Kultur and Culture
I. Why Look at German Kultur?
The anthropologists' "culture"
comes into English (e.g., through Tylor & Boas) from
German, and it carries with it a hundred years of development. When the
inspiration and institutional centre of American anthropology - Franz Boas
- moved to New York around 1890, he took up residence in the third largest
German-speaking city in the world, with at least a half million other German-speakers.
Adams (see below) refers to the dominant thread of German thought of the
time as "German idealism" (descending from Kant and Hegel), which was itself
profoundly intertwined with the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment's
rationalism. If the Englishman Tylor largely recycled the rationalist ideas
of the 1700's, Boas' "culture" was more irrational, more romantic.
The following is from William Y. Adams' 1998 The
Philosophical Roots of Anthropology, which
in fact deals mostly with the Americanist tradition.
There can be little doubt
that Tylor's conception and definition of culture, and indeed his
whole position in anthropology, derives largely from the German idealist
tradition. It is often forgotten that Tylor's self-education as an anthropologist,
following his return from Central America, took place partly in Germany,
and that the ethnographic materials cited so copiously in Researches
into the Early History of Mankind and in Primitive Culture are
mostly derived not from English but from German sources; especially from
the voluminous works of Klemm. In short and in sum, it was Tylor who gave
to the English-speaking world its central organizing concept of culture,
which had already been developed in everything but name by the German idealists.
This, rather than his somewhat intellectualized evolutionism, represents
his most signal contribution to the development of anthropological thought.
The giant figure of Franz
Boas
looms so large in the history of American anthropology that his name and
his work have already been cited repeatedly in this as well as in earlier
chapters. He was not a great innovator or an original thinker but a great
transplanter, who brought to America the German traditions of idealist
philosophy, particularist ethnography, and professional education. The
story of his life and career have been told so often in anthropological
literature that they must be part of the folklore that "every student anthropologist
knows and every grownup anthropologist must at least have forgotten," to
borrow a phrase from R.R. Marett....
II. From Kenan Malik's fine 1996 re-analysis
of well-worn territory in The Meaning of Race:
Race, History and Culture in Western Society.
Understanding the richness of human cultural endeavour
is a vital and fruitful quest. But contemporary visions of cultural difference
seek to learn about other cultural forms not to create a more rich and
universal culture, but to imprison us more effectively in a human zoo of
differences. The aim of multiculturalist education policies is to preserve
cultural differences as they present themselves in society, seemingly believing
that these differences are static and immutable. The explicit link that
opponents of transracial adoption make between 'race' and 'culture' - the
'race' of a child determines the 'culture' in which he or she should be
brought up - reveals a view of culture as a predetermined, natural phenomenon.
One American collection of articles on multiculturalism
argues that 'As we learn more about ecology and of ways to preserve nature,
we should also learn the great value of diversity and seek to preserve
a diverse cultural heritage'. The analogy here between the preservation
of nature and that of culture is telling. As we have already seen, the
concept of race arises through the naturalisation of social differences.
Regarding cultural diversity in natural terms can only ensure that culture
acquires an immutable character, and hence becomes a homologue for race.
Multiculturalists would no doubt abhor the racist policies of apartheid.
But what links the two is a Romantic concept of human difference and the
desire to understand better other cultures so as to preserve more effectively
the differences.
In this chapter I want to examine the key role played
by anthropologists in popularising the understanding of culture as an immutable,
inflexible essence and to explain how the anthropological concept of culture
came to be the cornerstone of
antiracist discourse....
The central figure in the story of the making of
twentieth-century cultural anthropology is the German-American, Franz Boas.
It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of Boas, not simply on
anthropology, but on our everyday perceptions of race, culture and difference.
Contemporary ideas such as multiculturalism, pluralism, respect for other
cultures, and belief in the importance of tradition and history are all
significant themes in Boas' work.... The legacy of Boas remains, however,
an ambiguous one. Boas certainly played a prominent part in the replacement
of racial theories of human difference with cultural theories, and
in so doing helped undermine the power of scientific racism. Yet the concept
of culture that he helped develop to a large extent rearticulated the themes
of racial theory in a different guise. Influenced both by the German Romantic
tradition and by a liberal, egalitarian outlook, the problem facing Boas,
notes George Stocking, was how to define the Romantic notion of 'the genius
of the people' in terms other than racial heredity. His answer, ultimately,
was the anthropological idea of culture.
Born in Germany, Boas emigrated to America in 1887
after completing his studies in physics at the universities of Heidelberg,
Bonn, Kiel and Berlin. His shift from physics to anthropology coincided
with his emigration from Germany. As a physicist Boas had made a field
trip to the Arctic to study colour perception among the Eskimos. He related
in a letter the impact of meeting 'savages':
I often ask myself what advantages our 'good society' possesses
over that of the 'savages'. The more I see of their customs, the more I
realise that we have no right to look down on them. Where amongst our people
would you find such hospitality?... We have no right to blame them for
their forms and superstitions which may seem ridiculous to us. We 'highly
educated people' are much worse, relatively speaking ... As a thinking
person, for me the most important result of this trip lies in the strengthening
of my point of view that the idea of a 'cultured' person is merely relative
and that a person's worth should be judged by his Herzensbildung
(lit: education of the heart).'
We can see here Boas's characteristic philosophical egalitarianism and
cultural relativism. We can also see that these characteristics arise largely
from his disillusionment with the values of 'our "good society"'. It was
this disillusionment with the modes of modernity that fuelled Boas's philosophy
all his life. It was the root of the ambiguity in his treatment of the
idea of culture. The egalitarianism that arose out of the Enlightenment
was positive and forward-looking. The philosophes held that social progress
could overcome artificial divisions and differences and reveal our essential
commonality. Boas's egalitarianism arose, on the contrary, from the belief
that such progress was not possible. Humanity was equal not because differences
could be overcome but because every difference was equally valid. For Boas,
then, 'equality' meant the acceptance of the actual inequalities of society
but the regarding of these inequalities as different manifestations of
a common humanity....
...[In his 1911 book The Mind of Primitive Man]
Boas is not contesting the concept of race, nor the division of humanity
into different races. He is contesting, rather, the basis on which such
division occurs, arguing that biological races differ from linguistic and
cultural races and that the three categories should not be confused or
conflated....
The second major theme in The Mind of Primitive
Man was a critique of hierarchical theories of race. The claims for
the superiority of the white, or Anglo-Saxon, race were, Boas argued, scientifically
spurious. The mental capacities of all human beings were fundamentally
similar. Boas believed that 'the organisation of mind is practically identical
among all races of man; that mental activity follows the same laws everywhere,
but that its manifestations depend upon the character of individual experience
that is subjected to the action of these laws'.
This sounds like the pure milk of Enlightenment
universalism. But there was a fundamental difference between the argument
put forward by Boas and that of an Enlightenment anthropologist such as
Degerando. The Enlightenment philosophes (and later anthropologists
influenced by this tradition, such as E. B. Tylor) posited the psychic
unity of humankind on the grounds that all human beings were rational.
Only in certain circumstances, however, was this rationality allowed to
come to fruition.... In other words, for Tylor 'primitive man' reasoned
soundly from false premises. As knowledge increased, premises became more
sound and progress took place on a rational or scientific basis. For Boas,
on the other hand, belief in the equality of 'primitive' and 'civilised'
man rested to a large extent on his belief that 'civilised man' had a limited
grasp of reason. Whereas Tylor regarded primitive folklore as originally
rational in origin, but surviving as irrational custom, Boas... saw the
culture of advanced peoples as folklore, unconscious in origin but central
to the maintenance of society through its rationalisation of traditional
forms of behaviour. Even scientific thought, for Boas, was analogous to
the thought processes of 'primitive man.'
Enlightenment thinkers had seen human beings as
conscious, creative subjects constantly making and remaking the world around
them. In the hands of nineteenth-century social evolutionists this argument
had become a rationale for 'race'. The creativity of humankind, they argued,
meant that all societies independently created their own customs and culture.
The fact, then, that some societies were more advanced than others meant
that some were naturally more creative than others, that less-advanced
societies were retarded on the social evolutionary scale.
Boas tackled the racist logic of the social evolutionists
by denying the creative aspects of humanity. Human beings were, for Boas,
essentially uninventive. Their creativity was expressed not in independent
invention but in the manipulation and reinterpretation of elements given
to them by their cultural tradition, or borrowed from other cultural traditions.
Important consequences flowed from these differences
in approach to human reason and creativity. In the Enlightenment tradition,
the application of reason to social problems helped dissolve human differences
and ensure that even those considered 'primitive' could enter the highest
reaches of civilisation. This was the transformative content of Enlightenment
universalism. This was taken furthest in the works of Marx, for
whom the transformative nature of conscious activity acted as the link
between the particular and the universal. For Marx human beings were conscious,
active subjects making and remaking the world around them. The process
of transforming society was also the process of overcoming parochialism
and division and of revealing the commonality of humanity.
For Boas, however, customs, rituals and habits were
of vital importance in the maintenance of societies. Culture was synonymous
not so much with conscious activity as with unconscious tradition. He drew
on the Romantic vision of culture as heritage and habit, the role of which
was to allow the past to shape the present. Tradition and history moulded
an individual's behaviour to such an extent that 'we cannot remodel, without
serious emotional resistance, any of the fundamental lines of thought and
action which are determined by our early education, and which form the
subconscious basis of all our activities.' Learned 'less by instruction
than imitation', cultural mores 'constitute the whole series of well-established
habits according to which the necessary actions of every day life are performed'.
'The idea of culture', observes [George] Stocking, 'which once connoted
all that freed men from the blind weight of tradition, was now identified
with that very burden, and that burden was seen as functional to the continuing
daily existence of individuals in any culture and at every level of civilisation.'
For Boas, then, the particularity of cultures was
essential in maintaining social stability. Every society had developed
its own habits, rituals and cultural forms which helped integrate individuals
and gave them a means to relate to each other and to the outside world.
Boas suggests that culture has an adaptive function and that social change
and progress could be harmful both to the individual and to society. It
was an argument that harked back to Burke, Coleridge, de Maistre and other
conservative critics of the French Revolution who believed that the social
forces unleashed by the revolutionary change undermined the essential props
of both the individual and society. This argument was given new shape in
the early part of this century through the work of the French sociologist,
Emile Durkheim.
Durkheim considered social facts to be objective
phenomena which should be considered on their own terms. Social phenomena
existed prior to any individual and exercised a constraint upon his behaviour.
Cultural habits and customs existed before the birth of an individual and
survived his death. Individuals did not freely choose a culture but were
compelled to adopt one. Cultural traits were neither accidental nor incidental.
Every custom and habit had a function in society and was necessary for
its survival. Even crime was necessary to society, since, by dramatising
deviance and retribution, it strengthened the sentiments which supported
the moral order. Central to this approach was the concept of 'collective
representation', by which Durkheim meant the beliefs, values and symbols
that were common to any particular society. Collective representations
served as a means of picturing the world meaningfully to members of that
particular social group. For Durkheim, individuals' modes of thinking and
feeling were shaped by such collective representations imposed on them
by their society.
Collective representations were rational by relative
rather than absolute standards - they were appropriate in so far as they
served to motivate individuals to play their proper social roles. There
could not be any other way for individuals in a particular society to make
sense of the world. For Durkheim dilferent people inhabited different symbolic
worlds of meaning, each as real and as true as any other. From the viewpoint
of one culture, the ideas and mores of another may have seemed backward
or irrational. But this was only because the collective representations
of one culture - the means through which people in that culture make sense
of the world - were necessarily different from those of another culture.
In other words, the ways and beliefs of each culture were rational in their
own terms, but necessarily irrational in terms of a differing culture.
The logic of such an argument was that a particular culture could be comprehensible
only to those who were an organic part of it.
Society, for Durkheim, was essentially a moral order.
The preservation this order depended upon the maintenance of sentiments
of social solidarity, and the embedding into the individual of the values
and norms of that society through collective representations - or culture.
Cultural change could therefore lead to social breakdown. From a functionalist
point of view it was necessary to maintain the particularities of any culture
- from tribal customs to traditional food habits, from religious rituals
to political procedures - if social anarchy was to be averted. This inevitably
led to a static, and conservative, view of social development.
III. Manuel on German versus
French Views of "Philosophical History"
From the intellectual historian
Frank
Manuel's Shapes of Philosophical History
(?1965). Here, he primarily contrasts French enlightenment thought with
German early 19th thought associated with idealism and romanticism.
Crossing the Rhine [from France to Germany] one
is immediately struck by a different temper among the philosophers of history.
The Germans were either pastors like Herder, sons of pastors like Lessing,
or state university professors like Kant and Hegel. Germany was economically
weak and politically divided, and despite the respectable positions occupied
by the pastors and professors in their isolated principalities, they never
presumed to exert direct influence on the external world of public affairs.
At most they were educators. The philosophies of history they wrote were
treatises that, by describing how the human species was fashioned in time,
aimed to mold the inner beings of their students and their small literate
public. Among the German pastors the militancy of a Luther had long since
died. And in the university the distinction between the vita activa
and
the vita contempletiva was absolute... the contemporary activism
of the American professoriat and its direct manipulation of power would
not be the least astonishing aspect of our way of life. German philosophical
discussions, even after the appearance of Marx, were remote from immediate
political and social reality, and perhaps this very circumstance rendered
them what Nietzsche would call interessant, in an interesting condition,
pregnant with novel ideas. Political dormancy made the Germans more speculative
and imaginative, less cut-and-dried, and often less sensible than their
French counterparts.
The German style of philosophical history faithfully
records the mood of these doctors of the inner life. In effect, the religious
spirit of Luther - not his political activism - informs virtually all the
works of the Germans. While the French wrote a secular history of man's
expanding capacities and his outward achievements, the Germans composed
a history of introverted man, a Protestant world history....
The French philosophers of history concentrate on
the novelties; they revel in the material conquests and in the new acquisitions.
They take a Baconian delight in sheer accumulation and in the variety of
objects. They enjoy what Montesquieu called Le bonheur de l'existence.
For
the Germans, who made world history into a Bildungsroman, the education
of the human race was no lark. There is throughout these writings a sense
of the pain and anguish of growth. They were dealing with a refractory
pupil who kicked against the pricks and learned only through punishment.
Man refuses to quit his minority, lamented Kant, anticipating Freud. The
Germans were always conscious of the bloody travail of history. While among
most of the French the philosopher's eye was focused on the growing ease
and the new rationality, the Germans, even the secularists among them,
were weighed down by a sense of inborn evil. The baubles of French civilization
they rejected with the moral righteousness of a Rousseau repudiating the
arts and sciences. For the Germans history had one meaning: the hard-won
battle for consciousness, which is Hegel's Spirit, or the struggle for
liberty, which even in Kant is not far removed from Luther's Christian
liberty....
...The Latin nations were formed by an admixture
of Latin and German blood, according to Hegel [c. 1820]. And because
of this miscegenation, they are not an appropriate, fitting abode for the
highest form of Spirit. How readily Absolute Spirit can backslide to a
Blut
und Boden theory!
Here Hegel closely approaches Herder [c.
1790], though he rarely mentions him. Herder too identified creativity
with Volk
purity. In describing world-history the Germans regard
the moments of intermingling as the ugly ones, for they give birth to half-breeds.
In virtually all philosophical history those who concentrate exclusively
on the abstraction of a nation or a culture or a civilization or a race
as the organic historical unit of discourse have a fatal tendency to regard
any intermixture as poisoning, corrupting, and diluting. The number of
such theories is legion: in Gobineau's doctrine racial contamination later
became the historical event that directly determined decay and destruction.
Hegel rejected the Latin nations, not only because they failed to achieve
"innerness," but because they were mongrel and polluted.
Perhaps the character of this German form of philosophical
history is again best brought out by contrast with the sensationalist or
arithmetic progressivism of the Turgot-Condorcet type [i.e., French,
1750-1790]. They are opposites. In the French system a closed or isolated
culture is in continuous peril of stultification; the rut of sameness is
mortal. The multiplication of communications, the creation of new relationships
is the key to new perceptions, hence to new ideas. Endless novelty invites
new impressions and discoveries. The French look upon cross-fertilization
as the highest good, productive of science, technology, and ultimately
moral perfectibility. The Germans, on the other hand, tend to view cross-fertilization
as destructive of values, style, identity, structure, growth. The intrusion
from the outside is alien, unnatural, inimical to form and cohesiveness.
German race theories did not need to await the new biology; they had already
acquired philosophical roots in the conceptualization of culture itself
in Herder and Hegel....
Since the French saw man as endlessly malleable
and his reason easily amenable to novelty, a long hiatus between the discovery
of a new truth and its implementation in history was not inherently necessary.
The speed of change depended on the wills of men, which could be rationally
organized for maximum effectiveness; progress could be accelerated through
reform. The French philosophes from Turgot down, with their geometric
pattern of enlightenment - blocks of darkness that presented danger and
of light that in time would penetrate the black - expected this conversion
of superstition to scientism to take place as painlessly and as fast as
possible. Even Auguste Comte, the Frenchman most committed to a stadial
theory, nevertheless argued in the Positive Polity that the contemporary
savage world could rapidly advance from fetishism to scientism (naturally
under the appropriate tutelage of Parisians), skipping the intermediate
stages through which Western Europe had passed because the universal progressist
model had already been set.
Beginning with Herder, German philosophical history
was bound to a slow genetic sense of time. Benign transformations in national
genius had sometimes taken place through the penetration of its hard core,
but only with the passage of ages. For each being, each Volk, for
mankind itself, there was an ordained time-span of growth and decay, and
there was no way that organized wills could affect this biological life-process....
French philosophy of history deals with events and
actions; German, with the soul. Though both use a terminology that betrays
a common Christian origin, the French wrote a history of the achievements
of the mind and humanity (to amend Condorcet), the Germans a history of
Spirit itself, for which men and their deeds are only vessels. Perhaps
in their contrasting sense of historical time do we finally perceive the
most fundamental difference between the French and the German schools -
French progress is continuous and subject to rapid change, German is discontinuous
in its leaps and beyond human will to alter. I would even hazard the reflection
that sciences of man, down to our own day, called upon to depict process
in time - whether economic growth or child development - find themselves
forced to choose between these two modes developed by French and German
philosophical history.
IV. Adams on German Historical Particularism
From William Y. Adams' (1998) The
Philosophical Roots of Anthropology. These
quotes are taken from scattered pages in his chapter on German Idealism,
so the choppiness is mine, not his.
The philosophy of history developed by the Germans
has been labeled both as rationalist and as progressivist, inviting comparison
in both respects with the Enlightenment traditions of France and Scotland.
But the comparison obscures more than it clarifies, for both rationality
and progress meant something very different to the Germans than they did
to the French and the Scots. The historical outlook of the French, and
to a lesser extent of the Scots, was societal, pragmatic, and to a considerable
degree materialist, while that of the Germans was individualist and mentalist....
In the French and Scottish schemes reason was primarily a means to practical
ends, while to the Germans it was always an end in itself.
The difference was also, and importantly, one between
a world in being and a world in becoming - a philosophical distinction
originally noted by the Germans themselves....
The concept of Geist (usually translated
as 'spirit') was widely employed by the Aufklarung philosophers, but they
never attempted to define it systematically. They used it variously to
mean the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist), national character (Volksgeist),
the
spirit of groups or corporations (Gesellschaftsgeist), the spirit
of events (Geist der Begebenheiten), or the overall driving force
of human creativity (unmodified Geist). As we saw a little earlier,
it was the dynamic tension between these sometimes conflicting forces that
was seen as propelling history forward.
The Geist concept was invoked by the German Enlightenment
philosophers mainly in their attempt to define the German Self: to identify
the essential factor that made Germans different from other Europeans.
They did not apply it in a systematic way to anyone but themselves and
their own historical predecessors. They nevertheless laid the foundation
for a more general cultural particularism and relativism, when later philosophers
began to apply the Geist concept to all of the world's peoples and cultures....
[T]he undoubted father of German Historical Particularism
as an articulate philosophy was Johann Gottfried Herder, another
onetime pupil of Kant. Herder's contribution to the subsequent development
of German Idealism has been vastly underrated, both in his own country
and abroad. There are probably several reasons for this neglect. To begin
with, his published oeuvre is massive, muddled, and frequently obscure:
Rationalism and Mysticism, Progressivism and Primitivism, Deism and Agnosticism
seem to tumble over one another in a disorderly progression in his pages.
There is, consequently, no one clearcut philosophical message. It is possible
to cite specific passages to show that Herder was for or against almost
anything....
Herder's main ideas that are relevant to us here
were set forth in his four-volume Ideen zur Philosophie der Menschengeschichte
(Ideas
about the Philosophy of the History of Mankind), published between 1784
and 1791. Here, as everywhere in his writing, his message was not entirely
clear or consistent, so that he has been identified at times both as a
racist and an antiracist, a progressivist and an antiprogressivist. He
was adamant in condemning the conventional racial typologies of his time,
yet he believed at least to some extent in the genetic inheritance of cultural
characteristics - the Geist of each culture....
In Herder's scheme, the first, relatively brief
stage of history was the time between the first appearance of man and the
emergence of regionally differentiated cultures; the time when there was,
in effect, a single, worldwide prehistoric culture. The second and by far
the longest stage, which Herder called the Volk stage, comprised
the familiar world divided into separate peoples with separate languages
and traditions. The third stage, brief and as yet incomplete, was marked
by the gradual worldwide spread of modern Western civilization, which would
eventuate once again in a single, worldwide culture. Herder called this
the Historical stage because, in his view, Volk cultures were in a state
of timeless equilibrium, and therefore had no historical self-consciousness.
Whatever Herder's historical vision may have been,
it was always the Volk that captured his strongest sympathies and interest.
His use of the term, as of most other terms, was not entirely clear or
consistent. It referred to all of the world's peoples before the rise of
Western industrial civilization, but also at times to the less educated
elements that persisted within the European societies of his own time.
In other words, the Volk concept lumped together primitives, peasants,
and proletarians - a conjunction that was also commonly made by progressivists
in the eighteenth century....
In sum, Volk-ness was an evolutionary stage defined
not by material circumstances but by a particular mind-set, which had been
characteristic of all mankind during most of its history, and which still
persisted among all but the educated elites in European countries. It was
the mind-set characterized by a timeless, nonreflective adherence to traditions
- the Volksgeist - that had arisen through the conjunction of man's creative
imagination and the environmental and climatic conditions peculiar to each
region. Herder's distinction between the Volk and the "historic" mindsets
clearly anticipates the distinction later made by Ferdinand Tonnies between
Gemeinschaft
and
Gesellschaft,
and
also Levy-Bruhl's distinction between the prelogical primitive mentality
and the logical civilized mentality....
While the identification of Herder as the father
of anthropology has not been widely acknowledged within the profession,
he undoubtedly deserves recognition as the modern-day father of Cultural
Relativism. Indeed his commitment to this doctrine was adamant: he spoke
out repeatedly and vehemently against all forms of colonialism, imperialism,
and slavery. "O man, honor thyself; neither the pongo nor the gibbon are
thy brother: the american and the negro are: these therefore thou shouldst
not oppress, or murder or steal; for they are men, like thee...." More
broadly, Herder may be identified also as the father of the concept of
cultures
in
the specific, plural sense, as opposed to culture
in the generic
sense....
In the later nineteenth century German Historical
Particularism developed in two rather different directions, which I will
here call German Nationalism and Ethnic Idealism. German Nationalism was
the ideology driving the unification of the many German kingdoms in the
1860s and 70s. It was a thoroughly statist and chauvinist doctrine, emphasizing
not only the distinctness of the Germans but also their superiority over
other peoples, and their historically ordained destiny to rule over non-Germans.
This doctrine evolved through Hegel, Nietzsche, and Kossina into the excesses
of Nazism. Ethnic Idealism on the other hand was egalitarian and nonstatist:
the Germans served merely to exemplify the historical and cultural uniqueness
of all Volker. If the cultural autonomy of the Germans entitled
them to aspire toward political unity and autonomy; so also did the cultural
autonomy of all other peoples. Evolving through the works of Herder, Windelband,
and Dilthey, the ethnic idealist position gave birth in time to the morphological
school of biology, to Gestalt psychology, to the historicist movement in
history, and to the semisacred doctrine of Cultural Relativism in anthropology.
Throughout the nineteenth century German particularism
found expression not only in the tomes of the philosophers, but also in
the work of the German ethnologists and ethnographers....
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