Feigl lecture – 16 March 2005

•	empirical science – it’s truth claims held only until further notice (self-correctability science’s greatest asset – warranted assertability/probability) – differs only in degree from knowledge acquired by common sense.
•	its aims:  description, explanation, prediction (as adequate and accurate as possible, given context)
•	social sciences in principle similar to “hard science”, although explanation/prediction dicier for them.

Scientific criteria (regulative ideals)
1.	Intersubjective testability (“objectivity”).  Scientific claims must be intelligible and testable.  A distinction of kind, not degree. (e.g., religion, transcendental metaphysics)
2.	Reliability (sufficient degree of confirmation).  A distinction of degree, not kind.  Higher or lower degrees of probability.  (e.g., astrology, alchemy)
3.	Definiteness and precision.  The attempt to reduce “border-zone vagueness to a minimum” (57) (to whatever degree is required by the problem – you don’t need a razor to cut butter).
4.	Coherence/systematic structure.  Not a mere collection of facts.  A well-connected theoretic system.  Hypothetico-deductive procedure.
5.	Comprehensiveness/scope.  Unlike common sense, science goes beyond our senses.

•	distinction between pure and applied sciences (the latter have different aims)

“Misconceptions” that Feigl seeks to refute:
•	science arises out of practical/social needs.  F:  this is important, butonly part of the story.
•	science is too unstable and, therefore, is no foundation for human affairs.  F: scientific change is more subtle than this.  Besides, the quest for certainty is immature.
•	science is evaluated by its own standards (this isn’t objective).  F:  but, if it’s knowledge that you’re after, what other standards are there?  Besides, science has been revising these standards since its inception.
•	scientific abstractions and idealizations distort reality.  F:  science does the best it can to reflect nature as well as it can.
•	science is too reductionist about what cannot be measured.  F:  measure is not indispensable in all branches of science; science does a good job at prediction the qualities of experience.
•	science doesn’t explain; the reality behind appearances is beyond the reach of science.  F:  questions unanswerable by science are not questions of knowledge.
•	science is incompatible with religion.  F:  science threatens religious explanations, not religious attititudes.
•	science is dangerous.  F:  socio-political factors, and not science, are the real dangers; science is neutral (theory vs. application).
•	scientific detachment makes scientists indifferent to pressing human problems.  F:  only if they’re maladjusted.
•	reductionist physical science doesn’t do justice to organic, mental, and social realms.  F:  there are still big problems to be solved, but what method is better equipped than science to solve them?
•	scientific methodology can never replace empathy/intuition.  F:  nothing in science denies inspiration.
•	science is only descriptive, not normative.  F:  better description means better prescription.  Besides, isn’t there something inherently praiseworthy about the scientific model and its intersubjective pursuit of truth?

Next class:  Heidegger.