Philosophy 128g, Lecture Notes, Part I. [© Robert DiSalle 2001]

[N.B. These are intended as a guide to the readings and to the most important themes of the course. They are not intended to be, by themselves, a sufficient resource for studying for the exam.]

Introduction: General philosophical questions raised by and about psychoanalysis.

1. The status of Freud's theory as a "science."

1.1 To what extent can there be any science, Freudian or otherwise, of human mental and emotional life? If human mentality is motivated and determined by reasons, does this place it beyond the grasp of any analysis of causes? Is the idea of interpreting human thought and action incompatible with the idea of giving it a causal explanation?

1.2. Assuming that it is appropriate to expect psychiatry to be a natural science, does Freud's theory qualify as a science ?

What, in general, qualifies a theory as scientific?

Why did Freud think that psychoanalysis is a science?

1.2.1. It was supposed to bring the study and treatment of hysteria out of the realm of superstition and into the realm of medical science: hysteria would be regarded as a specific medical condition with specific causes, not as some kind of personal defect for which women could be judged or blamed.

1.2.2. The causes of hysteria could be comprehended within the natural-scientific picture of causality, based on the physical model of energy-flow and the biological model of evolution. Psychoanalysis would be a part of the "scientific Weltanschauung" (world-picture). This would mean that, like physical processes, the psychic processes involved in hysteria would follow deterministic laws.

1.2.3. The basis for the theory would be "clinical observation," particularly of the neurotic symptoms including dreams and slips of the tongue. The method of "free association" would guarantee that the patient reveals the true connections between conscious thoughts and the unconscious memories that are supposed to be their ultimate source.

2. Some familiar reasons offered against regarding psychoanalysis as a science:

2.1. It refers to what is unobservable (the unconscious, the Id, etc.). A scientific psychology would be based on directly observable phenomena, such as behavior.

2.2. It is unfalsifiable. Scientific theories are logically committed to certain predictions, and the failure of those predictions means a failure of the theory. (It doesn't mean anything to say that the evidence agrees with the theory, if it's impossible to imagine any evidence that could conflict with it.) But psychoanalysis can interpret any imaginable behaviour and any possible therapeutic outcome. Therefore it is not really a scientific theory.

2.3. The "hermeneutic" view of psychoanalysis: Psychoanalysis should not be a science, because it deals in interpretation, not causal explanation. The correctness of interpretation can only be judged by the patient, not by the canons of scientific evidence.

3. The philosophical background to Freud (i.e. Currents of thought in the late 19th century that were crucial to the development of Freud's theory)

3.1. The theory of evolution

Darwinian theory: Blind variation in inherited traits of offspring, combined with selective retention by environmental pressures ("natural selection"), leads to gradual changes of species over time.

Lamarckian theory: Traits acquired by individuals, through efforts to adapt, can be inherited ("inheritance of acquired characteristics").

3.2. Physical determinism: all natural processes, including biological an psychological ones, are in principle understandable as conforming to the laws of physics.

Epistemological dimension: To understand a natural phenomenon is to subsume it under some set of deterministic laws from which we could predict that phenomenon. (Explanation and prediction are said to be symmetrical, on this point of view: To predict a phenomenon we have to be able to deduce logically that it will occur, given the relevant laws of nature and the required initial conditions. To explain the same phenomenon, after it has occurred, we have to be able to state the laws of nature and initial conditions from which we could have deduced its occurrence beforehand.

Metaphysical dimension: If we can understand and predict psychological phenomena through deterministic laws (e.g. Physical laws), then we have reason to think that these phenomena are reducible to physics--i.e. That a psychological system really is a physical system.

3.3. Conservation of energy: Energy cannot be created or destroyed in any natural process. Biological (and by extension psychological) processes do not involve any fundamentally different form of energy, and so this law must constrain them as well.

3.4. Materialism: All natural phenomena are based on the interactions of matter; mental events in particular arise from these same interactions. Obviously this is closely related to determinism.