Philosophy of science 134E
Instructor: Christian Lacroix
Nov. 18, 2004
Lakatos
Argues for a solution to the demarcation problem by using the notion of research program.

Lakatos’ view
The scientific status of a research programme does not depend on confirmation.
	Popper is right that confirmation is all too easy to get.
So Lakatos’ view goes against the sophisticated inductionists.

The scientific status of a research programme does not depend on being falsifiable but not yet falsified.
	- All research programmes face some anomalies, yet are not abandoned.
	- There is no crucial experiment.
So Lakatos’ view goes against Popper’s falsificationism.

If scientific revolutions are not brought about by falsification, does it mean that they are irrational (as Kuhn says)?

The rational of scientific revolutions is that scientists tend to prefer progressive research programmes over degenerative ones.
	- Kuhn is wrong that scientific revolutions are sudden, irrational changes in 	vision.
Thus Lakatos’ view goes against Kuhn’s.

Good points of Lakatos’ model
1- A research programme can be more or less progressive.
2- A progressive research programme can eventually become degenerative, and conversely.
3- Fits better the history of science than inductivism or falsificationism.
4- Preserves the rationality of science.

Problems with Lakatos’ model
1- To be a progressive research programme implies the notion of confirmation.
To be progressive, a research programme must make novel and unexpected predictions.
But not just any novel predictions will make a programme progressive: only the predictions that turn out right.
To make a prediction that turn out right is to gain confirmation, according to the sophisticated inductivists.

2- To be a degenerative research programme is equivalent to being either unscientific or falsified for Popper.
A RP is degenerative when it is not making novel predictions (i.e., is unscientific), or when these predictions turn out wrong (i.e., is falsified).

3- Lakatos’ model does not solve the Duhem problem, which in turn questions the rationality of science.
To say that there are no crucial experiments is to accept the Duhem problem, but the Duhem problem means that rejecting a theory is not completely rational.

Lakatos – Conclusion
Lakatos’ model represents a good synthesis of the views of the sophisticated inductivists, Popper, and Kuhn.
However, it does not really solve any of the most important problems plaguing these views.

Kuhn’s classic view
Kuhn (1962) is famous for arguing that:
	Science is not cumulative;
	There is no scientific method;
	There is no objective way to evaluate evidence in favour of, or against, a theory.
In short, science is essentially irrational.

This view has been taken to imply relativism about scientific knowledge.
	Scientific relativism: the idea that the ‘truths’ of scientific theories are determined 	in whole or in part by social forces.
The social constructivists and many post-modernists thinkers are strong partisans of scientific relativism.

Kuhn revisited
In his later work, Kuhn sought to distance himself from the most extreme view which gives absolutely no role to rationality in science. (e.g., his 1973/77)
He suggests that there are five core values common to all paradigms.

Five criteria for a good scientific theory
1- A theory should be empirically accurate within its domain.
2- A theory should be consistent with other accepted theories.
3- A theory should be wide in scope and not just accommodate the facts it was designed to explain.
4- A theory should be as simple as possible.
5- A theory should be fruitful in the sense of providing a framework for ongoing research.

Problems with these criteria
1- These criteria are imprecise
	E.g., what does “simple” really mean?
2- The criteria can conflict with one another
	E.g., what if we must choose between a simple but narrow in scope theory, and a 	wide in scope but more complex theory?

Consequence of these problems
Because of these problems, two scientists equally committed to these criteria can differ in their interpretation of which theory is the better one.

What is going to make them put more emphasis on some criteria rather than on others are individual historical factors.
	E.g., past training and experience, social and cultural factors, personality, etc.

Kuhn revisited – Conclusion
Scientific change is determined by both objective and subjective factors.
In his earlier work, Kuhn was only putting more emphasis on the subjective factors because they had been neglected before.

Does this make scientific change rational?