The Ontological Argument & The Problem of Evil

St. Anselm: A Defense of the Ontological Argument

Chapter II.

Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.

"this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak--a being than which nothing greater can be conceived--understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist."

-so the fool understands the concept of God, but he refuses to admit that God exists.

"And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which greater."

"Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived."

-this greater conceivable thing being the one that exists in both the understanding and in reality.

"But obviously this is impossible"

-the conception of "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived" requires us to posit the existence, in reality, of this being.

Chapter III

God cannot be conceived not to exist.--God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.--That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.

"it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist;

and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist.

Hence, if that, which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived."

-God has to be a being "which cannot be conceived not to exist." Otherwise, God could not be "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived." (this would violate the concept of God held in our understanding.)

Chapter IV

How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived.

"But how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive."

-in short, the fool doesn't really understand what God is (or what the conception of God entails).

see 8. St. Anselm's Ontological Argument. Look at the Plantinga account of St. Anselm's argument

Immanuel Kant: A Critique of the Ontological Argument

an absolutely necessary being: "A verbal definition is certainly easy enough; it is something, the non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition throw any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to cogitate the non-existence of a thing..."

-examples of necessity have been drawn from judgments, not from things

-"the absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of a thing..."

-the geometrical proposition that a triangle has three sides doesn't entail that three angles necessarily exist. Rather, it entails that, if a triangle exists, it must contain three angles.

-if it try to retain the subject (triangle), but get rid of the predicate (three angles), I fall into contradiction.

-but if I don't suppose the existence of a triangle (or try to imagine a triangle without three angles) then no contradiction arises. -contradiction can't occur if I don't posit (or at least think about) the subject.

apply this to the Anselm's discussion of God.

God (subject) is omnipotent (predicate)

God (subject) is "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived" (predicate)

"Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it...Now if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God is, or There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates--I posit an object in relation to my conception.

According to Kant, the onto logical argument seems plausible only because it treats existence, in reality, as a predicate. Once we realize that existence or being is not a predicate (or a property) the argument falls apart.

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B.C. Johnson: Evil and Suffering Prove Atheism is True

-the death of the innocent child.

-is it necessary?

-heaven is not an adequate response; neither is the appeal to long term consequences.

-human free will does not solve problem of God as negligent bystander.

-why do appeals to dependency and moral urgency fail?

-according to Johnson, "moral urgency" and "virtue building" don't provide human with good reasons for failing to help others, so they don't provide God with good reasons either. Is this sound?

-is there a middle ground between excessive control and human freedom? Should God intervene to prevent the worst sort of disasters. Could he/she?

-can we judge God by human moral standards (as the child eventually judges the parent)?

-does the available evidence support the notion of an evil God a good God?

John Hick "The Problem of Evil and Suffering: A Response

rejected solutions: (1) evil is an illusion, (2) God is finite

Augustine: all things good (but to varying degrees)

-evil is a distortion (not sent by God) of something that is inherently valuable.

moral evil vs. non-moral evil

-moral evil is dealt with by an appeal to the incompatibilist/libertarian conception of free will.

non-moral evil is dealt with by an appeal to the importance of adversity, hardship, and the necessary conditions for human accomplishment.