...
I will next consider
the defence of 'necessity'. There is authority for saying that in
case of great and imminent danger, in order to preserve life, the
law will permit of an encroachment on private property. That is shown
by Mouse's Case n4, where the ferryman at Gravesend took 47 passengers
into his barge to carry them to London. A great tempest arose and
all were in danger. Mr. Mouse was one of the passengers. He threw
a casket belonging to the plaintiff overboard so as to lighten the
ship. Other passengers threw other things. It was proved that, if
they had not done so, the passengers would have been drowned. It was
held by the whole court that 'in any case of necessity, for the safety
of the lives of the passengers' it was lawful for Mr. Mouse to cast
the casket out of the barge. The court said it was like the pulling
down of a house, in time of fire, to stop it spreading; which has
always been held justified pro bono public.
The doctrine
so enunciated must, however, be carefully circumscribed. Else necessity
would open the door to many an excuse. It was for this reason that
it was not admitted in R v Dudley and Stephens n5, where the three
shipwrecked sailors, in extreme despair, killed the cabin-boy and
ate him to save their own lives. They were held guilty of murder.
The killing was not justified by necessity. Similarly, when a man
who is starving enters a house and takes food in order to keep himself
alive. Our English law does not admit the defence of necessity. It
holds him guilty of larceny. Lord Hale said n6 that 'if a person,
being under necessity for want of victuals or clothes, shall upon
that account clandestinely, and animus furandi, steal another
man's food, it is felony'. The reason is because, if hunger were once
allowed to be an excuse for stealing, it would open a way through
which all kinds of disorder and lawlessness would pass. So here. If
homelessness were once admitted as a defence to trespass, no one's
house could be safe. Necessity would open a door which no man could
shut. It would not only be those in extreme need who would enter.
There would be others who would imagine that they were in need, or
would invent a need, so as to gain entry. Each man would say his need
was greater than the next man's. The plea would be an excuse for all
sorts of wrongdoing. So the courts must, for the sake of law and order,
take a firm stand. They must refuse to admit the plea of necessity
to the hungry and the homeless; and trust that their distress will
be relieved by the charitable and the good. Applying these principles,
it seems to me in the circumstances of these squatters are not such
as to afford any justification or excuse in law for their entry into
these houses. We can sympathize with the plight in which they find
themselves. We can recognize the orderly way in which they made their
entry. But we can go on further. They must make their appeal for help
to others, not to us. They must appeal to the council, who will, I
am sure, do all it can. They can go to the Minister, if need be. But,
so far as these courts are concerned, we must, in the interest of
law and order itself, uphold the title to these properties. We cannot
allow any individuals, however great their despair, to take the law
into their own hands and enter these premises. The court must exercise
its summary jurisdiction and order the defendants to go out.
...
[Judgments of
EDMUND DAVIES LJ. And MEGAW LJ. omitted].
DISPOSITION:
Appeals dismissed
with costs. Orders for possession in 28 days.