity of development in two different parts of the globe must always
be due to migration and diffusion. On this basis historical contact is
demanded for enormously large areas. The theory demands a high degree of
stability of cultural traits such as is apparently observed in many primitive
tribes, and it is furthermore based on the supposed co-existence of a number
of diverse and mutually independent cultural traits which reappear in the
same combinations in distant parts of the world. In this sense, modern
investigation takes up anew Gerland's theory of the persistence of a number
of cultural traits which were developed in one center and carried by man
in his migrations from continent to continent.
It seems to me that if the hypothetical foundations
of these two extreme forms of ethnological research are broadly stated
as I have tried to do here, it is at once clear that the correctness of
the assumptions has not been demonstrated, but that arbitrarily the one
or the other has been selected for the purpose of obtaining a consistent
picture of cultural development. These methods are essentially forms of
classification of the static phenomena of culture according to two distinct
principles, and interpretations of these classifications as of historical
significance, without, however, any attempt to prove that this interpretation
is justifiable. To give an example : It is observed that in most parts
of the world there are resemblances between decorative forms that are representative
and others that are more or less geometrical. According to the evolutionary
point of view, their development is explained by arranging the decorative
forms in such order that the most representative forms are placed at the
beginning. the others being so placed that they show a gradual transition
from representative to purely conventional geometric forms.
283
This order is then interpreted as meaning that geometric designs originated
from representative designs which gradually degenerated. This method has
been pursued, for instance, by Putnam, Stolpe, Balfour, and Haddon, and
by Verworn and, in his earlier writings, by von den Steinen. While I do
not mean to deny that this development may have occurred, it would be rash
to generalize and to claim that in every case the classification which
has been made according to a definite principle
represents an historical development. The order might as well be reversed
and we might begin with a simple geometric element which, by the addition
of new traits, might be developed into a representative design, and we
might claim that this order represents an historical sequence. Both of
these possibilities were considered by Holmes as early as 1885. Neither
the one nor the other theory can be established without actual historical
proof.
The opposite attitude, namely, origin through diffusion,
is exhibited in Heinrich Schurtz's attempt to connect the decorative art
of Northwest America with that of Melanesia. The simple fact that in these
areas elements occur that may be interpreted as eyes, induced him to assume
that both have a common origin, without allowing for the possibility that
the pattern in the two areas -each of which shows highly distinctive characteristics-
may have developed from independent sources. In this attempt Schurtz followed
Ratzel who had already tried to establish connections between Melanesia
and Northwest America on the basis of other cultural features.
While ethnographical research based on these two
fundamental hypotheses seems to characterize the general tendency of European
thought, a different method is at present pursued by the majority of American
anthropologists. The difference between the two directions of study may
perhaps best be summarized by the statement that American scholars are
primarily interested in the dynamic phenomena of cultural change, and try
to elucidate cultural history by the application of the results of their
studies; and that they relegate the solution of the ultimate question of
the relative importance of parallelism of cultural development in distant
areas, as against worldwide diffusion, and stability of cultural traits
over long periods to a future time when the actual conditions of cultural
change are better known. The American ethnological methods are analogous
to those of European, particularly of Scandinavian, archaeology, and of
the researches into the prehistoric period of the eastern Mediterranean
area.
It may seem to the distant observer that American
students are en-
284
gaged in a mass of detailed investigations without much bearing upon the
solution of the ultimate problems of a philosophic history of human civilization.
I think this interpretation of the American attitude would be unjust because
the ultimate questions are as near to our hearts as they are to those of
other scholars, only we do not hope to be able to solve an intricate historical
problem by a formula.
First of all, the whole problem of cultural history
appears to us as an historical problem. In order to understand history
it is necessary to know not only how things are, but how they have come
to be. In the domain of ethnology, where, for most parts of the world,
no historical facts are available except those that may be revealed by
archaeological study, all evidence of change can be inferred only by indirect
methods. Their character is represented in the researches of students of
comparative philology. The method is based on the comparison of static
phenomena combined with the study of their distribution. What can be done
by this method is well illustrated by Lowie's investigations of the military
societies of the Plains Indians, or by the modern investigation of American
mythology. It is, of course, true that we can never hope to obtain incontrovertible
data relating to the chronological sequence of events, but certain general
broad outlines can be ascertained with a a high degree of probability,
even of certainty.
As soon as these methods are applied, primitive
society loses the appearance of absolute stability which is conveyed to
the student who sees a certain people only at a certain given time. All
cultural forms rather appear in a constant state of flux and subject to
fundamental modifications.
It is intelligible why in our studies the problem
of dissemination should take a prominent position. It is much easier to
prove dissemination than to follow up developments due to inner forces,
and the data for such a study are obtained with much greater difficulty.
They may, however, be observed in every phenomenon of acculturation in
which foreign elements are remodeled according to the patterns prevalent
in their new environment, and they may be found in the peculiar local developments
of widely spread ideas and activities. The reason why the study of inner
development has not been taken up energetically, is not due to the fact
that from a theoretical point of view it is unimportant, it is rather due
to the inherent methodological difficulties. It may perhaps be recognized
that in recent years attention has been drawn to this problem, as is manifested
by the investigations on the processes of accultura-
285
tion and of the interdependence of cultural activities which are attracting
the attention of many investigators.
The further pursuit of these inquiries emphasizes
the importance of a feature which is common to all historic phenomena.
While in natural sciences we are accustomed to consider a given number
of causes and to study their effects, in historical happenings we are compelled
to consider every phenomenon not only as effect but also as cause. This
is true even in the particular application of the laws of physical nature,
as, for instance, in the study of astronomy in which the position of certain
heavenly bodies at a given moment may be considered as the effect of gravitation,
while, at the same time, their particular arrangement in space determines
future changes. This relation appears much more clearly in the history
of human civilization. To give an example: a surplus of food supply is
liable to bring about an increase of population and an increase of leisure,
which gives opportunity for occupations that are not absolutely necessary
for the needs of every day life. In turn the increase of population and
of leisure, which may be applied to new inventions, give rise to a greater
food supply and to a further increase in the amount of leisure, so that
a cumulative effect results.
Similar considerations may be made in regard to
the important problem of the relation of the individual to society, a problem
that has to be considered whenever we study the dynamic conditions of change.
The activities of the individual are determined to a great extent by his
social environment, but in turn his own activities influence the society
in which he lives, and may bring about modifications in its form. Obviously,
this problem is one of the most important ones to be taken up in a study
of cultural changes. It is also beginning to attract the attention of students
who are no longer satisfied with the systematic enumeration of standardized
beliefs and customs of a tribe, but who begin to be interested in the question
of the way in which the individual reacts to his whole social environment,
and to the differences of opinion and of mode of action that occur in primitive
society and which are the causes of far-reaching changes.
In short then, the method which we try to develop
is based on a study of the dynamic changes in society that may be observed
at the present time. We refrain from the attempt to solve the fundamental
problem of the general development of civilization until we have been able
to unravel the processes that are going on under our eyes.
Certain general conclusions may be drawn from this
study even now.
286
First of all, the history of human civilization does not appear to us as
determined entirely by psychological necessity that leads to a uniforrn
evolution the world over. We rather see that each cultural group has its
own unique history, dependent partly upon the peculiar inner development
of the social group, and partly upon the foreign influences to which it
has been subjected. There have been processes of gradual differentiation
as well as processes of leveling down differences between neighboring cultural
centers, but it would be quite impossible to understand, on the basis of
a single evolutionary scheme, what happened to any particular people. An
example of the contrast between the two points of view is clearly indicated
by a comparison of the treatment of Zuni civilization by Frank Hamilton
Cussing on the one hand, on the other by modern students, particularly
by Elise Clews Parsons, Leslie Spire, Ruth Ben edict and Ruth Bundle. Cussing
believed that it was possible to explain Zuni culture entirely on the basis
of the reaction of the Zuni mind to its geographical environment, and that
the whole of Zuni culture could be explained as the development which followed
necessarily from the position in which the people were placed. Cushion's
keen insight into the Indian mind and his thorough knowledge of the most
intimate life of the people gave great plausibility to his interpretations.
On the other hand, Dr. Parsons' studies prove conclusively the deep influence
which Spanish ideas have had upon Zuni culture, and, together with Professor
Kroeber's investigations, give us one of the best examples of acculturation
that have come to our notice. The psychological explanation is entirely
misleading, notwithstanding its plausibility, and the historical study
shows us an entirely different picture, in which the unique combination
of ancient traits (which in themselves are undoubtedly complex) and of
European influences, have brought about the present condition.
Studies of the dynamics of primitive life also show
that an assumption of long continued stability such as is demanded by Elite
Smith is without any foundation in fact. Wherever primitive conditions
have been studied in detail, they can be proved to be in a state of flux,
and it would seem that there is a close parallelism between the history
of language and the history of general cultural development. Periods of
stability are followed by periods of rapid change. It is exceedingly improbable
that any customs of primitive people should be preserved unchanged for
thousands of years. Furthermore, the phenomena of acculturation prove that
a transfer of customs from one region into another without
287
concomitant changes due to acculturation, are very rare. It is, therefore,
very unlikely that ancient Mediterranean customs could be found at the
present time practically unchanged in different parts of the globe, as
Elite Smith's theory demands.
While on the whole the unique historical character
of cultural growth in each area stands out as a salient element in the
history of cultural development, we may recognize at the same time that
certain typical parallelisms do occur. We are, however, not so much inclined
to look for these similarities in detailed customs as rather in certain
dynamic conditions which are due to social or psychological causes that
are liable to lead to similar results. The example of the relation between
food supply and population to which I referred before may serve as an example.
Another type of example is presented in those cases in which a certain
problem confronting man may be solved by a limited number of methods only.
When we find, for instance, marriage as a universal institution, it may
be recognized that marriage is possible only between a number of men and
a number of women; a number of men and one woman; a number of women and
one man; or one man and one woman. As a matter of fact, all these forms
are found the world over and it is, therefore, not surprising that analogous
forms should have been adopted quite independently in different parts of
the world, and, considering both the general economic conditions of mankind
and the character of sexual instinct in the higher animals, it also does
not seem surprising that group marriage and polyandrous marriages should
be comparatively speaking rare. Similar considerations may also be made
in regard to the philosophical views held by mankind. In short, if we look
for laws, the laws relate to the effects of physiological, psychological
, and social conditions, not to sequences of cultural achievement.
In some cases a regular sequence of these may accompany
the development of the psychological or social status. This is illustrated
by the sequence of industrial inventions in the Old World and in America,
which I consider as independent. A period of food gathering and of the
use of stone was followed by the invention of agriculture, of pottery and
finally of the use of metals. Obviously, this order is based on the increased
amount of time given by mankind to the use of natural products, of tools
and utensils, and to the variations that developed with it. Although in
this case parallelism seems to exist on the two continents, it would be
futile to try to follow out the order in detail. As a matter of fact, it
does not apply to other inventions. The domestication of ani-
288
mals, which, in the Old World must have been an early achievement, was
very late in the New World, where domesticated animals, except the dog,
hardly existed at all at the time of discovery. A slight beginning had
been made in Peru with the taming of the llama, and birds were kept in
various parts of the continent.
A similar consideration may be made in regard to
the development of rationalism. It seems to be one of the fundamental characteristics
of the development of mankind that activities which have developed unconsciously
are gradually made the subject of reasoning. We may observe this process
everywhere. It appears, perhaps, most clearly in the history of science
which has gradually extended the scope of its inquiry over an ever-widening
field and which has raised into consciousness human activities that are
automatically performed in the life of the individual and of society.
I have not heretofore referred to another aspect
of modern ethnology which is connected with the growth of psycho-analysis.
Sigmund Freud has attempted to show that primitive thought is in many respects
analogous to those forms of individual psychic activity which he has explored
by his psycho-analytical methods. In many respects his attempts are similar
to the interpretation of mythology by symbolists like Stucken. Rivers has
taken hold of Freud's suggestion as well as of the interpretations of Graebner
and Elliot Smith, and we find, therefore, in his new writings a peculiar
disconnected application of psychologizing attitude and the application
of the theory of ancient transmission.
While I believe some of the ideas underlying Freud's
psycho-analytic studies may be fruitfully applied to ethnological problems,
it does not seem to me that the one-sided exploitation of this method will
advance our understanding of the development of human society. It is certainly
true that the influence of impressions received during the first few years
of life have been entirely underestimated and that the social behavior
of man depends to a great extent upon the earliest habits which are established
before the time when connected memory begins, and that many so-called racial
or hereditary traits are to be considered rather as a result of early exposure
to certain forms of social conditions. Most of these habits do not rise
into consciousness and are, therefore, broken with difficulty only. Much
of the difference in the behavior of adult male and female may go back
to this cause. If, however, we try to apply the whole theory of the influence
of suppressed desires to the activities of man living under different social
forms, I think we extend beyond their
289
legitimate limits the inferences that may be drawn from the observation
of normal and abnormal individual psychology. Many other factors are of
greater importance. To give an example: The phenomena of language show
clearly that conditions quite different from those to which psycho-analysts
direct their attention determine the mental behavior of man. The general
concepts underlying language are entirely unknown to most people. They
do not rise into consciousness until the scientific study of grammar begins.
Nevertheless, the categories of language compel us to see the world arranged
in certain definite conceptual groups which, on account of our lack of
knowledge of linguistic processes, are taken as objective categories and
which, therefore, impose themselves upon the form of our thoughts. It is
not known what the origin of these categories may be, but it seems quite
certain that they have nothing to do with the phenomena which are the subject
of psycho-analytic study.
The applicability of the psycho-analytic theory
of symbolism is also open to the greatest doubt. We should remember that
symbolic interpretation has occupied a prominent position in the philosophy
of all times. It is present not only in primitive life, but the history
of philosophy and of theology abounds in examples of a high development
of symbolism, the type of which depends upon the general mental attitude
of the philosopher who develops it. The theologians who interpreted the
Bible on the basis of religious symbolism were no less certain of the correctness
of their views, than the psycho-analysts are of their interpretations of
thought and conduct based on sexual symbolism. The results of a symbolic
interpretation depend primarily upon the subjective attitude of the investigator
who arranges phenomena according to his leading concept. In order to prove
the applicability of the symbolism of psycho-analysis, it would be necessary
to show that a symbolic interpretation from other entirely different points
of view would not be equally plausible, and that explanations that leave
out symbolic significance or reduce it to a minimum, would not be adequate.
While, therefore, we may welcome the application
of every advance in the method of psychological investigation, we cannot
accept as an advance in ethnological method the crude transfer of a novel,
one-sided method of psychological investigation of the individual to social
phenomena the origin of which can be shown to be historically determined
and to be subject to influences that are not at all comparable to those
that control the psychology of the individual.
back to list
of readings