The Irrationality of Pascal’s Wager

	Blaise Pascal’s wager is not a very rational argument because it is directed towards choosing either Christianity or choosing no religion at all.  Pascal chooses to argue that choosing to believe in God should be a choice between choosing Christianity or Atheism.
	Pascal believed that we can never be certain of God’s existence, therefore we must choose either to believe in Him or not to believe in Him.  Pascal presents the idea that it is more probable to choose to believe in God since believing in God would provide more spiritual rewards for the believer as opposed to the non-believer.  He hypothesizes that if one were to believe in God, and if God were proven to exist, that individual would gain infinitely in terms of religious rewards.  For example, they would live the afterlife in paradise.  If they were to find that God did not exist, however, they would only succumb to knowing their judgment was false.  If they choose not to believe, and God is found to exist, the individual would ultimately go to hell.  If God is found not to exist, then they would win, but only the satisfaction that they are correct about their prediction.   
According to this logical argument, it is reasonable to take the chance and choose the first option, which is to believe in God’s existence.  Pascal urges people to make this choice because it simply has the best outcomes favouring rewards: ‘If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing’ (Pascal 50).  This offers a way to persuade those who cannot decide whether they should or should not believe in God, to indeed take a small risk and believe in God.  One of the ways that Pascal’s wagering process can be proposed is mathematically with an equation.  In the equation P1(S1-C1) + P2(S2-C2) > 0, S is assigned to each possible outcome of an action, C is the cost of this action, where this difference is multiplied by the probability, P.  In the equation, if the left side is greater than 0, then wagering on behalf of the action is worth the risk.  For example, if the action of believing in God is put into the equation then the outcome would be an enormous value, therefore persuading the action-taker to believe in God.      
Pascal shows his persuasiveness towards his belief of wagering faith when he states: ‘But here is an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite’ (Pascal 51).  According to Pascal, this ‘happy life’ to gain comes from the benefits of Christianity.  He stated that Christianity offered the greatest explanatory evidence for religious questions, such as how the world evolved or why we humans are here on earth, therefore he believed that Christianity was the only other option next to Atheism.  
	I disagree with Pascal’s argument because his viewpoint on choosing a belief is too narrow.  Realistically, Christianity is not the only religion in the world.  Many other religions offer many different rewards and benefits that can be gained, but Pascal ignores these religions as they appear to him as if they cannot explain the world as well as Christianity can.  I find this an unfair argument because all religions of the world provide many varieties of theoretical explanations for the nature of our world.  For example, dealing with death, Christianity believes the soul is either sent to heaven or hell, whereas in Buddhism the spirit is reincarnated.  Although these two beliefs differ, they both offer explanations of equal legitimacy.  According to Pascal, since Christianity is the world’s most well-known religion, we should take priority in using its explanations over other religions.  For example, Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity offer immense post-mortal rewards.  No one is to say that any one of these religions is greater than the other because there is no fact to support this.  
In relation to this argument, Pascal’s probability formula works for any religion, such as Islam or Buddhism.  More specifically, for example, rewards offered by Islam could be of equal value with Christianity’s.  This means that when the Islamic religion is used in Pascal’s equation, the outcome would turn out to such a value that that the odds support believing in God. Therefore, this would prove that Islam could as easily persuade one to believe in Islam or Christianity, as opposed to Christianity alone.  Since the equation can work with any religion, Pascal’s final assumptions can work with any religion as well.  If another religion turns out to have the equal outcome of wagering between belief and non-belief as Christianity’s outcome, then it is fair to say that if you wager in favour of believing, you will gain all and virtually lose nothing.  Therefore, it is safe to say that one can gain infinitely if they choose any religion.  
Pascal’s wager is a strong argument and could work if he did not just focus on Christianity as the prime source of explanation for paradoxes.  What Pascal should have done was devise a set of other equations, or methods, one for each religion in the world, if he believed not all religions are not equal.  In other words, if Pascal believed that a certain religion did not possess the same spiritual value to gain rewards as other religions, then he should have made a completely new set of methods for each religion.  This way, several faiths could be presented and chosen from by one who cannot make a proper decision regarding the existence of God.  Therefore, Christianity should not be the only religion involved in Pascal’s wager.  Superiority of world religions cannot be judged by one person because it will present a biased viewpoint.  In conclusion, I doubt Pascal’s theorem can work universally since its ideas are too central to Christianity’s religious rewards.