Our point is not to celebrate such networks over more exclusively identitarian social movements or group-based claims. Networks are no more intrinsically virtuous than identitarian movements, and groups are intrinsically suspect. Politics—in southern Africa or elsewhere—is hardly a confrontation of good universalists or good networks versus bad tribalists. Much havoc has been done by flexible networks built on clientage and focused on pillage and smuggling; such networks have sometimes been linked to "principled" political organizations; and they have often been connected to arms and illegal merchandise brokers in Europe, Asia, and North America. Multifarious particularities are in play, and one needs to distinguish between situations where they cohere around particular cultural symbols and situations where they are flexible, pragmatic, readily extendable. It does not contribute to precision of analysis to use the same words for the extremes of reification and fluidity, and everything in between.

To criticize the use of *identity* in social analysis is not to blind ourselves to particularity. It is rather to conceive of the claims and possibilities that arise from particular affinities and affiliations, from particular commonalities and connections, from particular stories and self-understandings, from particular problems and predicaments in a more differentiated manner. Social analysis has become massively, and durably, sensitized to particularity in recent decades; and the literature on identity has contributed valuably to this enterprise. It is time now to go beyond identity—not in the name of an imagined universalism, but in the name of the conceptual clarity required for social analysis and political understanding alike.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

4 Globalization

There are two problems with the concept of globalization, first the "global," and second the "-ization." The implication of the first is that a single system of connection—notably through capital and commodities markets, information flows, and imagined landscapes—has penetrated the entire globe, and the implication of the second is that it is doing so now, that this is the global age. There are certainly those, not least of them the advocates of unrestricted capital markets, who claim that the world should be open to them, but that does not mean that they have gotten their way. But many critics of market tyranny, social democrats who lament the alleged decline of the nation-state, and people who see the eruption of particularism as a counterreaction to market homogenization give the boasts of the globalizers too much credibility. Crucial questions don't get asked: about the limits of interconnection, about the areas where capital cannot go, and about the specificity of the structures necessary to make connections work.

Behind the globalization fad is an important quest for understanding the interconnectedness of different parts of the world, for explaining new mechanisms shaping the movement of capital, people, and culture, and for exploring institutions capable of regulating such transnational movement. What is missing in discussions of globalization today is the historical depth of interconnections and a focus on just what the structures and limits of the connecting mechanisms are. It is salutary to get away from whatever tendencies there may have been to analyze social, economic, political, and cultural processes as if they took place in national or continental containers; but to adopt a language that implies that there is no container at all, except the planetary one, risks defining problems in misleading ways. The world has long has been—and still is—a space where economic and political relations are very uneven; it is filled with lumps, places where power coalesces

surrounded by those where it does not, places where social relations become dense amid others that are diffuse. Structures and networks penetrate certain places and do certain things with great intensity, but their effects tail off elsewhere.

Specialists on Africa, among others, have been drawn into the globalization paradigm, positing "globalization" as a challenge that Africa must meet or else as a construct through which to understand Africa's place in a world whose boundaries are apparently becoming more problematic. My concern here is with seeking alternative perspectives to a concept that emphasizes change over time but remains ahistorical, and which seems to be about space, but which ends up glossing over the mechanisms and limitations of spatial relationships. Africanists, I argue, should be particularly sensitive to the time depth of cross-territorial processes, for the very notion of *Africa* has itself been shaped for centuries by linkages within the continent and across oceans and deserts—by the Atlantic slave trade, by the movement of pilgrims, religious networks, and ideas associated with Islam, by cultural and economic connections across the Indian Ocean. The concept cannot, I will also argue, be salvaged by pushing it backward in time, for the histories of the slave trade, colonization, and decolonization, as well as the travails of the era of structural adjustment fit poorly in any narrative of globalization—unless one so dilutes the term that it becomes meaningless. To study Africa is to appreciate the long-term importance of the exercise of power across space, but also the limitations of such power. The relevance of this history today lies not in assimilation of old (colonial) and new (global) forms of linkages but in the lessons it provides about both the importance and the boundedness of long-distance connections. Historical analysis does not present a contrast between a past of territorial boundedness and a present of interconnection and fragmentation, but rather a back-and-forth, varied combination of territorializing and deterritorializing tendencies.

Today, friends and foes of globalization debate "its" effects. Both assume the reality of such a process, which can either be praised or lamented, encouraged or combated.[1] Are we asking the best questions about issues of contemporary importance when we debate globalization? Instead of assuming the centrality of a powerful juggernaut, might we do better to define more precisely what it is we are debating, to assess the resources possessed by institutions in different locations within patterns of interaction, to look toward traditions of transcontinental mobilization with considerable time depth?

Globalization is clearly a significant native's category for anyone studying contemporary politics. Anyone wishing to know why particular ideo-

logical and discursive patterns appear in today's conjuncture needs to examine how it is used. But is it also a useful analytic category? My argument here is that it is not. Scholars who use it analytically risk being trapped in the very discursive structures they wish to analyze. Most important in the term's current popularity in academic circles is how much it reveals about the poverty of contemporary social science faced with processes that are large-scale, but not universal, and with the fact of crucial linkages that cut across state borders and lines of cultural difference but which nonetheless are based on specific mechanisms within certain boundaries. That global should be contrasted to local, even if the point is to analyze their mutual constitution, only underscores the inadequacy of current analytical tools to analyze anything in between.

Can we do better? I would answer with a qualified yes, but mainly if we seek concepts that are less sweeping, more precise, which emphasize both the nature of spatial linkages and their limits, which seek to analyze change with historical specificity rather than in terms of a vaguely defined and unattainable endpoint.

VIEWS OF GLOBALIZATION

The first style of talking about globalization can be termed the Banker's Boast. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the market orientation of Communist China, investments supposedly can go anywhere. Pressure from the United States, the IMF, and transnational corporations brings down national barriers to the movement of capital. This is in part an argument for a new regulatory regime, one which lowers barriers to capital flow as well as trade, and which operates on a global level. It is also an argument about discipline: the world market, conceived of as a web of transactions, now forces governments to conform to its dictates. Globalization is invoked time and time again to tell rich countries to roll back the welfare state and poor ones to reduce social expenditures—all in the name of the necessity of competition in a globalized economy.[2]

Next comes the Social Democrat's Lament. It accepts the reality of globalization as the bankers see it, but instead of claiming that it is beneficial for humankind, it argues the reverse. The social democratic left has devoted much of its energy to using citizenship to blunt the brutality of capitalism. Social movements thus aim for the nation-state—the institutional basis for enforcing social and civic rights. Whereas the enhanced role of the nation-state reflected organized labor's growing place within the polity, globalization has allegedly undermined the social project by marginalizing the

political one. In some renderings, globalization must therefore be fought, while in others, it has already triumphed and there is little to do except lament the passing of the nation-state, of national trade union movements, of empowered citizenries.[3]

Finally comes the Dance of the Flows and the Fragments. This argument accepts much of the other two—the reality of globalization in the present and its destabilizing effect on national societies—but makes another move. Rather than homogenize the world, globalization reconfigures the local— but not in a spatially confined way. People's exposures to media—to dress, to music, to fantasies of the good life—are highly fragmented; bits of imagery are detached from their context, all the more attractive because of the distant associations they evoke. Hollywood imagery influences people in the African bush; tropical exoticism sells on rue du Faubourg St. Honoré. This detachment of cultural symbolism from spatial locatedness paradoxically makes people realize the value of their cultural particularity. Hence, a sentimental attachment to "home" by migrants who don't live there but who contribute money and energy to identity politics. As flows of capital, people, ideas, and symbols move separately from one another, the dance of fragments takes place within a globalized, unbounded space.[4]

There is something in each of these conceptions. What is wrong with them is their totalizing pretensions and their presentist periodization. The relationship of territory and connectivity has been reconfigured many times; each deserves particular attention.[5] Changes in capital markets, transnational corporations, and communications in the last decades deserve careful attention, but one shouldn't forget the vast scale in which investment and production decisions were made by the Dutch East Indies Company—linking the Netherlands, Indonesia, and South Africa and connecting to ongoing trading networks throughout Southeast Asia—in the seventeenth century. Some scholars argue that the "really big leap to more globally integrated commodity and factor markets" was in the second half of the nineteenth century, that "world capital markets were almost certainly as well integrated in the 1890s as they were in the 1990s." Such arguments work better for OECD countries than elsewhere and do not adequately express qualitative change, but economic historians still stress that the great period of expansion of international trade, investment, and interdependence was the decades before 1913, followed by a dramatic loss of economic integration after 1913. For all the growth in international trade in recent decades, as a percentage of world GDP it has only barely regained levels found before World War I. Paul Bairoch finds a historical record of "fast internationalization alternating with drawback" rather than evidence

of "globalization as an irreversible movement." The extensive work now being done on specific patterns of production, trade, and consumption, on national and international institutions, and on existing and possible forms of regulation is salutary; however, fitting it all into an "-ization" framework puts the emphasis where it does not belong.[6]

The movement of people, as well as capital, reveals the lumpiness of cross-border connections, not a pattern of steadily increasing integration. The high point of intercontinental labor migration was the century after 1815. Now, far from seeing a world of lowering barriers, labor migrants have to take seriously what states can do. France, for example, raised its barriers very high in 1974, whereas in the supposedly less globalized 1950s Africans from French colonies, as citizens, could enter France and were much in demand in the labor market. Aside from family reconstitution, labor migrations to France have become "residual."[7] Clandestine migration is rampant, but the clandestine migrant cannot afford the illusion that states and institutions matter less than flows. Illegal (and legal) migration depends on networks that take people some places but not others. Other sorts of movements of people follow equally specific paths. Movements of diasporic Chinese within and beyond Southeast Asia is based on social and cultural strategies that enable mobile businessmen and migrating workers to adjust to different sovereignties while maintaining linkages among themselves. As Aihwa Ong argues, such movements do not reflect diminishing power of the states whose frontiers they cross or undermine those states; rather, such states have found new ways of exercising power over people and commodities.[8] We need to understand these institutional mechanisms, and the metaphor of global is a bad way to start.

The deaths of the nation-state and the welfare state are greatly exaggerated. The resources controlled by governments have never been higher. In OECD countries in 1965, governments collected and spent a little over 25 percent of GDP; this has increased steadily, reaching close to 37 percent in the supposedly global mid 1990s.[9] Welfare expenditures remain at all-time highs in France and Germany, where even marginal reductions are hotly contested by labor unions and social democratic parties and where even conservatives treat the basic edifice as a given. The reason for this is contrary to both the Bankers' Boast and the Social Democrat's Lament: politics. This point has been emphasized in regard to Latin America: both France and Brazil face tough international competition, but in France the welfare state can be defended within the political system, whereas in Brazil globalization becomes the rationale for dismantling state services and refraining from the obvious alternative—taxing the wealthy. In the more developed Latin

American countries, taxes as a percentage of GNP are less than half the levels of western Europe.[10] There are alternatives to acting in the name of globalization, which the Brazilian state has chosen not to pursue.

But one should not make the opposite mistake and assume that in the past the nation-state enjoyed a period of unchallenged salience and was the unquestioned reference point for political mobilization. Going back to the antislavery movements of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, political movements have been transnational, sometimes focused on the empire as a unit, sometimes on civilization, sometimes on a universalized humanity. Diasporic imaginations go far back too—the importance of deterritorialized conceptions of Africa to African Americans from the 1830s is a case in point.

What stands against globalization arguments should not be an attempt to stuff history back into national or continental containers. It will not fit. The question is whether the changing meaning over time of spatial linkages can be better understood in a some other way than globalization.

Globalization is itself a term whose meaning is not clear and over which substantial disagreements exist among those who use it. It can be used so broadly that it embraces everything and therefore means nothing, but for most writers, it carries a powerful set of images, if not a precise definition. Globalization talk takes its inspiration from the fall of the Berlin Wall, which offered the possibility or maybe the illusion that barriers to cross-national economic relations were falling. For friend and foe alike, the ideological framework of globalization is liberalism—arguments for free trade and free movement of capital. The imagery of globalization derives from the World Wide Web, the idea that a weblike connectivity of every site to every other site is a model for all forms of global communications. Political actors and scholars differ on "its" effects: diffusion of the benefits of growth versus increasing concentration of wealth, homogenization of culture versus diversification. But if the word means anything, it means expanding integration, and integration on a planetary scale. Even differentiation, the globalizers argue, must be seen in a new light, for the new emphasis on cultural specificity and ethnic identification differs from the old in that its basis now is juxtaposition, not isolation.

For all its emphasis on the newness of the last quarter century, the current interest in the concept of globalization recalls a similar infatuation in the 1950s and 1960s: modernization.[11] Both are "-ization" words, emphasizing a process, not necessarily fully realized but ongoing and probably inevitable. Both name the process by its supposed endpoint. Both were inspired by a clearly valid and compelling observation: that change is rapid

and pervasive. And both depend for their evocative power on a sense that change is not a series of disparate elements but their movement in a common direction. Modernization theory failed to do the job that theory is supposed to do, and its failure should be an illuminating one for scholars working in the globalization framework. Modernization theory's central argument was that key elements of society varied together and this clustering produced the movement from traditional to modern societies: from subsistence to industrial economies, from predominantly rural to predominantly urban societies, from extended to nuclear families, from ascriptive to achieved status, from sacred to secular ideologies, from the politics of the subject to the politics of the participant, from diffuse and multifaceted to contractual relationships (see chapter 5).

The flaws of modernization theory parallel those of globalization. The key variables of transition did not vary together, as much research has shown. Most important, modernization, like globalization, appears in this theory as a process that just happens, something self-propelled. Modernization talk masked crucial questions of the day: were its criteria Eurocentric, or even based on an idealized vision of what American society was supposed to be like? Was change along such lines just happening or was it being driven—by American military might or the economic power of capitalist corporations?

The contents of the two approaches are obviously different, and I do not wish to push the parallel beyond the observation that modernization and globalization represent similar stances in relation to broad processes. Both define themselves by naming a future as an apparent projection of a present, which is sharply distinguished from the past. For the social scientist, the issue is whether such theories encourage the posing of better, more precise questions or slip over the most interesting and problematic issues of our time.

CAPITALISM IN AN ATLANTIC SPATIAL SYSTEM—AND BEYOND

So let me start somewhere else, with C. L. R. James and Eric Williams.[12] These books are both solidly researched analyses, and they are political texts. I intend to talk about them in both senses, to emphasize how reading them allows us to juxtapose space and time in a creative way. James was born in the British colony of Trinidad in 1901. He was a Pan-Africanist and a Trotskyite, an activist in anti-imperialist movements in the 1930s that linked Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean. *Black Jacobins* (1938) was a his-

tory of the Haitian revolution, from 1791 to 1804, and it showed that in the eighteenth century as much as the twentieth economic processes and political mobilization both crossed oceans.

To James, slavery in the Caribbean was not an archaic system. The organizational forms that became characteristic of modern industrial capitalism—massed laborers working under supervision, time-discipline in cultivation and processing, year-round planning of tasks, control over residential as well as productive space—were pioneered on Caribbean sugar estates as much as in English factories. The slaves were African; the capital came from France; the land was in the Caribbean. Eric Williams, historian and later prime minister of Trinidad, elaborated the process by which the transatlantic connections were forged, arguing that the slave trade helped bring about capitalist development in England, eventually the industrial revolution.

Slavery was not new in Africa or in Europe. What was new was the interrelationship of Africa, Europe, and the Americas, which changed the way actors in all places acted, forced a change in scale, and gave a relentless logic to the expansion of the system into the nineteenth century.

When the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was being discussed in Paris, it did not occur to most participants that the categories might embrace people in the colonies. But colonials thought they did, first planters who saw themselves as property-owning Frenchmen, entitled to voice the interests of their colony vis-à-vis the French state, then the *gens de couleur*, property-owning people of mixed origin, who saw themselves as citizens too, irrespective of race. Then slaves became aware both of universalistic discourse about rights and citizenship coming from Paris and the weakening of the state as republicans, royalists, and different planters fought with each other. James stresses the "Jacobin" side of the rebellion: the serious debate in Paris over whether the field of application of the universal declaration was bounded or not, the seizure by slaves of this discourse of rights, the mixture of ideals and strategy that led a French governor to abolish slavery in 1793 and try to rally slaves to the cause of Republican France, and the multisided and shifting struggle of slave-led armies, full of alliances and betrayals, which ended in the independence of Haiti. He mentioned that two-thirds of the slaves at the time of the revolution were born in Africa, but he was not particularly interested in that fact or its implications.

The year of *Black Jacobins'* publication, 1938, was the centenary of Great Britain's decision to end the intermediary status ("apprenticeship") through which slaves passed as they were emancipated. The British gov-

ernment, which had for years emphasized its emancipatory history, now banned all celebrations of the centenary. A series of strikes and riots had taken place in the West Indies and central Africa between 1935 and 1938; celebrating emancipation might have called attention to the meagerness of its fruits. James brings this out in his text. His intervention tied a history of the liberation accomplished in 1804 to the liberation he hoped to see—in the British as well as in the French empires—in his own time.

His text had another significance. Haiti did not go down in history as the vanguard of emancipation and decolonization; it was for colonial elites the symbol of backwardness and for nineteenth-century abolitionists an embarrassment. James wanted to change that record, to make the Haitian revolution a modern uprising against a modern form of exploitation, the vanguard of a universal process. Michel-Rolph Trouillot has called attention to what James left out in order to do this, what he calls the "war within the war," another layer of rebellion by slaves of African origin who rejected the compromises the leadership was making—for it was seeking to preserve plantation production, some kind of state structure, and some kind of relationship with the French—all of which these slaves rejected. Trouillot notes that the upper class of Haiti likes to claim direct descent from the nationalists of 1791; to do so takes a willful act of silencing.[13]

In spite of all James left out for his 1938 purposes, he disrupts present-day notions of historical time and space in a fruitful way. The revolution happened too early. It began only two years after the storming of the Bastille. The nation-state was being transcended as it was being born; the universe to which the rights of man applied was extended even as those rights were being specified; slaves were claiming a place in the polity before political philosophers had decided whether they belonged; and transoceanic movements of ideas were having an effect while territorially defined social movements were still coming into their own. Many of the questions being debated in James's time were already posed, with great forcefulness, between 1791 and 1804. So too some of the questions James didn't want to pose, as Trouillot has reminded us.

Looking at 1791 and 1938 together allows us to see politics in cross-continental spatial perspective, not as a binary opposition of local authenticity against global domination, and to emphasize struggle over the meaning of ideas as much as their transmission across space. The French Revolution installed liberty and citizenship in the lexicon of politics, but it did not fix their meanings, the spatial limits of the concepts, or the cultural criteria necessary for their application. If some political currents (in 1791 or 2000) sought a narrow, territorially or culturally bounded definition of the

rights-bearing citizen, others (in 1791 or 2000) developed deterritorialized political discourses. This dialectic of territorialization and deterritorialization has undergone many shifts since then.

James's argument is an "Atlantic" one, Williams's as well. Both emphasize a specific set of connections, with worldwide implications to be sure, but whose historical actuality is more precisely rooted. The development of capitalism is at the core of their argument: capital formation via the African-European-American slave trade, the interconnectedness of labor supply, production, and consumption, and the invention of forms of work discipline in both field and factory. The struggle *against* this transoceanic capitalism was equally transoceanic.

Atlantic perspectives have been considerably extended via Sidney Mintz's analysis of the effects of Caribbean sugar on European culture, class relations, and economy, and Richard Price's studies about the cultural connections of the Caribbean world. Such studies do not point to the mere transmission of culture across space (as in other scholars' search for "African elements" in Caribbean cultures), but look instead at an intercontinental zone in which cultural inventiveness, synthesis, and adaptation take place, both reflecting and altering power relations.[14]

The Atlantic perspective does not necessarily have this ocean at its core. There were many shorelines and islands that were all but bypassed by the colonizing-enslaving-trading-producing-consuming system, even at its eighteenth-century peak. And there were places in other oceans (such as Indian Ocean sugar-producing islands) that were Atlantic in structure even if they were in another ocean. Powerful as the forces James and Williams wrote about, they had their histories, their limitations, their weaknesses. One can, as these authors show, write about large-scale, long-term processes without overlooking specificity, contingency, and contestation.

OCEANS, CONTINENTS, AND INTERTWINED HISTORIES

But the history of long-distance connections goes back farther than the history of capitalism centered in northwestern Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. Take the following sentence from an historian's article: "There have been few times in history when the world has been so closely interconnected—not only economically, but also in culture and tradition."[15] Is she writing about the globalization era of the late twentieth century? Actually, she is describing the Mongol empires of the fourteenth century: an imperial system stretching from China to central Europe, laced with trade routes and

featuring linked belief systems (a marriage of kinship and warrior ideology from East Asia and Islamic learning and law from western Asia), a balance of nomadic, agricultural, and urban economies, and a communications system based in relays of horsemen that kept the imperial center informed.

Analyzing regional connections and culture—in large empires or networks of trade and religious linkages—means coming to grips with the lumpiness of power and economic relations and the way such asymmetries shifted over time.[16] Attempts to posit a transition from multiple worlds to a single world system with a core and a periphery have been mechanistic and inadequate to understand the unevenness and the dynamics of such a spatial system. Rather than arguing for a sixteenth- or seventeenth-century world system—and then assigning causal weight to the logic of the system itself—one can argue that structures of power and exchange were not so global and not so systematic and that what was new was in the domain of political imagination.[17] With the widespread Portuguese and Dutch voyages and conquests, it became possible to think of the world as the ultimate unit of ambition and political and economic strategy. But it still required considerable scientific progress, in cartography for example, to give content to such imaginings, let alone to act on such a basis. The relationship among different regional trading systems, religious networks, projections of power, and geographical understandings presents a complex and highly uneven historical pattern.

Empires are a particular kind of spatial system, boundary-crossing and also bounded. There is now abundant scholarship on their ambiguity: their structure emphasizes difference and hierarchy, yet they also constituted a single political unit, and hence a potential unit of moral discourse. Jurists in Spain from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century debated the moral authority of an imperial ruler to subordinate certain subjects but not others, to take the land of some but not others. Imperial forces often recognized and profited from preexisting circuits of commerce, but they could also be threatened by networks they did not control and by the unpredictable effects of interaction between agents of empire and indigenous commercial and political actors. Empires generated creole societies that might distance themselves from the metropole even as they claimed "civilizational" authority by association with it.[18]

A seminal intervention into these issues—in some ways breathing new life into the James-Williams argument—comes from a historian of China, Kenneth Pomeranz. He notes that the economies of Europe and China before 1800 operated in quite different ways but that it makes little sense to say that one was better, more powerful, or more capable of investment and

innovation than the other. Instead of a single center of a world economy, he finds several centers with their own peripheries. The central regions in China and those in northwestern Europe were not notably unequal in their access to resources needed for industrialization. But after 1800, they diverged. He argues that different kinds of relations with regional peripheries shape this divergence. China's trading and political connections with Southeast Asia brought it into relationship with a periphery that was in many ways too similar: rice-growing, trade-oriented communities. European expansion, however, both built upon and built differentiation, in terms of ecology and in terms of labor. The slave plantation in European colonies developed resource complementarities with key regions in Europe that the Chinese empire could not emulate. China could not overcome resource blockages in food and fuel that the industrializing regions of Western Europe were able to surmount. The different forms of imperial projection—the specific blockages overcome or not overcome—shaped the divergence.[19]

Africa's place within such a picture is crucial: the possibility of moving—by force—labor from Africa to parts of the Americas (where indigenous populations had been marginalized or killed off) allowed European empires to develop labor complementarities and to turn land complementarities into something useable. African slaves grew sugar on Caribbean islands that supplied English workers with calories and stimulants. But how could such a frightful complementarity come about? Only with powerful commercial and navigational systems to connect parts of this Atlantic system. Only with an institutional apparatus—the colonial state—capable of backing up the coercive capability of individual Caribbean slave owners, of defining an increasingly racialized system of law that marked enslaved Africans and their descendants in a particular way, and of enforcing property rights across different parts of an imperial system, but whose power was vulnerable in ways James pointed out. Only by developing connections to African states, mostly unconquered, and African trading systems, and then by influencing those relationships in a powerful—and horrendous—manner.[20]

But to understand the contrast—and the interrelation—of coastal West Africa and the heartlands of capitalist agriculture and early industrialization in England, one must look at the ways in which production was organized, not just the way it fit into a wide spatial system. Marx stressed the importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of "primitive accumulation," the separation of producers from the means of production. It was this process that forced the possessors of land and the possessors of labor power to face each day the necessity to combine their assets with some degree of efficiency. Feudal landlords, slave owners, and peasants all

could respond—or not respond—to market incentives, but capitalists and workers were trapped.

One can argue that in most of Africa one is at the other extreme, and therefore Africa should play a crucial role in the study of capitalism, however paradoxical this might now appear. For a combination of social and geographic reasons, what Albert Hirschman calls the "exit option" was particularly open in Africa.[21] There were a few places with the resources for prosperity, but many places with adequate resources for survival, and corporate kinship structures made mobility into a collective process. Africa's islands of exploitation were linked by trading diasporas and other sociocultural linkages, so that movement and the juggling of alternative political and economic possibilities remained key strategies. This does not mean that Africa was a continent of tranquil villages, for efforts were being made to overcome precisely the challenges of kinship groups and physical dispersal. The would-be king tried to get hold of detached people—those who fell afoul of kinship group elders or those whose own groups had fallen apart—to build a patrimonial following. But anyone who built up land resources had to face the problem that laborers could flee or use their corporate strength to resist subordination. Expanding production often meant bringing in outsiders, often through enslavement. Power depended on controlling the external.

And here we have an intertwining of histories that cannot simply be compared. The British economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was prepared to use its overseas connections in a more dynamic way than had the Iberian imperialists of an earlier epoch. African kings were vulnerable at home and found strength in their external connections. The slave trade meant different things to different partners: for the African king it meant gaining resources (guns, metals, cloth and other goods with redistributive potential) by seizing someone else's human assets, rather than facing the difficulties of subordinating one's own population. Raiding slaves from another polity and selling them to an outside buyer externalized the supervision problem as well as the recruitment problem. Over time, the external market had increasing effects on the politics and economics of parts of West and Central Africa, effects that were unpredictable to the first rulers who became enmeshed in this transatlantic system. It fostered militarized states and more efficient slave-trading mechanisms. This militarization was, from the point of view of African participants in the process, an unintended consequence of the fatal intertwining: outlets for war captives created a new and insidious logic that began to drive the entire system of slave catching and slave marketing.

So while one set of structures were enhanced in Africa by the slave trade, another set—the "modern" institutions of production, commercialization, and capital movement described by James and Williams—developed between the Caribbean and Europe. The Atlantic system depended on the connection of vastly different systems of production and power and had different consequences for each point in the system.

When Europeans finally decided in the early nineteenth century that the slave trade was immoral, the odium of it was attached to Africans who continued to engage in such practices, and Africans moved from being the Enslavable Other to the Enslaving Other, an object for humanitarian denunciation and intervention.[22] What was most "global" in the nineteenth century was not the actual structure of economic and political interaction, but the language in which slavery was discussed by its opponents: a language of shared humanity and the rights of man, evoked by a transatlantic social movement that was both Euro-American and Afro-American. This language was used first to expunge an evil from European empires and the Atlantic system and, from the 1870s onward, to save Africans from their alleged tyranny toward each other. The actual impetus and mechanisms of European conquest were of course more particular than that. Colonial invasions entailed the concentration of military power in small spaces, the movement of colonial armies onward, and a strikingly unimpressive colonial capacity to exercise power systematically and routinely over the territories under European rule. A globalizing language stood alongside a structure of domination and exploitation that was lumpy to an extreme.

This is little more than a sketch of a complex history. From the sixteenth-century slave trade through the nineteenth-century period of imperialism in the name of emancipation, the interrelation of different parts of the world was essential to the histories of each part of it. But the mechanisms of interrelation were contingent and limited in their transformative capacity—as they still are. In that sense, the Atlantic system was not entirely systematic, nor was it an eighteenth-century "globalization."

DOING HISTORY BACKWARDS: COLONIZATION AND THE ANTECEDENTS OF GLOBALIZATION

Scholars working within globalization paradigms differ over whether the present should be considered the latest of a series of globalizations, each more inclusive than the last, or else a global age distinct from a past in which economic and social relations were contained within nation-states or em-

pires and in which interaction took place among such internally coherent units. Both conceptions share the same problem: writing history backwards, taking an idealized version of the "globalized present" and working backwards to show how everything either led up to it ("proto-globalization") or how everything, until the arrival of the global age itself, deviated from it. In neither version does one watch history unfold over time, producing dead ends as well as pathways leading somewhere, creating conditions and contingencies in which actors made decisions, mobilized other people, and took actions that both opened and constrained future possibilities.[23]

Let us take an example from where I left off in the last section: colonization by European powers in Africa in the late nineteenth century. At first glance, this fits a metahistory of integration—however ugly some of its forms may have been—of apparently isolated regions into what was becoming a singular, European-dominated globality.[24] Colonial ideologists themselves claimed that they were "opening" the African continent. But colonization does not fit the integrative imagery associated with globalization. Colonial conquests imposed territorial borders on long-distance trading networks within Africa and imposed monopolies on the growing external trade of this time, damaging or destroying more articulated trading systems crossing the Indian Ocean and the Sahara Desert and lining the West African coast. Africans were forced into imperial economic systems focused on a single European metropole. More profoundly, colonial territories were highly disarticulated politically, socially, and economically: colonizers made their money by focusing investment and infrastructure on extremely narrow, largely extractive forms of production and exchange.[25] They taught some indigenous peoples some of what they needed to interact with Europeans, and then tried to isolate them from others whose division into allegedly distinct cultural and political units ("tribes") was emphasized and institutionalized. There might be a better case for calling colonization deglobalization rather than globalization, except that the prior systems were constituted out of specific networks, with their own mechanisms and limits, and except that colonial economies were in reality crosscut by numerous networks of exchange and socio-cultural interaction (also dependent on specific mechanisms and bounded in particular ways). To study colonization *is* to study the reorganization of space, the forging and unforging of linkages; to call it globalization, distorted globalization, or deglobalization is to hold colonization against an abstract standard with little relation to historical processes.

Was decolonization a step toward globalization? It was literally a step toward *internationalization*—that is, a new relationship of nation-states,

which is what globalizers, with reason, try to distinguish from globalization. Newly independent states were at pains to emphasize their national quality, and economic policy often relied on import-substitution industrialization and other distinctly national strategies to shape such an economic unit.

Does the era of Structural Adjustment Plans, imposed on now-hapless African states by international financial institutions such as the IMF, at last represent the triumph of globalization on a resistant continent? That certainly was the goal: IMF policy is consistent with the Banker's Boast, an imposed lowering of barriers to capital flows, reduction of tariff barriers, and aligning of currency on world markets.

But was that the effect? It takes a big leap to go from the Banker's Boast to a picture of actual integration. In fact, Africa's contribution to world trade and its intake of investment funds was *larger* in the days of national economic policy than in the days of economic openness.[26] Shall we call this the age of globalizing deglobalization in Africa or of distorted globalization? Is Africa the exception that proves the rule, the unglobalized continent, and is it paying a heavy price for its obstinacy in the face of the all-powerful world trend? The problem with making integration the standard—and measuring everything else as lack, failure, or distortion—is that one fails to ask what is actually happening in Africa.

The downsizing of governments and the loosening of investment and trade regulations are important trends, but they reflect the force of pro-globalization *arguments* within institutions like the IMF more than an ongoing *process*. Rule-making is not production, exchange, or consumption. All of those depend on specific structures, and these need to be analyzed in all their complexity and particularity. Africa is filled with areas where international investors do not go—even when there are minerals that would repay investors' efforts. To get to such places requires not deregulation, but institutions and networks capable of getting there.

One could make related arguments about China—where the state's economic role and importance in mediating relations to the outside world are far too strong for the globalization paradigm–or Russia, where oligarchs and mafias imply a model focused on networks more than integrative world markets. Africa now appears to belong to the half of the globe that is not globalized. Better, however, to emphasize not a globalizing (or deglobalizing) Africa (or China, or Russia), but rather changing *relationships* of externally based firms and financial organizations, indigenous regional networks, transcontinental networks, states, and international organizations.[27] Some linkages, such as the relationships of transnational oil com-

panies to the state in Nigeria or Angola, are narrowly extractive in one direction and provide rewards to gatekeeping elites in the other. There is nothing weblike about this. At another extreme are the illicit networks that sent out diamonds from the rebel-controlled areas of Sierra Leone and Angola and brought in arms and luxury goods for warlords and their followers. Such networks were built out of youth detached from their villages of origin (or kidnapped from them), and flourished in contexts where young men had few routes to a future other than joining the forces assembled by a regional warlord. These systems were linked to diamond buyers and arms sellers in Europe (sometimes via South Africa, Russian, or Serbian pilots), but they depended on quite specific mechanisms of connection. Rather than integrating the regions in which they operated, they reinforced fragmentation and reduced the range of activities in which most people in a violence-torn region could engage.[28] The diamond-arms nexus recalls the slave trade of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for there too, as James and Williams understood very well, were historical processes unfolding in Africa that made no sense except in their relationship to the Atlantic system. The modern version provides a product to be enjoyed by people in distant lands—who do not necessarily ask where the diamond came from, any more than the consumers of sugar in nineteenth-century England wanted to know about the blood in which their sugar was soaked. And now, there are "international issue networks" developing to tell the diamond users in Europe and North America about this blood, using a universalistic language similar to that of the antislavery movement of the early nineteenth century.

MORE THAN LOCAL AND LESS THAN GLOBAL: NETWORKS, SOCIAL FIELDS, DIASPORAS

How does one think about African history in ways that emphasize spatial connection but do not assume the global? The vision of the colonial official or the 1930s anthropologist, of Africa divided neatly into culturally distinct, self-conscious units, did not work, despite the tendency of official myths to create their own reality. By the 1950s and 1960s, anthropologists were using other concepts: the "social situation," the "social field," and the "network." The first two emphasized that in different circumstances Africans constructed distinct patterns of affinity and moral sanction and moved back and forth between them; class affiliation might be operative in a mine town, deference to elders in a village. Conquest itself created a "colonial situation," as Georges Balandier described it in his pathbreaking

article of 1951, defined by external coercion and racialized ideology within a space marked by conquest boundaries; Africans, far from living within their bounded tribes, had to maneuver within—or try to transform—the colonial situation. The network concept stressed the webs of connection that people developed as they crossed space, countering the somewhat artificial notion of situations as being spatially distinct.[29]

These terms did not provide a template for analyzing a structure, but they directed the researcher toward empirical analysis of how connections were formed, toward defining units of analysis by observation of the boundaries of interaction. They encouraged studying the channels through which power was exercised. These concepts thus had their limits, and they did not address the kinds of macro-processes to be found in the historical analysis of James or Williams. Nevertheless, one can use such a framework to study the merchant diasporas of West Africa—in which Islamic brotherhoods as well as kinship and ethnic ties maintained trust and information flows across long distances and during transactions with culturally distinct populations—or the long-distance migrant labor networks of southern Africa.[30] The network concept puts as much emphasis on nodes and blockages as on movement, and thus calls attention to institutions—including police controls over migration, licensing, and welfare systems. It thus avoids the amorphous quality of an anthropology of flows and fragments.

These concepts open the door to examination of the wide variety of units of affinity and mobilization, the kinds of subjective attachments people form and the collectivities that are capable of action. One is not limited by supposedly primordial identifications, to the tribe or race for instance, or to a specific space. One can start with identification with Africa itself and study the diasporic imagination, for Africa as a space to which people attached meaning was defined less by processes within the continental boundaries than by its diaspora. If slave traders defined Africa as a place where they could legitimately enslave people, their victims discovered in their ordeal a commonality that defined them as people with a past, a place, a collective imagination.

When African American activists in the early nineteenth century began to evoke images of Africa or "Ethiopia," they were making a point within a Christian conception of universal history more than a reference to particular cultural affinities. The meanings of Africa-consciousness have been varied, and their relationship to the particulars of Africa even more so. J. Lorand Matory argues that certain African "ethnic groups" defined themselves in the course of an African-American dialogue under the influence of former slaves who returned to the region of their fathers and ad-

vocated forms of collective identification that transcended local divisions and were based as much on an imagined future as a claimed past.[31]

The spatial imagination of intellectuals, missionaries, and political activists, from the early nineteenth to the mid twentieth century was thus varied. It was neither global nor local, but was built out of specific lines of connection and posited regional, continental, and transcontinental affinities. These spatial affinities could narrow, expand, and narrow again. Pan-Africanism was more salient in the 1930s and early 1940s than in the 1950s, when territorial units became more accessible foci of claims and when political imagination became (for a time at least) more national. French officials in the postwar decade tried to get Africans to imagine themselves in a different way, as citizens of a Union Française, and African politicians tried to use this imperial version of citizenship to make claims on the metropole. But imperial citizenship was riddled with too many contradictions and hypocrisies to constitute to most Africans a plausible case for supranational identification. French officials, aware of the cost of making imperial citizenship meaningful, backed away from it, using the word *territorialization* in the mid 1950s to emphasize that in conceding power to Africans the government was devolving on them the responsibility of meeting the demands of citizens with the resources of individual territories.[32] Among the various possibilities—pan-African visions, large-scale federations, and imperial citizenship—the territorially bounded citizenship that Africans received was the product of a specific history of claims and counterclaims.

One needs to look at other circuits: religious pilgrimages to Mecca and networks of training that Muslim clerics followed all over the Sahara Desert, from the eighth century, and intensely from the eighteenth; regional systems of shrines in Central Africa; religious connections between Africans and African American missionaries. The linkage between intra-African and extra-African networks is an old one: the Brazil-Angola-Portugal slave-trading nexus; trans-Saharan commercial, religious, and scholarly networks connecting to Hausa and Mandingo systems within West Africa; a trading system extending from Mozambique Island through the Red Sea, southern Arabia, and the Persian Gulf to Gujarat; a Dutch-pioneered system that connected Indonesia, South Africa, and Europe, with tentacles reaching into the interior of southern Africa; the network of merchants and professionals across coastal West Africa, with links to Brazil, Europe, the Caribbean, and the West African interior, shaping racially and culturally mixed coastal communities; and, more recently, the horrifically effective networks of diamond and arms smugglers connecting Sierra

Leone and Angola to Europe. One cannot argue that networks are soft and cozy whereas structures are hard and domineering.[33]

And one can look at the border-crossing "issue networks," of which the antislavery movement of the early nineteenth century was the great pioneer.[34] Anticolonial movements from the 1930s onward were able to make the once-ordinary category of "colony" into something unacceptable in international discourse largely because they linked activists in African towns and cities with principled groups in metropoles, who in turn tied those issues to the self-conception of democracies. In South Africa in the early twentieth century, scholars have found in a single rural district linkages to church groups emphasizing Christian brotherhood, to liberal constitutionalist reforms in cities, to African American movements, and to regional organizations of labor tenants.[35] The shifting articulations of local, regional, and international movements shaped a political repertoire that kept a variety of possibilities alive and suggested ways of finding help in the African diaspora and in Euro-American issue networks. In the end, South African whites, who prided themselves on their connections to the "Christian" and "civilized" west, lost the battle of linkages.

Perhaps social democrats have better things to do than lament. The current efforts of trade unions and NGOs to challenge "global" capitalism via "global" social movements—such as those against sweat shops and child labor in the international clothing and shoe industries or the movement to ban "conflict diamonds"—have precedents going back to the late eighteenth century, and they have won a few victories along the way. Arguments based on the rights of man have as good a claim to global relevance as arguments based on the market. And in both cases, discourse has been far more global than practice.

RETHINKING THE PRESENT

The point of these short narratives is not to say that nothing changes under the sun. Obviously, the commodity exchange system, forms of production, the modalities of state interventions into societies, capital exchange systems, let alone technologies of communication, have changed enormously. The slave-sugar-manufactured goods commodity circuits of the eighteenth century had a vastly different significance for capitalist development in that era than the diamond-arms circuit does today. My argument is for precision in specifying how such commodity circuits are constituted, how connections across space are extended and bounded, and how large-scale, long-term processes, such as capitalist development, can be analyzed with due

attention to their power, their limitations, and the mechanisms that shape them. One can, of course, call all of this globalization, but that is to say little more than that history happens within the boundaries of the planet and therefore all history is global history. However, if one wants to use globalization as the progressive integration of different parts of the world into a singular whole, then the argument falls victim to linearity and teleology. The globalizers are right to tell us to look at long-distance connections. The difficulty is to come up with concepts that are discerning enough to say something significant about them. Like modernization theory, globalization draws its power from uniting diverse phenomena into a singular conceptual framework and a singular notion of change. And that is where both approaches occlude rather than clarify historical processes.

But what about reversing the argument—admitting that there is little point in refining globalization by adding a historical dimension, and turning instead to the other position that some globalizers take: that the global age is now, and it is clearly distinguished from the past? Here, my argument has not been against the specificity of the present, but whether characterizing it as global distinguishes it from the past. Communications revolutions, capital movements, and regulatory apparatuses all need to be studied and their relationships, mutually reinforcing or contradictory, explored. But we need more refined theoretical apparatus and a less misleading rhetoric than that provided by globalization—whether Banker's Boast, Social Democrat's Lament, or the Dance of the Flows and Fragments. I have argued this both by looking at the variety and specificity of cross-territorial connecting mechanisms in past and present, and the misleading connotations of the "global" and the "-ization."

The point goes beyond the academic's quest for refinement: a lot is at stake in the kinds of questions brought to the fore by the conceptual apparatus. International financial institutions that tell African leaders that development will follow if they open their economies will not get to the bottom of that continent's problems unless they address how specific structures within African societies, within or across borders, provide opportunities and constraints for production and exchange and how specific mechanisms in external commodity markets provide opportunities and blockages for African products. State institutions, oligarchies, warlords, regional mafias, commercial diasporas, oligopolistic foreign corporations, and varied networks shape the nature of capitalism and its highly uneven effects. Capitalism remains lumpy.[36]

It is no surprise that journalists and academics alike react with a sense of wonder to the multiplicity of forms of communication that have opened up

(but are available only to some) and to the border-crossing strategies of many firms (but not others). The globalization fad is an understandable response to this sense of connectivity and opportunity, just as modernization theory was to the collapsing rigidities of European societies in the 1950s and the escape from the constraints of colonial empires. Globalization can be invoked to make a variety of claims, but it can also constrict the political imagination, occlude the power and importance of the long history of transnational mobilizations, and discourage focus on institutions and networks that can offer opportunities as well as constraints.

Of course, all the changing forms of transcontinental connections, all the forms of integration and differentiation, of flows and blockages, of the past and present can be seen as aspects of a singular but complex process, which we can label globalization. But that is to defend the concept by emphasizing how little it signifies. Words matter. The incessant talk about globalization—the word, the images associated with it, and arguments for and against "it"—both reflect and reinforce fascination with boundless connectivity. Yet scholars do not need to choose between a rhetoric of containers and a rhetoric of flows. They do not need to decide whether Africa is part of a necessary and universal trend or a peculiar and frustrating exception; instead they can analyze how it and other regions are linked and bounded. Not least of the questions we should be asking concerns the present: what is actually new? What are the limits and mechanisms of ongoing changes? And above all, can we develop a differentiated vocabulary that encourages thinking about connections and their limits?

5 Modernity

The word *modernity* is now used to make so many different points that continued deployment of it may contribute more to confusion than to clarity. Scholars who use the term are trying to address issues of great importance for debates over past, present, and future. Modernity is evoked in public debate, and such uses demand attention. But modernity is not just a "native's category"; it is employed as an analytic category as well—defining a subject for scholarly inquiry—and that is where its value is in doubt. Four perspectives on modernity run through much of the academic literature:

1. Modernity represents a powerful claim to singularity: it is a long and continuing project, central to the history of Western Europe, and in turn defining a goal to which the rest of the world aspires. This singularity is applauded by those who see new opportunities for personal, social, and political advancement as liberation from the weight of backwardness and the oppressiveness of past forms of Western imperialism.

2. Modernity, again, is a bundle of social, ideological, and political phenomena whose historical origins lie in the West, but this time it is condemned as itself an imperial construct, a global imposition of specifically Western social, economic, and political forms that tames and sterilizes the rich diversity of human experience and the sustaining power of diverse forms of community.

3. Modernity is still singular; it is indeed a European project and a European accomplishment, to be defended against others who may knock at the gate but whose cultural baggage renders the mastery of modernity unattainable.

101. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995). See also the classic study of Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

4. GLOBALIZATION

1. Early on, globalization was a particularly American fad, but it has become more "global." In France, for example, *mondialisation* is much debated in politics and increasingly in academic circles. If the "pros" dominate the American debate, the "antis" are prominent in France, and they even have their public hero, José Bové, arrested for wrecking a McDonalds. The Socialist government argued that globalization could and should be regulated and controlled, but they did not question its reality. See "Procès Bové: La fête de l'antimondialisation," *Le Monde*, June 30, 2000; "Gouverner les forces qui sont à l'oevure dans la mondialisation," *Le Monde*, June 27, 2000. For different uses of the globalization concept by French academics, see GEMDEV (Groupement Economie Mondiale, Tiers-Monde, Développement), *Mondialisation: Les mots et les choses* (Paris: Karthala, 1999); Serge Cordellier, ed., *La mondialisation au delà des mythes* (Paris: La Découverte, 2000 [1997]), Jean-Pierre Faugère, Guy Caire, et Bertrand Bellon, eds., *Convergence et diversité à l'heure de la mondialisation* (Paris: Economica); and Philippe Chantpie et. al., *La nouvelle politique économique: L'état face à la mondialisation* (Paris: PUF, 1997).

2. This is the version of globalization one sees in the newspapers every day, and it can be found in vivid form in a book by *New York Times* correspondent Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999). However, the pro-business *Economist* has long held a more skeptical view, for it thinks the economy isn't globalized enough.

3. Susan Strange exaggerates the decline of the state but provides a valuable analysis of "non-state authorities." She finds the word *globalization* hopelessly vague. Saskia Sassen embraces globalization and treats it as a causative agent ("Globalization has transformed the meaning of . . ."). But much of her work consists of useful and insightful discussion of the intersection in cities of transnational migration and financial movements, as well as of the problems of regulation of interstate economic activities. She too emphasizes the declining relevance of states. Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its. Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1998). For other versions of the decline of states, see David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage, 1994); and Bertrand Badie, *Un monde sans souveraineté: Les états entre ruse et responsabilité* (Paris: Fayard, 1999). For one of many examples of the denunciatory

mode of globalization literature, see Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

4. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). What is striking to a historian about this book is Appadurai's assertion of newness without the slightest effort to examine the past and his preference for inventing a new vocabulary (ethnoscapes, etc.) to characterize phenomena at a global level rather than a sustained effort to describe the mechanisms by which connections occur.

5. Some observers describe the present age as one of the "annihilation of space by time." That, of course, is a nineteenth-century idea—from Marx—and space-time compression has had many moments. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

6. Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 2, 4; Paul Bairoch, "Globalization Myths and Realities: One Century of External Trade and Foreign Investment," in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1996), 190; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); and Kevin R. Cox, *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local* (New York: Guilford Press, 1997).

7. *Le Monde*, June 20, 2000.

8. Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999).

9. "A Survey of Globalisation and Tax," *The Economist*, Jan. 29, 2000, p. 6

10. Atilio Boron, "Globalization: A Latin American Perspective," unpublished paper for CODESRIA conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1998.

11. Dean Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 (1973): 199–226.

12. C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1963 [1938]); Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). See also Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern* (London: Verso, 1997).

13. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: The Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon, 1995); Carolyn E. Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990).

14. Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin, 1985); Richard Price, *First-Time: The Historical Vision of an Afro-American People* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). For a more recent perspective, see Michael A. Gomez, *Exchanging Our Country Marks: The Transformation of African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

15. B. A. F. Manz, "Temur and the Problem of a Conqueror's Legacy," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 8, pt.1 (1998): 22.

16. For an illuminating study of unevenness within a seaborne regional system in Southeast Asia—of the differential impact of political power and the multiple forms of connection, pilgrimage as much as trade—see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Notes on Circulation and Asymmetry in Two 'Mediterraneans,' 1400–1800," in Claude Guillot, Denys Lombard, and Roderich Ptak, eds., *From the Mediterranean to the China Sea* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 1999), 21–43.

17. Critiques of world-system theory in some ways parallel those of modernization and globalization. See, for example, Frederick Cooper, Allen Isaacman, Florencia Mallon, Steve Stern, and William Roseberry, *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

18. Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513–1830* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

19. Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

20. The argument is spelled out in Cooper's essay in Cooper et al., *Confronting Historical Paradigms.* For a related argument emphasizing the historical depth of contemporary patterns, see Jean-François Bayart, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion," *African Affairs* 99 (2000): 216–67.

21. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

22. Frederick Cooper, Thomas Holt, and Rebecca Scott, *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

23. An example of ascending globalizations can be found in the GEMDEV volume (*Mondialisation*), where Michel Beaud writes of "several globalizations," and about "archeo-globalizations" and "proto-globalizations" (11). In the same book, Gérard Kébabdjian makes the opposite argument, distinguishing between today's "globalized" structure and colonial economies, which entailed exchange within bounded regimes (54–55). A variant between the two, in the same book, comes from Jean-Lous Margolin, who looks for "preceding phases of globalization," and then writes of "the distortion into colonial imperialism of the strong globalizing wave coming from the industrial and political revolutions" (127), of "the aborted globalization surrounding Europe, 1850–1914" (130), then of the "quasi-retreat of the global economy by a third of Humanity" (under communism, 127, 130, 131). He ends up with a dazzling nonsequitur: "All this prepared the globalization, 'properly speaking,' of today" (132). All three variants reduce history to teleology with little understanding

of how human beings act in their own times and in their own contexts. More recently, A. G. Hopkins, while claiming to eschew teleology, divides history into archaic, proto-, modern, and postcolonial globalization. "Globalization: An Agenda for Historians," in Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (New York: Norton, 2002), 3–4.

24. Michael Geyer and Charles Bright present as plausible a case for a mid- or late-nineteenth-century origin for globalization as the case for the late twentieth (or for that matter the sixteenth) century, but the contention that what was created was globality is unconvincing in regard to any of these alternatives. "World History in a Global Age," *American Historical Review* 100 (1995): 1034–60.

25. On agriculture in colonial and postcolonial Africa—notably the importance of "exploitation without dispossession"—see Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

26. Africa's share of world trade fell from over 3 percent in the 1950s to less than 2 percent in the 1990s (1.2 percent if one excludes South Africa). Africans have the use of one telephone line per 100 people (1 per 200 outside of South Africa), compared to 1 per 50 in the world as a whole. Electricity is unavailable in many rural areas and doesn't always work in urban ones; mail services have deteriorated, and radio is often unusable because batteries are too expensive; millions of people get their information in an older way—word of mouth. World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the Twenty-First Century?* (Washington: World Bank, 2000).

27. Béatrice Hibou, "De la privatisation des économies à la privatisation des états," in Hibou, ed., *La privatisation des états* (Paris: Karthala, 1999).

28. Rather than constitute alternatives to the state, such mechanisms more likely interact with state institutions and agents. Janet Roitman, "The Garrison-Entrepôt," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 150–52 (1998): 297–329; Karine Bennafla, "La fin des territoires nationaux?" *Politique Africaine* 73 (1999): 24–49; Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou, *La criminalisation de l'état en Afrique* (Paris: Ed. Complexe, 1997).

29. Georges Balandier, "La situation coloniale: Approche théoretique," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* 11 (1951): 44–79; Max Gluckman, "Anthropological Problems Arising from the African Industrial Revolution," in Aidan Southall, ed., *Social Change in Modern Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 67–82; J. Clyde Mitchell, *Social Networks in Urban Situations: Analysis of Personal Relationships in Central African Towns* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969). See also chapter 2.

30. Abner Cohen, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Migrants in Yoruba Towns* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

31. James T. Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); J. Lorand Matory, "The English Professors of Brazil: On the Diasporic Roots of the Yoruba Nation," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (1999): 72–103.

32. See chapter 7; and Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

33. The variety and time depth of diasporic phenomena, as well as the specificity of the mechanisms by which they were organized, are emphasized in Emmanuel Akyeampong, "Africans in the Diaspora; The Diaspora in Africa," *African Affairs* 99 (2000): 183–215. See also chapter 6.

34. David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770–1823* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

35. William Beinart and Colin Bundy, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

36. As Hibou ("De la privatisation") shows, the privatization of nationalized companies in Africa produced something quite different from a "private sector" of competing firms connected to world markets: officials may privatize state-owned firms to themselves, leading to private accumulation through government and narrow channels of interaction. Similarly, the Soviet Union remains vastly different from post-1989 fantasies of market integration. Markku Lonkila, "Post-Soviet Russia? A Society of Networks?" in Markku Kangaspuro, ed., *Russia: More Different Than Most?* (Helsinki: Kikimora, 1999), 98–112.

5. MODERNITY

1. Björn Wittrock, "Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition," *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 59. Or what is one to make of the statement that "modernity in China, as it is globally, is a contested terrain where different experiences of the modern produce not a homogeneous modernity, but a cultural politics in which the conquest of the modern is the ultimate prize"? Or "Modernity is the illusion that defines the modern"? Arif Dirlik, "Modernity as History: Post-Revolutionary China, Globalization, and the Question of Modernity," *Social History* 27 (2002): 33.

2. John D. Kelly, "Alternative Modernities or an Alternative to 'Modernity': Getting out of the Modernist Sublime," in Bruce M. Knauft, ed., *Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 262. This book is notable for skepticism toward the term. Yet the editor, perhaps more than most contributors, does not want to go as far as Kelly, and for all his critical insight, contributes to the term's proliferation. See Knauft, "Critically Modern: An Introduction," esp. 32.

3. Partha Chatterjee, "Two Poets and Death: On Civil and Political Society in the Non-Christian World," in Timothy Mitchell, ed., *Questions of Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 47. Nicholas Dirks reversed the order but to the same dehistoricizing effect: "Colonialism is what modernity was all about." "History as a Sign of the Modern," *Public Culture* 2 (1990): 29.

4. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 254, stresses incommensurability. Simon Gikandi refers to his own entry into cultural analysis by citing his parents, Kikuyu Christians, who "decided to break away from the traditions of their people and embrace the modern culture of colonialism, a culture that seemed to guarantee them new spaces of self-inscription in the narrative of modernity." What Gikandi has to say about the culture is revealing and insightful, but the point of departure makes his problem more difficult. He omits an important history, dating at least to the 1930s, of efforts by many Kikuyu to be both Kikuyu and Christian, to found independent churches and schools that would continue to embrace rituals and social practices of the Kikuyu people while seeking new cultural resources and building a community that avoided the dichotomy that Gikandi—like many of the missionaries—seems to say was all that was available to them. *Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 20.

5. W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

6. Examples of the inevitability argument come from Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrialization and Labor: Social Aspects of Economic Development* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press for the Institute of World Affairs, 1951); and Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harrison, and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Industrial Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) .

7. The most influential summary of them is Dean Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15 (1973): 199–226. There have been some revivals of largely unreconstructed modernization, for example R. Inglehart, "Modernization, Sociological Theories of," in Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes, eds., *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 15: 9965–71. Unlike Inglehart, most of the other authors in this new edition of the *Encyclopedia* do not echo the 1968 version, which is cited below.

8. For a critical, historical approach to analyzing world systems, see Frederick Cooper, Allen Isaacman, Florencia Mallon, William Roseberry, and Steve Stern, *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

9. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Lisa Rofel, *Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Daniel Miller, *Modernity, An Ethnographic Approach: Dualism and Mass Consumption in Trinidad* (Oxford: Berg, 1994); Carol Breckenridge, ed., *Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World*