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Bacon Preface to The great instauration; The new organon, Aphorisms 1-46; selections from The advancement of learning (Works IV: 13-17, 20-27,
47-57, and 294-98)
1. What did Bacon
mean by comparing the wisdom of the ancients to the boyhood of knowledge? He
took it to be unproductive, just as boys are infertile, but, like boys, to be
capable of talking as if it were able to produce something. What it has failed to produce in particular
is an augmentation of knowledge and some means of improving the material
conditions of life. (Works IV, p.14)
2. How is it that
the mechanical arts are superior to philosophy? They
make advances and improve over time. (P.14)
3. How did Bacon
respond to the charge that the works of the ancients have withstood the test
of time, and that if more could have been done to improve the sciences it
would have been done already? He
offered two replies. He observed that
knowledge of past discoveries might have been lost, or that the discoveries
might have been made by private individuals who never made their knowledge
public. Further supporting this second
possibility, he claimed what tends to pass the test of time is not what is
most true and useful, but what gives rise to controversy and disputation or
what is merely entertaining. (P.15)
4. How did Bacon
respond to the charge that the pursuit of knowledge of nature may be impious
and contrary to divine commands? By
citing the myth of the Garden of Eden and claiming it is rather the pursuit
of moral knowledge that was originally forbidden by God, not the
identification and classification of the phenomena of nature (symbolized by
Adam’s naming of the beasts). (P.20)
5. What are the
true ends of knowledge? Not
pleasure of contemplation, profit, fame, or power (over other human beings),
but “the benefit and use of life.”
This involves a kind of power, but it is power over nature rather than
civil power. (P.21)
6. What was the
chief effect Bacon took the new science he was proposing to promise? To
be able to command nature in action. (P.24)
7. What is the
proper method to pursue when inquiring into the nature of things? Induction
from particular experience, reaching general concepts and laws only at the
end of a long process of investigation.
This is to be contrasted with the method of making a hasty induction
to general concepts and principles and then deducing effects from them by
syllogistic logic. (P.24)
8. How does the
type of induction Bacon recommended differ from traditional forms of
induction? Rather
than proceed by “simple enumeration,” it will proceed by analyzing experience
through a process of exclusion and rejection (i.e., controlled experiment).
(P.25)
9. What is the key
to rectifying the defects of sense experience, according to Bacon? Using
sense just to judge the outcome of properly designed experiments. (P.26) 10.
What is the "fixed and established maxim"
that we must not forget on pain of being seduced by the insidious action of
ineradicable idols? That
we can only make judgments on the basis of a legitimate induction. (P.27) 11.
What is the most we can do to “effect works?” Mix
or separate substances. We cannot
produce, prevent, or control the reactions that follow as a consequence.
(Aphorism 4) 12.
What would Bacon say about the principle that nature
always employs the simplest means? He
would call it an idol of the tribe (Aphorism 45, cf. aphorisms 10, 21,
24). We assume that nature must be a
certain way simply because it is easier for our minds to grasp it if it is
that way, not because we actually find it to be that way (in fact, we find
all sorts of complexities which we seek to explain away and wrongly try to
reduce to unity). 13.
What is being joined or separated in the cases where
mixing or separation (moving things about) brings about an “artificial”
object or occurrence? Actives
and passives. (P. 294)
That is, things with corresponding active and passive powers. Humans only have the power to move things
around. It is the things themselves
that have the power to react — a power we cannot control. Boyle “On the
Excellency and Grounds of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy” (Matthews,
109-118)
1. In what way is
Boyle’s corpuscularianism unlike the atomism of
Epicurus and Lucretius? Boyle
was unwilling to suppose that the universe evolved simply through the atoms
having chanced to come together in the right combinations. (As he pointed out at Matthews, 111, this
is what Epicurus and Lucretius thought.)
He thought that God’s intervention is necessary to bring this about.
2. What is the
cause of all change in the created world, according to Boyle? Mechanical
operations among the parts of matter (bottom of p.111).
3. What are the two
grand principles of the corpuscular or mechanical philosophy? Matter
and motion (p.113).
4. What are the
possible effects of one part of matter on another as Boyle envisioned them? One
part of matter can impart motion to another (“drive it on in its entire bulk”
— p.113), i.e. it can push or pull it, or it can split it to pieces. In both cases the effect is a result of
collision, which emerges as the only possible cause of change in the created
world. Cf. 117: “One part of matter
can act upon another only by virtue of local motion, or the effects and
consequence thereof.” Note, however,
that Boyle appears to have allowed that motion might be generated not just by
matter (where one part of already moving matter collides with another), but also
directly by spirits (cf. 113, 118).
5. What are the
properties of the parts of matter? Shape,
size, motion, orientation, manner of aggregation of component parts (Boyle
actually lists motion, figure, size, posture, rest, order or texture —
p.113).
6. How many
different kinds of matter are there, for Boyle? In
one sense there are infinitely many different kinds of material, because the
shapes, sizes, arrangements, and motions of the particles that compose things
may be varied in infinitely many ways.
But in another sense, there is just one kind of material because the
particles themselves are all cut from the same kind of stuff, so that only
the sizes and shapes of pieces makes the pieces different from one another,
not anything else like weight or mass or hardness, etc. (pp. 113-114)
7. Why did Boyle
consider the fact that the parts of matter may be infinitely varied in motion
and shape to be an advantage? It
allows for sufficiently rich explanatory resources to deal with almost any
phenomenon. His idea seems to be that
the more shapes and motions you have to appeal to, and the more different
kinds of compounds of shaped and moving parts, the greater the number of
results you can account for as following as a consequence. This is fine up to a point, but wildly optimistic
if you consider that Boyle proposed to explain not just the workings of
machines but all physical, chemical, and biological phenomena in this way:
electricity and magnetism, fire, emission and absorption of light,
brittleness, fluidity, colour, the phenomena of
life. (p.114)
8. What is wrong
with supposing that mechanical principles apply only to medium sized or large
objects (like clocks or heavenly bodies) but not to the small parts of
things? All
our experience goes to show us that, as bodies are divided down into smaller
and smaller parts, mechanical principles still continue to be valid for
describing their behaviour — they still operate under the force of pushes and
pulls. (pp. 114-15)
9. Why did Boyle
consider that the principles and explanations of the mechanical philosophy
are more satisfying than those of the Aristotelians or other chemists? Discussion
question on p.116. Broadly, because
the mechanical philosophy deals with common notions of everyday life that
everyone can understand and experiences regularly, and also that everyone can
know how to tinker with. Everyone
understands what it is for one thing to hit one another and the other to move
or break up or send the first flying back as a result. Everyone understands nailing and
knitting. Everyone understands how
levers work or ball bearings behave or how axles and spindles and gears and
cogs and chains may work in a machine.
All that is involved here is parts of matter hitting other parts of
matter and causing them to move. And
because these sorts of causes are so easy to describe and understand, they
are also open to us to tinker with, modify and control. But the principles of the Aristotelian
philosophy: form and matter, final cause, act and potency, are very obscure
and difficult to understand. And
explanations involving these terms leave no real room for us to modify or
control the process of nature. They
leave the ultimate causes of change mysterious or occult and so beyond our
control. 10.
What is required for one part of matter to be able
to act upon another? The
one has to move and collide with the other (p.117). But note again that he seems to allow that
spirits (as opposed to parts of matter) might have an ability to also
initiate motion (cf. 113, 118). 11.
In what sense may the mechanical philosophy coexist
with the supposition that change in nature is brought about by the agency of
spirits? Boyle
was happy to allow that spirits may exist and act in nature, but he insisted
that if they do they must do so by making bits of matter move and
collide. So the principles of
mechanical philosophy, far from being undermined by the postulate that
spirits act in nature, are themselves necessary to explain the manner in
which the activity of those spirits brings about changes in nature. (The best way to explain Boyle’s
willingness to allow for the activity of spirits is to note that he
explicitly allowed that motion may be produced, not just as a result of
collision of one body against another, but directly by the action of spirits
— cf. pp. 113, 118. So spirits can
somehow act on bits of matter to initiate or change the direction of
motion. It is just that all the
subsequent effects of this action are described by mechanical principles.) Galileo, “Il Saggiatore” (The Assayer) (Matthews,
53-61)
1. What is heat
generally believed to be? P.
56. Something that actually exists as
such in the bodies that affect us with the sensation of heat. When we feel a hot body we get a peculiar
warm or burning sensation in our skin.
That is what we commonly call “heat.”
And we suppose that this very thing — this warm or burning feeling
isn’t just in our skin but actually inheres in the hot body as a quality.
2. According to
Galileo there are some properties that it is impossible to conceive a body
not having. What are these properties? P.
56. Extension, shape, size, position,
motion or rest, contact or separation with other bodies, and number.
3. What is the
basis for our belief that bodies have such properties as being red or white,
bitter or sweet? Sense
experience. P.56
4. How could a body
possibly have shape but no colour? All
bodies lack colour in the dark. (Applying the claim on pp.57 and 59 that
these qualities need not be supposed to exist in the absence of any
perceiver. Darkness removes the
conditions under which a perceiver can sense visually and so destroys colour,
but the body remains.)
5. What
significance did Galileo attach to the fact that a body tickles more under
the nose than on the back? He
took it to indicate that the tickling sensation must be entirely in us and
not in the object. P.57
6. What determines
whether our tactile sensations will be pleasant or unpleasant? The
configuration of the bodies that touch us. P.58
7. What is the
cause of variations in taste? Variations
in the arrangement of differently shaped particles. P.58
8. What excites
tastes, sounds, and odours? The
size, shape, and motion of the bodies that impact on the sense organs. P.59
9. What accounts
for the operation of fire? The
quick motion and piercing shape of certain particles in the hot material. P60 10.
Is it right to say that fire is hot, i.e., that heat
exists in fire? It
is wrong. Fires are not hot. They are only more or less quickly
moving. The only thing that actually
exists in fire is motion of its shaped parts.
The heat is a sensation that exists in the person who perceives the
fire rather than in the fire itself. (P.60) 11.
Why did Galileo think that a bellows increases the
heat of a fire? P.
60. Galileo thought that fire is
simply a collection of fast moving, very small, sharp particles. The blast of air from the bellows increases
the speed of their motion, which makes them penetrate our body more deeply,
do more damage to it as a result, and so give us a feeling of greater
heat. So whereas we today think that
the bellows makes the fire hotter because it supplies more oxygen for the
chemical reaction that generates the heat, Galileo thought that it makes the
fire hotter because it increases the speed of motion of the fire particles. 12.
Did Galileo think that matter is infinitely
divisible (i.e., that you can in principle go on dividing a piece of matter
in halves forever)? P.
61. He thought that the process of
division or dissolution can only go up to a point, at which point “truly
indivisible atoms” are arrived at. Hobbes, Human nature I-III (Gaskin, 21-30)
1. What is sense? A
conception produced by the presently occuring
action of an object (HN II.2). There
is a fuller definition to be found in De Corp. XXV.2. Hobbes there specified that sense is the
outward rebound of a motion into the sense organ produced by an object. This is a more strictly physiological
account of sense, echoed by what he said later in HN II.8.
2. What is colour,
and where is it to be found? The
way the motion transmitted by the object into the brain appears to us (HN
II.4.3). It is not clear where it is
to be found since it is not obvious where appearances exist. What exists in the brain is a motion and
not an appearance and Hobbes was not friendly to the notion that our minds
are distinct from our brains. So it is
not as if brain motions could “appear” coloured to some mind that is looking
at what is happening in the brain.
3. What convinced
Hobbes that colours and images do not exist outside of us? The
facts i) that they are not located in the
places where they appear to be located, as is evident in the case of
reflections and echos, ii) that we may
experience them when there is obviously no external object outside of us
causing them, as is evident in the case of double vision, and iii) that
we may experience them merely as a result of motion and impact on our sense
organs, when once again there is obviously nothing outside of us that could
have them, as is evident in the case of seeing a flash of light when one’s
head is hit (HN II.5-7).
4. What leads us to
mistakenly believe that light and sound are outside of us? The
fact that the motion in the brain, which is what these sensations really are,
is traveling in an outward direction after having rebounded from going
inwards (HN II.8).
5. Why do our
sensations remain with us after the bodies causing them have ceased to press
on our organs, and why do they only slowly fade away? Because
sensation is just a motion of parts within our bodies, and once a thing is set
in motion it will continue in that motion unless something special happens to
bring it to rest. Since, even when
something does happen to bring what is in motion to rest, it will only be
able to do so gradually, and will not be able to stop the motion all at once,
it follows that once we do get a sensation it will only fade away gradually
(HN III.1).
6. If our
sensations stay with us after the bodies causing them have ceased to press on
our organs, why are we not aware of them? They
are obscured by the more violent motions coming in from the sense organs (HN
III.1).
7. What is the
cause of dreams? The
fact that the sense organs have temporarily ceased to function, so that old
motions, left over from past experiences, can come to our attention (HN
III.2).
8. How did Hobbes
define the notions of obscurity and clarity of conception? Representations
are clear when all their parts are distinctly conceivable, obscure when, even
though the representation is present as a whole, its parts cannot be
distinctly represented or told apart from one another (HN III.7).
9. How does
remembrance differ from sensing? When
we remember we have an image that has parts that we were previously able to
distinctly conceive, but that are now confused, so that we find that the
image is able to give less information than we had expected to get from it
(HN III.7). Hobbes, Human nature IV-VI (Gaskin, 31-43)
1. What is the
chief reason why, in our deliberations we most often trace out chains of
cause and effect, rather than proceed from anything to anything? There
are two parts to the answer to this question: the influence of past
experience and appetite. The influence
of past experience explains why one conception follows another in the order
in which they do. Appetite explains
why the first conception in the sequence arises in the mind. On the first point, Hobbes wrote that “the
cause of the coherence or consequence of one conception to another, is their
first coherence, or consequence at the time when they were produced by sense”
(HN IV.2). That is, the reason why one
conception follows upon the other in the order they do is that they were
originally experienced in that order.
This is particularly the case with causes and effects. If one thing causes another, then in
sensory experience the conception of the cause will regularly be followed by
a conception of the effect and so they will tend afterwards to be imagined in
that order. Thus, Hobbes wrote, “as to
the sense the conception of cause and effect succeed one another; so may they
after sense in the imagination” (HN IV.2).
Because conceptions tend to follow one another from cause to effect or
effect to cause, when someone’s appetites lead them to have a certain desire
or aversion, or to conceive a certain end or purpose, they will tend to think
first of that end, then the means to that end, then the means to that means,
and so on. Thus, we end up tracing out
chains of cause and effect in our deliberations. As Hobbes puts it, “The cause [of our
deliberating in this way] is the appetite of them, who, having a conception
of the end, have next unto it a conception of the next means to that end [and
from thence to the thought of … the next means … etc.].” (HN
IV.2) See also DE CORP. XXV.8.
2. What leads us to
suppose that certain events will occur in the future or that events that we
have not witnessed have occurred in the past? Having
seen one sort of event regularly happen after another sort in the past. This experience establishes a mental
connection between the two types of event so that whenever the antecedent
event is seen, we form a conception of the consequent event, even though it
has not occurred yet, and whenever the consequent event is seen, we form a
conception of the antecedent event and think it must have preceded, even
though we did not witness its occurrence. (HN IV.7).
3. What is a sign? In
general, a sign is any conception that leads us to think of some conception
other than itself. At HN IV.9 Hobbes
noted that when we have experienced one conception to be regularly followed
by another, we are led to have the antecedent conception upon witnessing the
consequent and vice versa. Thus,
antecedent and consequent events are at least one kind of sign. The marks discussed in HN V.1, which are
also said to lead us to conceive of something else, are another kind of
sign. Note that Hobbes stressed at HN
IV.10 that the connection between antecedent and consequent events is merely
conjectural and can often fail.
Indeed, people can often be quite mistaken when they deliberate about
future and past events on this basis, and they differ from one another in
prudence as a result. If we think of
causes as things that are in fact what brings about an effect, then the antecedent
event cannot properly be considered to be a cause or the consequent event an
effect. They are simply signs that
lead the mind to form conceptions of one another.
4. Did Hobbes think
that we are in control of the course of our thoughts? No. He thought that we cannot simply will to
have a certain thought. Before we can
get a thought, we need to have an experience of something that has been
connected with that thought in the past and so calls it to mind (HN V.1).
5. What is a mark
and what purpose does the creation of marks serve? Something
that can be sensed (perhaps just by hearing), that has been regularly
associated with a certain conception in the past, and that is set up in a
certain place so that when we go back to that place and run into the mark we
will, in virtue of its association, be reminded of the conception (HN
V.1). The use of marks is a way of
getting around the fact that we are determined to have the thoughts that we
do. By setting up marks we are in effect
able to cause ourselves to have certain conceptions on appropriate subsequent
occasions, something we could not otherwise do simply by a sheer act of will
or deliberate remembrance or attention.
6. In what sense
are universal names “indefinite?” The
person who uses a universal name does not expect their hearers to conceive of
any particular one of the many individuals referred to by that name. The person who uses a particular name, in
contrast, expects us to conceive of a certain individual (HN V.6).
7. What remedy is
there for the confusion into which language has fallen by the equivocal and
unthinking use of terms? To
go back to sense experience and precisely identify those experiences we want
each of our terms to pick out (HN V.14)
8. List the four
things Hobbes identified as being necessary for knowledge. To
have obtained conceptions of things from experience; to have unambiguously
named these conceptions; to have constructed true propositions from these
names (propositions where the predicate names a class of objects that include
the thing named by the subject), and to have drawn correct or rational
inferences from these propositions (VI.4) Hobbes, Human Nature VII.1-2, XII, XI (Gaskin, 43-44,
70-73, 64-70)
1. How is pain
defined on Hobbes’ mechanical conception of the workings of the mind? A
motion that hinders the motion of the heart (HN VII.1).
2. How are appetite
and fear defined? An
appetite is an impulse to move towards a pleasure, a fear an impulse to move
away from a pain (HN VII.2).
3. Explain the
connection between will, appetite, fear, and deliberation. Deliberation
is the process where an appetite gives rise to a conception of a means to
satisfy the appetite, but that conception gives rise to fear, that fear gives
rise to a conception of a means to avoid the fear that produces another
appetite, and so on until some final appetite or fear is reached. (The process may also start with a
fear.) The final appetite or fear is
what we will (HN XII.1).
4. When are we said
to be at liberty? For
as long as we have the physical capacity or the command of the resources to
enable us to either do or not do a thing, and for as long as we continue to
be engaged in the process of deliberating about whether to do it or not. (HN
XII.1)
5. Why did Hobbes
say that deliberation takes away liberty? Deliberation
is the process of reaching a decision about whether to do or not do a thing,
and once that decision has been reached, we are no longer at liberty to do
otherwise, since we have made up our minds.
So long as deliberation is in process, we are at liberty, but once we
have made up our minds there is no longer any question of our being able to
do otherwise (if there were, then it would mean that we had not made up our
minds yet). (HN XII.1)
6. When is an
action said to be voluntary? When
it follows from the will. Voluntary actions
are those that are caused by our will whereas involuntary ones are those that
result from causes that make our bodies move without producing desires or
aversions or acting on our wills (HN XII.3).
7. If terrorists
threaten to kill your loved ones unless you smuggle something for them, and
you do smuggle the goods, is your action voluntary? Explain Hobbes’ reason for answering the
question as he does. It
is voluntary because your action was determined by your own last fear (HN
XII.3).
8. If, due to an
innate character flaw, you are quick to anger, are the actions you perform
out of anger voluntary? Explain
Hobbes’ reason for answering this question as he does. They
are voluntary because they still proceed from your own last appetite after
deliberation. That the deliberation is
hasty or inadequate changes nothing (HN XII.4).
9. If you will to
perform an action, is your willing voluntary? No. Hobbes considers talk of a voluntary or
free will to be not just false, but incoherent. A voluntary action is one that proceeds
from the will, that is, from the last appetite or fear to emerge after
deliberation. To speak of the will
being voluntary is therefore equivalent to saying that some last appetite or
fear arises in us as a consequence of some last appetite or fear. But this is nonsense. If the former appetite or fear is “last”
then the other cannot be. The other is
just an earlier stage in the deliberative process that leads up to the truly
last stage, and the entire chain of appetite and fear is a product of experience
and of opinions concerning what unpleasant or pleasant consequences will
follow from what causes (HN XII.5). 10.
What can we know about God? Nothing,
other than that God exists (HN XI.2). 11.
Why do people believe that God exists? By
means of a cosmological argument that infers that there must have been a
first cause that gave rise to everything that now exists. God just is the first cause. (HN XI.2) 12.
What is the erroneous and what the true conception
of spirits? A
spirit is properly understood to be an extended, shaped body that is
colourless and permeable and so not capable of affecting the senses, like
air. It is improperly understood to be
an unextended substance, which Hobbes takes to be a
contradiction in terms. (HN XI.4) 13.
What does a miracle prove? It
is a sign that a revelation, message or inspiration was given to someone by
some spirit, that is, some superhuman agent.
However, it does not prove that the spirit was godly (HN XI.7). 14.
How can we tell whether a revelation, or message, or
inspiration that has been given to someone really came from God? The
inspiration needs to be for some good purpose. In cases where that is not easily
determined, it needs to at least be in conformity with the Christian
scripture (HN XI.7). 15.
What is the basis for the belief that the Christian
scripture is the word of God? The
trust we place in the testimony of others in the Church, who we must know to
be honest and discerning (so not liable to be deceived and not willing to
deceive others), right back to the first individuals who saw the miracles and
received the Christian message (HN XI.9). 16.
How did Hobbes respond to the charge that he had
made faith depend on such natural capacities as our ability to discern
whether other people are noble and worthy of trust, rather than (as
Protestant doctrine would have it) an inspiration, graciously given by God to
the elect, that could bring them to accept the scripture in defiance of all
reason? By
claiming that not all people are equally discerning of the good qualities and
honesty of others, and that those who are were made so by God. So it comes down to the same thing in the
end. Either way God graciously made
some (and not others) so that they are able to receive the message, the
remainder having “hardened hearts.” 17.
What side did Hobbes take in the dispute over
whether the individual or the Church is to be the ultimate authority in the
interpretation of scripture? He
vests authority in the Church for all but the most important questions. This follows if our faith in the
authenticity of the Bible needs to be derived from the trust we repose in
others in the first place (HN XI.10).
Not surprisingly, this echoes his political views, which demand
obedience to authority in all but the most important questions (those of life
and death). Descartes, Discourse on method I-II and V (AT VI 1-22 and
55-60)
1. From what does
the diversity of our opinions arise? The
fact that we do not all employ the same method, or, as he put it, that “we
lead our thoughts along different paths.” (AT VI, 2)
2. What are the
sciences of mathematics and philosophy good for? Mathematics
for improving the material conditions of life (“facilitating all the arts and
lessening men’s labour”); philosophy for indulging in pretentious disputation
about matters you do not really understand (“speaking plausibly about all
things and making oneself admired by the less learned”). (6)
3. What was the
chief cause of Descartes’ delight with mathematics and his dismay with philosophy? He
was delighted with mathematics because its claims are certain and evident (7)
and disgusted with philosophy because it makes no claims that are not
contentious and so open to doubt. (8)
4. After abandoning
the study of letters, what two sources did
Descartes turn to in the search for knowledge? Both
come down to the same thing: experience.
Experience, on the one hand, of the world around him, and on the other
of his own nature. (9)
5. What led him to
subsequently reject one of these two sources as well? He
rejected worldly experience because the things it taught him are not
universally accepted in all parts of the world and so are as contentious and
dubious as the claims of philosophy. (10)
6. What excuse did
he offer for proposing an innovation in scientific method, despite the danger that it might be perceived as
reformist? He
appealed to a sceptical impasse arising from “the differences that have
always existed among the opinions of the most learned,” leaving him uncertain
what to believe unless he proceeded on his own initiative. Because all established knowledge had been
called into question by one group or other and so was contentious and
dubious, and because no common practice was universally accepted, someone
wishing to determine the truth would have no alternative but to seek for a
better method, immune to sceptical attack. (16)
7. What are the
disciplines that Descartes thought most likely to be able to contribute to his plan? Logic,
geometry, and algebra. (17)
8. In what way does
geometry serve as a model for all the things that can fall within human knowledge? As
in geometry, all are supposed to follow from one another by chains of simple
and easy reasoning, proceeding from evidently true first principles and
following the rules of proper demonstration. (19)
9. Why was it so
important to Descartes that he begin his
investigations with absolutely certain and indubitable truths? (This
is the first of his four rules of method). This
is not obvious from the text. But
anyone who wants to follow the example of geometricians and mathematicians
and proceed to gain knowledge by deducing it from axioms had better be very
sure that their axioms are sound. If
you start off with false axioms, everything you deduce from them will be
called into doubt. It is especially
important that you be sure of the truth of your initial assumptions if you
are going to doubt and reject the evidence of your senses. People who trust their senses can afford to
make mistakes early on, because if they do, the progress of their sensory
experiences will soon reveal to them that their deductions are at variance
with the way the world is (as Descartes had noted earlier, 9-10). But if you doubt what the senses tell you,
there is no way you can discover your error from subsequent experience. 10.
Could we distinguish between machines that have been
perfectly made to look and behave
like animals and real animals? No. (56) 11.
What are the means by which we can distinguish
between machines that look like
human beings and real human beings? By
reference to the way they use language to not merely give programmed replies,
but respond appropriately to the sense of whatever might be said to them
(56), and by reference to their abilities to solve new problems in new ways
(57). The performance of both tasks
requires, in Descartes’s view, reasoning abilities that cannot be accounted
for as the effects of mechanism since a machine can only do what it was
designed to do and cannot respond appropriately to novel circumstances. Descartes, Meditations I
1. What did
Descartes take to be required if one is to establish anything “firm and
lasting in the sciences,” and why did he think that such drastic measures are
required? We
must reject everything we previously thought we knew and start again entirely
afresh at building up a new system of knowledge. Descartes thought this is necessary because
he discovered that so many of the things he was taught in his youth were
false, and so many other beliefs were based on these false things that almost
the whole edifice of his knowledge was so rotten and unstable that there was
no other way to fix it than by tearing it all down and starting again. (AT
VII 17)
2. What would
justify rejecting an opinion? It
is not necessary to prove that it is false.
Neither is it necessary to find some reason for doubting it or
thinking it is not certain. All that
needs to be done is show that it is founded on something that is open to
doubt. (18)
3. What was the
foundation on which, up to the time of his meditations, Descartes claimed he
had based most of his beliefs? Sense
experience (18).
4. When have the
senses been thought reliable and when unreliable? They
are unreliable only when telling us of small and distant things, but seem
reliable when telling us of ourselves and objects in our immediate
surroundings, though, as it turns out, Descartes thinks that there is a
reason (the fact that we might be dreaming) that ought to lead us to doubt
their veracity even then. (18-19)
5. Are there any
definite signs to distinguish being awake from being asleep according to
Descartes? No.
(19)
6. If there were no
definite signs to distinguish waking from dreaming, what would that prove? That
none of the objects our senses appear to tell us about, including our own
bodies, might actually exist. (19)
7. Even if there
were no definite signs to distinguish waking from dreaming, would there still
be certain things our senses tell us about that are not cast into doubt? If not why not, if so what would these
things be? Descartes
suggested that the dreaming argument can only lead us to doubt whether there
are compound things around us like the objects our senses reveal to us. But he thought that the “simple and
universal things” that our sensory experiences are composed of, like colours
and shapes, ought to correspond to something real, otherwise it would be
difficult to explain how we could come to think of these things. He also thought that there are certain
truths we discover upon comparing these simple and universal things with one
another, notably the truths of arithmetic concerning numbers of these things,
and the truths of geometry concerning shapes, that would have to be true even
in a dream. (19-20)
8. What did
Descartes include in the class of “simple and universal things” from which
everything we imagine is constructed? What
he called “corporeal nature in general,” i.e., whatever generally and
necessarily goes into everything that is called a body. More specifically, this means being
extended in space. More specifically
yet, it includes shape, size, number, place, and duration. (20)
9. In what respect
do the sciences of physics, astronomy and medicine all differ from those of
arithmetic and geometry? In
two respects: first, the former deal with composite things (i.e., things made
up of a number of simple natures), whereas the latter deal only with simple
things (e.g. mathematics just deals with number, and different branches of
geometry deal with shape, measurement, analysis situs,
etc.). Second, the former make claims
about what actually exists in the world, whereas the latter describe their
objects without supposing that they actually exist. (20) 10.
Why did Descartes think that even the truths of
arithmetic and geometry are open to suspicion of possibly being false? For
two reasons. Firstly, because he saw
no reason to rule out the possibility that someone might be deceiving him or
forcing him to deceive himself every time that he performs the proofs of
these truths. Secondly, because people
sometimes make mistakes in calculation, even though they know better. If they make these mistakes sometimes, why
could it not be at least possible that everyone might make them all the time?
(21) 11.
Why did Descartes think that it would be even more
likely that I would always be deceived when performing calculations if God
does not exist than if God does exist? Because
if God does not exist, then the cause of my existing would have to be
something less perfect than God (God being by definition the most perfect
being possible). But if I had a less
than perfect cause, then it is even more likely that there would be some
fault in my make-up that would lead me to always perform calculations
incorrectly. (21) 12.
What would be wrong with admitting that the
existence of my own body, of the world around me, and of the truths of
arithmetic and geometry is highly probable? It
might make us slip into treating them as being certain and using them as
first principles (22). Descartes, Meditations II
1. What is
Descartes’s reason for rejecting the claim that God or some other great being
might instill all his thoughts in him? He
noted that for all he knew he might himself be the cause of these ideas. This seems to be what happens in dreams,
for example. We create all the
thoughts ourselves, even though we are not aware that we are doing so. (AT
VII 24)
2. Why did
Descartes think that each of the following reasons for denying that he exists
is inadequate:
i. I have denied
that I have senses or a body
ii.
I have persuaded myself that nothing at all exists
in the world
iii.
There could be a deceiver who is deceiving me about
this He
noted that he had no reason to believe that he needed to have senses or a
body in order to exist, (ii) he noted that if he had persuaded himself
of something, then he must exist in order to have been persuaded,
(iii) he noted that if he was deceived, then he had to exist in order to
be deceived. (24-25)
3. Why did
Descartes reject the traditional view that he is a rational animal? He
found the terminology obscure and meaningless, and thought that clarifying it
would be so long and difficult a task that it would not be worth the effort.
(25-26)
4. Why did he
reject the “spontaneous and natural” view that he is a body animated by
natural spirits? Because
an evil genius could be deceiving him about the existence of all of these things,
and because he had no grounds to be certain that any spatially extended
bodies exist. (AT VIII 26-27 and 28)
5. What is there
that Descartes found to be inseparable from himself? The
act of thinking. (27)
6. Would Descartes accept
that one ceases to think while in a deep sleep? He
worried that ceasing to think might entail ceasing to exist at p.27. This is an indication of just how essential
he viewed thinking to be to his nature.
7. What are the
sorts of things that are involved with thinking and that are in Descartes
insofar as he is a thinking thing? Doubting,
understanding, affirming, denying, willing, imagining and sensing. (28-29)
8. What is there
that cannot be false in sensing and imagining? The
things that are being sensed or imagined may not exist, but the act of
sensing or imagining must exist in us insofar as these ideas are being had by
us. For, even an evil genius could not
deceive us into thinking we are sensing or imagining without actually making
us sense or imagine. (28)
9. What is there
that is really essential to a sensible body like a piece of wax after we
remove everything that has to do merely with
the way it manifests itself on special occasions and concentrate just
on those features it must always possess in any circumstance whatsoever? That
it is extended somehow in space, capable of taking on a variety of shapes and
sizes, and capable of taking on a variety of sensible qualities. (30-31) 10. How do these
features of the wax come to be known? Through
perception on the part of the mind alone.
That is, through a kind of understanding. 11. How do the
features that Descartes originally perceived the wax to have come to be
known? In
the same way, through an inspection on the part of the mind alone, though
this inspection is more obscure and confused.
Descartes stressed at p.31 that it only seems that perception is a
sensing or touching or imagining. In
fact, it is always a kind of judging or purely mental apprehension, not
involving corporeal sense organs. Descartes, Meditations IIIa (AT VII 34-42)
1. What made
Descartes so sure that nothing we very clearly and distinctly perceives could
be false? My
certainty of my own existence is founded on nothing other than a clear and
distinct perception. If such a
perception could deceive me, I would not be able to trust it when it tells me
that I exist. Since, however, my own
existence is beyond doubt, I must be able to trust it, and so must be able to
trust whatever I perceive at least as clearly and distinctly as I perceive my
own existence. (AT VII 35)
2. Is the existence
of the earth, sky, and stars clearly and distinctly perceived? If not, why not, if so, in what sense? All
that is clearly and distinctly perceived is that my ideas of these things
exist in me; I do not clearly and distinctly perceive the existence of
external objects resembling these ideas.
This is because the dreaming argument leaves me with a sense of doubt
about them. (35)
3. Are the truths
of mathematics clearly and distinctly perceived? If not, why not, if so in what sense? They
are clearly and distinctly perceived.
If they are open to doubt, it is only because of a very tenuous and
metaphysical ground for doubting them: the thought that God might be powerful
enough to deceive us even about things we clearly and distinctly
perceive. This thought enables us to
doubt them when we are not engaged in perceiving them (e.g., when we later
remember having perceived them but do not review them in all their evidence). But while we are engaged in perceiving
them, we cannot consider the doubt to be at all well founded. (36)
4. What is the
proper definition of the term, “idea?” An
idea is a thought that is like an image of a thing. More precisely, it is a thought that is
about something else or that refers to an object. (37)
5. What is the most
frequently occurring error in judgment, in Descartes’s opinion? Supposing
that our ideas depict objects that actually exist outside of us, and depict
them accurately. (37)
6. Explain
Descartes’s distinction between natural impulse and light of nature. By
natural impulse he means a kind of instinct to believe a certain thing, even
though we do not clearly and distinctly perceive its truth. By seeing something in the light of nature,
he means clear and distinct perception.
Natural impulse is not a trustworthy source of truth, but it is hard
to accept that we might ever be mistaken about what we perceive very clearly
and distinctly. (38-39)
7. Why is it an
error to suppose that because I have some ideas that come and go
independently of my will, that therefore these ideas must be caused by
external objects? Because
I only know it on the basis of a natural impulse and those sorts of impulses
have misled me in the past, and because there could be something else in me
aside from my will that brings them about.
This is obviously what happens in the case of dreaming, for
instance. Moreover, we know for a fact
that certain ideas that seem to us to proceed from objects do not do so. For example, there is no bright object
about a foot in diameter that hangs just above the clouds and illuminates the
earth. Even supposing there is a sun,
it is represented by a very different idea.(39)
8. Explain
Descartes’s distinction between formal and objective reality. Formal
reality is the collection of real, positive qualities that go to constitute
the form of a thing. Objective reality
is the collection of real, positive qualities that go to constitute the form
of the object of an idea. (40)
9. Why could an
effect not be greater than its cause? Because
an effect can only acquire its positive and real qualities (those that make
it as great a thing as it is) from its “total” cause (i.e. the totality of
the circumstances that work together to produce the effect), and a cause cannot
give positive and real qualities to an effect unless it has those qualities
to give. (Note that
Descartes did not make these claims positively and in his own voice, but
instead tried to prod his readers to accept them by asking rhetorical
questions. Asking questions can
sometimes be a way of stating what problem needs to be studied next. But at other times, as here, it serves as a
belligerent way of making a point — by shifting the onus onto the reader to
provide reasons to disagree rather than taking on the onus of supplying an
argument to convince the reader. When
someone turns to make a point by way of asking questions, it is a fairly
clear indication that they lack a good argument for their position. Those who have good arguments give those
arguments. They do not need to resort
to rhetoric.) (40) 10.
Can an idea of an object be more perfect than the
object itself? It
can’t. The idea is like a photocopy or
print of an original. It can be more
confused or obscure than the original, but not more perfect in the sense of
containing more than is to be found in the original. (42) Descartes, Meditations IIIb (AT VII 42-52,
cf. Discourse IV, AT VI 33-36)
1. What are the
three main types of ideas from which all other types of ideas may be formed? Ideas
of myself, of physical bodies, and of God.
Combining aspects of my ideas of myself with my ideas of corporeal
things will permit me to form ideas of animals and other human beings, and
combining aspects of my idea of myself with my ideas of God will permit me to
form ideas of all other sorts of spirits. (AT VII 43)
2. What would
justify our considering an idea to be false? Arising
in us due to some imperfection in our nature in virtue of which we
represented the absence of some type of quality (like heat) as if it were
itself a real, positive thing. If cold
is merely the absence of heat, but it nonetheless feels like something to be
cold (and not like nothing at all), then cold would be a materially false
idea. (43-44)
3. How did
Descartes define the term “substance?” It
is a thing that can exist on its own, independently of anything else (at
least for a time). (44)
4. Why did
Descartes think that even his ideas of the extension of corporeal things
could have been invented by him on his own? As
a substance that is capable of existing on its own, I am greater than
extension and its modes, which are mere properties that can only exist within
some substance or other. Descartes
claimed this is a sufficient reason for considering me to be the eminent
cause of these ideas. (An eminent
cause is a cause that does not formally contain its effect, but that rather
belongs to a higher order of being than its effect.) (45)
5. What is the
particular feature of the idea of God that Descartes found it impossible to
explain as an effect of his own nature? God’s
infinity. (45)
6. Why should I
think that my perception of God is prior to my perception of myself? Because
I conceive of myself as imperfect.
Descartes maintained that an awareness of imperfection is only
possible if you have a sense of something more perfect. So from the fact that we conceive of
ourselves as imperfect it follows that we must have a conception of a being
more perfect than we are. (45-46)
7. Why could I not
have created myself? Because
were I powerful and resourceful enough to do that,
I should have been powerful and resourceful enough to give myself some better
cognitive capacities so that I would not have so many doubts or make so many
mistakes. This is because just
bringing a substance (such as myself) into existence out of nothing is more
difficult than bringing a quality (such as a power of knowledge) into
being. To bring a substance into being
is to create something that can exist on its own, whereas to bring a quality
into being is to create something that can only exist in something else. So anyone who could do the former ought to
be capable of doing the latter (48)
8. Why does
conservation not differ from creation? Because
when the present becomes past, what exists at the present gets destroyed (since
the past does not any longer exist).
So to conserve something in existence means constantly recreating it
from one moment to the next. (49)
9. Why could a
chain of human ancestors stretching back to infinity not have produced me? Because
a cause is not just required to account for my first coming into existence
but of my being sustained in existence from one moment to the next. Whatever that cause is, it must be capable
of recreating me (a substance) from one moment to the next. If it was not similarly capable of
recreating itself from one moment to the next, it would require some other
cause to sustain it. But there cannot
be an infinite regress here, especially because we are concerned with what
now sustains me. (Descartes did not go
into any further detail, but perhaps his thought was that it takes time for a
cause to act, so that were there even a short chain of causes, I would pass
out of existence during the time it takes for a more remote cause, A, to act
to sustain a more proximate cause, B, leaving B no more opportunity to act to
sustain me, since I’ve disappeared. It
is interesting that Descartes felt it necessary to add this further appeal to
sustaining causes. While many
philosophers have considered the claim that there cannot be an infinite
regress of past causes for a given effect to be obviously true, others have
not been persuaded and the point continues to be debated today.) But a cause capable of bringing itself into
existence would be capable of giving itself all other perfections. So it would be God. (50) 10.
Why could a number of partially perfect things not
have worked together to each contribute a small part of what I find in
myself? Because
these would not be adequate to produce my idea of God, which represents all
distinct perfections as unified. (50) Descartes, Meditations IV
1. What did
Descartes first propose as an answer to the question of what causes me to be
deceived and led into error? Descartes’s
first proposal was that error does not arise from anything God made and put
into me, but is rather simply due to the fact that I lack something. So I don’t make mistakes because what God
put into me malfunctions, but only because God did not put something into me. This is a consequence of the fact that I
was not created to be a being that possesses all perfections, but instead as
a being that occupies an intermediate point on the scale between possessing
all perfection (being God) and possessing no perfection (being nothing). [It
might be added by way of further justification that variety in creation is a
good thing. Making a variety of things
necessitates making things with varying degrees of perfection ranging between
God himself and nothing. We should praise God for making the
universe as rich in variety as it is rather than complain that we are not
among the more perfect or angelic forms of creation.] (AT VII 54)
2. Why is this
explanation for error “not yet satisfactory?” Because
error does not simply result from something I lack (a privation) but arises
from something that ought to be in me.
If I am made to think and judge, as I am, we would expect that God,
being a perfect artisan, would make me so that I perform that function
correctly. This is not to say that God
could not create imperfect things, but their imperfection would just arise
from their not having been created to perform certain functions. So God could create a thing that just grows
and reproduces but does not sense or know and this thing would simply lack
perfections. But given that he creates
something that is supposed to sense or know, we should expect that, being an
expert artisan, he would have put everything into that thing that it needs to
perform those functions well, and so should not have put anything into it
that would lead it to be deceived. (55)
3. What sorts of
causes are utterly useless in physics?
Why? What
Aristotle called final causes, that is, those having to do with the reason
why something happens (its end). Descartes claimed that knowledge of these
causes would presuppose knowledge of God’s intentions in making things as
they are, and that this is more than we are in a position assume to know,
given the vast difference between God and us.
(55)
4. What must we be
careful to take into account when ascertaining the degree of perfection of a
thing? How
well it fits in with the wholes of which it is a part and whether its
imperfections might not contribute to a greater perfection in the whole.
(55-56)
5. On what does
error depend? A
capacity of knowing and a capacity of judging or affirming, which involves an
act of will. (56)
6. What is the
proper function of the intellect? All
that the intellect does is perceive ideas (56). He says that the ideas are ones that I
“can” make a judgment about, suggesting that it is not actually the intellect
that judges, but the will. However, as
later becomes clear, the intellect can in certain cases compel the will. (59)
7. In what sense is
the intellect imperfect? It
is imperfect to the extent that it does not clearly or distinctly perceive
all the ideas that there are to be perceived. (56)
8. Why can we not
fault God for creating us with this kind of imperfection in our intellects? We
cannot fault God for making us with intellects that are not able to clearly
or distinctly perceive all ideas because this is merely a limitation on what
we are able to achieve with our intellects and not a cause of error or
imperfection in what our intellects are able to achieve. Insofar as they simply perceive ideas, they
do not judge and do not make mistakes, and insofar as they compel the will to
judge, they never compel it wrongly.
They just can’t make judgments about everything. This is a limitation, not a defect. (56)
9. In what does the
will solely consist? An
ability to adopt an attitude of affirmation or denial or approval or
rejection that does not arise from any external constraint, but merely from
our own nature. Note that Descartes is
not here concerned with the freedom of action, but merely with the freedom of
willing. Whether we can act on what we
will is another question. (57) 10.
What is the lowest grade of freedom of the will and
how does it differ from more perfect grades? The
lowest grade of freedom is when we do not see any reason to prefer one choice
over another, and merely pick one. In
higher grades of freedom, there is something in us that determines us to
prefer a certain choice. This thing
might either be our understanding or some instinct or insight that God has
implanted in us. The freedom we feel
in circumstances of indifference is of a lower grade because it proceeds from
an inadequacy in our knowledge. (57-58) 11.
What is the cause of error? An
imbalance between the powers of the will and the intellect, which allows for
the possibility that the will might determine us to make a judgment in circumstances
where we lack understanding. (58) 12.
How are errors to be avoided? By
using our power of will to refrain from judging unless we feel our will
determined to do so by a clear and distinct perception on the part of the
understanding. (59) 13.
God could have made me more cautious, so that my
caution restrain me from ever willing to affirm something I do not clearly
and distinctly understand. But he
didn’t. Can he be faulted for that? Why or why not? Because
God may have some inscrutable purpose for allowing this imperfection in my
nature. (61) Descartes, Meditations V
1. What qualities
did Descartes believe are clearly and distinctly perceived? Extension
in length, breadth, and depth, together with its shapes, sizes, positions and
motions, plus various particular geometrical properties and truths concerning
these things. (AT VII 63)
2. How is it that
Descartes could say that my ideas of geometrical shapes are not made by me,
even though I can imagine them on my own, and call them up or make them go
away at will? Because
they compel me to conceive their content in a certain way (in accord with the
laws of geometry) and I have no power to imagine them differently. For example, cubes can only be imagined to
have six faces. No more than four
equidistant points can be imagined. (64)
3. How did
Descartes respond to the objection that I may have learned of geometrical
shapes from sensory experience of similarly shaped objects, and that the
reason why I seem to “remember” these shapes rather than to have produced
them myself in my own imagination is that I am really just remembering
something I have seen before? He
observed that I am able to call up many shapes in my imagination that I am
sure I have never seen before, yet these shapes also have geometrical
properties that appear to exist independently of my will, and in this sense
are more like something I “recollect” than like something I hve myself produced. (64-65)
4. Why, according
to Descartes, can existence not be separated from the “essence” (i.e., the
definition) of God? Because
by definition God is an all-perfect being, and Descartes insisted that
existence is a perfection. (65)
5. How did
Descartes respond to the objection that I might arbitrarily attach the idea
of existence to the idea of God in my imagination, so that from the fact that
I choose to make this connection, it in no way follows that the connection
must be true and that God must exist? He
claimed that it is not up to me whether or not to attach the idea of
existence to the idea of God, any more than it is up to me to attach the idea
of internal angles equal to two right angles to the idea of a triangle. The nature of the idea of God itself forces
this result, and we have no ability to think otherwise. (66)
6. How did Descartes
respond to the objection that just because I cannot form an idea of God that
does not include the idea of existence, it does not follow that there must be
an object (God) that corresponds to this idea? He
admitted that it is generally true that just because things are connected in
our ideas, it does not follow that anything exists corresponding to those
ideas. Just because we cannot think of
a mountain without a valley (or an up slope without a down slope) it does not
follow that a mountain (or a slope) exists.
However, in the case of the idea of God, existence is one of the
things that is found to be necessarily connected with the other things that
are thought in the idea. So since it
cannot be separated from those other things, any more than an up slope can be
separated from a down slope, it follows that those other things, which are
characteristic of God, must exist, and hence that God must exist. My thought of God does not bring this
result about, any more than my thought brings it about that a cube must have
exactly six faces. It is instead the
nature of the thing itself that brings it about that my thought must exhibit
these features. (66-67)
7. Supposing that
the existence of God is not yet certain, under what circumstances would it be
possible to doubt what one has clearly and distinctly perceived? The
circumstance where one is no longer actively engaged in having the clear and
distinct perception, but is doing other things and merely recalls having had
the clear and distinct perception in the past. Under these circumstances, the thought that
one has often made mistakes in calculation in the past or that there might be
an evil genius can induce doubt. (69-70)
8. How is it that
all demonstrations in mathematics might be said to rest on a prior demonstration
of the existence of God? Because
demonstrations in mathematics depend on clear and distinct perception, which,
as long as the existence of God is in question, can only be trusted at the
time it is actually being experienced.
(Because it is only at that time that the understanding compels the
will to believe.) At other times, when
we are not clearly and distinctly perceiving the result, we can doubt it on
the grounds that we have made errors in calculation in the past or might be
deceived. However, once the existence
of God has been clearly and distinctly perceived, we can say that if the
demonstration was in fact clearly and distinctly perceived, then what it
tells us is reliable because we cannot be deceived or mistaken about such
things. Thus, a proof of God’s
existence provides mathematical demonstrations with evidence they did not
previously have. (70) Descartes, Meditations VIa (AT VII 71-80)
1. What sorts of
material things can at least possibly exist? Those
that are the objects of pure mathematics.
Such objects are considered to only have those properties that
mathematics deals with: shape, size, motion, and divisibility into a number
of parts. They are not considered as
bearing any sensible qualities. (AT VII 71)
2. How does
imagination differ from understanding? When
we imagine we not only grasp the definition or the simple natures that go
into making the thing what it is, but “see the thing as if it were present,”
i.e., we make something like a “picture” of the thing. (72)
3. Why is imagination
not part of my essence? Essence
has to do with what a thing has to have in order to be the sort of thing that
it is. And I can quite well imagine
myself still being a thinking thing, and even still having all the thoughts I
now have (since imagination merely duplicates some of the thoughts I have in
my understanding) without the imagination.
So it can have nothing to do with my essence. (73)
4. Why is it not
without reason that people think that they sense bodies existing in space
outside of them rather than sense only their own thoughts? Because
these ideas occur independently of their wills, and because they are much
more vivid, explicit, and detailed than the ideas formed in imagination. (75)
5. What sort of
things are taught to us by nature? That
we need to flee what causes pain as it is damaging the body, that what is
pleasing is beneficial to the body, that particular sensations (such as
hunger or thirst) are indicative of a need to perform certain actions (eat or
drink), that objects exist in space outside of us and resemble the sensations
we receive, that we have bodies to which we are intimately connected so that
we can move them and feel pleasure and pain from them. (75-76)
6. What allowed
Descartes to claim that the fact that I experience a pain in a certain part
of my body is not enough to prove that that part exists? One
thing is the dreaming argument of Meditations I, but on 77 he mentions
another one: the case of the phantom limb.
People who have had a limb amputated report still experiencing it as
if it were there, so obviously a limb need not be present for a pain in that
limb to be felt by the mind.
7. Why should the
fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing without the other
entail that they are really different from one another? Because
the ability to clearly and distinctly conceive the one without thinking of
the other shows that there would be no impossibility in God bringing the one
about without or apart from the other.
And that means that they must really be different things. God could not bring about a mountain
without a valley (since a valley just is what is at the base of a mountain),
because these are one and the same thing considered under different
descriptions. But if God can bring
about the one without the other, then it is not merely the descriptions that
are different, but the things. (78)
8. Explain the
nature of the relation that Descartes supposed to hold between himself and
his powers of sensing and imagining. He
thought that these capacities are not really part of me, but are at best
attached to me. I could exist as a
thinking being even if I were to lack them, but they would need to be
instantiated in some human being or other in order to exist. (78)
9. Why would God be
a deceiver if my ideas of extended bodies were not caused by extended bodies? Because
these ideas must have some cause that contains extension either formally or
eminently and God gave me a strong inclination to believe that this cause
contains extension formally and not eminently. Since there is no way I could discover the
error of this inclination were it mistaken (since it has been established
that God could have created material things), and since I can conceive of
myself perfectly well without having to think of it, which means it must be
really separate from me, God would be a deceiver were he to have given it to
me were what it tells me false. (79-80) Descartes, Meditations VIb
1. Why is it that
even though Descartes thought he could demonstrate that corporeal things must
exist, he still did not think that those things exist exactly as we grasp
them by sense? What must be true of
them? Because
what our senses reveal to us is in very many cases obscure and confused. Corporeal things need only contain what we
clearly and distinctly perceive. As it
turns out, this means that they must be extended somehow. But exactly how they are extended, what
particular sizes and shapes and motions they have, or whether they contain
anything in addition to extension are not things we clearly or distinctly
perceive. (AT VII 80)
2. What things did
Descartes think are taught to us by nature and what by a habit of making
reckless judgments? By
nature we are taught that we have bodies and that our sensations of hunger,
thirst, and pain indicate when these bodies are in a less than optimal
state. We are also taught that other
bodies exist, that our sensations of different sensible qualities arise from
differences in these bodies, and that sensations of pleasure and pain
indicate whether these bodies are harmful or beneficial to our bodies. Reckless judgment teaches us that there is
empty space and that bodies have exactly those sensible qualities and those
modes of extension that they are peceived to have.
(80-82)
3. What is the
proper purpose for which sensations were given to the mind? To
signify those things that are harmful or beneficial to the continued union of
mind and body. (83)
4. Did Descartes
think that all the motions of our bodies are mechanically caused? No. Some are determined by the will and the
mind. (84)
5. What is
necessary if the mind is to be affected by the body? A
particular part of the brain, the common sense, must be affected. (86)
6. Does the brain
feel pain? No. It simply undergoes a motion, transmitted
to it by the nerves. It is the mind
that experiences a sensation of pain as a result of certain motions occurring
in the brain. (87)
7. Why is it in
fact better that our senses should occasionally deceive us about what is good
or bad for us? Because
it is preferable that they tell us what is good or bad for us in the vast
majority of cases than that they not tell us anything at all. And there is no other way they could
work. They have to communicate what is
happening at the surface of the sense organ to the brain. Since the brain is widely separated from
the sense organs, information has to travel along a chain of nerves from the
sense organs to the brain. That
creates the possibility of deception when other causes than the usual ones
move the nerves or the brain in the same way. (88-89)
8. What needs to be
done in order to be sure that our senses are not deceiving us? We
need to check the reports that a given sense organ is giving against those
supplied by other organs, bring in our memories of what our senses have told
us at earlier times about the thing we are examining, and check that all this
information is consistent with what our understanding, through clear and
distinct perception, tells us could be possible. (89)
9. In what does the
difference between dreaming and waking experience consist? Descartes
claimed that dreams involve a discontinuity in the sequence of events. (89) Descartes, Principles I.1-23
1. Why should we
think that we are the victims of prejudices or “preconceived opinions” that have
kept us from knowledge of the truth? Because
we began life as infants who did not have full reasoning abilities and made
infantile judgments about the objects of sensory experience that may not have
been rationally justified. Note that
Descartes was not opposing reasoning to sense experience. His claim was not that as infants we could
only rely on sense experience and it deluded us about things whereas reason
reveals the truth. He instead meant to
oppose infantile judgment to rational judgment. His point was that, as infants, we made
infantile judgments about the nature of the objects of sensory
experience. These judgments are
inconsistent with what reason tells us about those same objects (the objects
of sensory experience). Descartes is
not opposing sensible knowledge of a sensible world to rational knowledge of
a purely intelligible world, but irrational or pre-rational opinion about the
sensible world with rational knowledge of the sensible world. (Princ. I.1)
2. What is the
“scale” of the doubt that Descartes proposed in Principles I.1? What
things does he propose to call into doubt and what things would he consider
to be above doubt? He
proposed to doubt “everything which we find to contain even the smallest
suspicion of uncertainty.” In other words,
if you can conceive any reason to doubt something, however extravagant that
reason may be, you should doubt it, so that the only things that are immune
to doubt are those things that are so obvious and certain that no reason can
be offered for thinking they might be otherwise than they are. (Princ. I.1)
3. What is called
into doubt by the fact that our senses sometimes deceive us and by the fact
that there is no certain way of distinguishing being awake from dreaming? The
actual existence of all the objects of sensory experience. Note that the stress is placed on
“existence,” rather than on “object.”
We do not doubt the objects of sensory experience themselves in the
sense of doubting that they are what we conceive them to be. We don’t doubt that a red square is red or
is square. We don’t doubt that we have
the concept of a red square or worry that our concept of a red square might
be a concept of something entirely different.
We only doubt that it exists where and when it is presented to us, or
that what actually exists in the place and at the time where we think a red
square exists really is a red square.
(Princ. I.4)
4. Should we doubt
principles that are revealed to us by reasoning? If so, why?
If not, why not? Yes,
we should, for two reasons. One is
that we see people around us make mistakes in reasoning and yet be convinced
that they are right, which proves that it is possible to be deceived about
the results of demonstration. The
other is that we cannot presume that we were so perfectly made that our
reasoning powers should perform flawlessly.
Even if our cause was an all-perfect being, it could have made us such
that we are always deceived about matters we know by reasoning or
demonstration. After all, since it
obviously did make us so that we are deceived about these matters sometimes,
this establishes a possibility that it could have made us so that we are
deceived about these matters all the time. (Princ.
I.5)
5. What are the
limits of human freedom? We
have no ability to refrain from believing things that are completely certain
and that have been thoroughly examined.
(Princ. I.6. As will be discovered later, this is
not actually a limitation, in Descartes’s estimation, but the highest
expression of freedom. So it turns out
that there are no limits on human freedom at all. It is “infinite.” This will be considered later.)
6. What makes my
existence certain (beyond all possibility of doubt)? Because
to doubt that I exist is to think and to think is to exist, so I cannot doubt
that I exist without providing myself with a certain demonstration that I do
in fact exist. (Princ. I.7)
7. What am I
certain of when I claim to be certain of my own existence? What else, besides myself, am I certain of
insofar as I have this certainty of my own existence? Just
that we have thoughts. We remain
uncertain that anything revealed to us by the senses is true, and so remain
uncertain that we have bodies. My
certainty of myself is therefore inseparable from certainty of the existence
of certain thoughts, understood as things that “happen within me” and of
which I have some awareness. This
means, in effect, that I am certain of the existence of my thoughts or
concepts of all the objects of sensory experience, considered as thoughts or
concepts in me. Note that, in speaking
in this way, Descartes was implying that we are certain, not just of the
thoughts, but of something that “contains” them — something “within” which
they occur. This container for
thoughts is myself. So in being
certain that I exist I am certain of the existence of at least two different
sorts of things: myself and my thoughts. (Princ.
I.9)
8. What is “known
by the natural light?” That
nothingness has no attributes or qualities. (Princ.
I.11. By the
way, this sudden appeal to the “natural light” as a kind of oracle stands in
stunning incongruity with what has been said up to now about only accepting
what is beyond any shadow of a doubt, particularly when we consider that
Descartes meant to employ the contrapositive principle that the existence of attributes
or qualities implies the existence of something (some substance) that has
those attributes or qualities. One
would have expected some demonstration of this “nothingness principle at
least on a level with that provided for certainty of self existence.)
9. What determines
that there must be some substance in existence? The
presence of attributes and qualities. (Princ. I.11) 10.
What makes our knowledge of a substance “clear” The
greater the number of attributes and qualities we find in a thing, the
clearer our knowledge. (Princ. I.11) 11.
Why do we find more attributes in our minds than in
anything else? Because
any attribute or quality we think we find in anything else is experienced by
way of some idea we find in ourselves and so indicates the presence of a correspondent
attribute or quality of the mind (though, of course, not necessarily the same
one). (Princ. I.11) 12.
Where does the power of sense perception reside? In
the mind, not the body. (Princ. I.12) 13.
What makes it of paramount importance for us to
determine what ultimately caused us to exist? Keeping
within the bounds of the doubt articulated over Princ.
I.1-6, it is not possible for us to know anything outside of ourselves. Limiting ourselves to what we find in us,
it is possible to identify certain ideas and “common notions” and to attempt
to demonstrate truths about these ideas by appeal to the “common
notions.” (This is perhaps already
what was done in Princ. I.7 and 11.) But we cannot be assured of the truth of the
results of these demonstrations as long as we think that we may have been so
imperfectly designed as to make systematic errors in demonstration — errors
that could in principle not be corrected by adopting a correct method and
making frequent reviews. So before we
can proceed to demonstrate anything further, we need to establish what
designed us and whether it would have made us like that. (Princ.
I.13) 14.
Under what conditions is it possible to doubt the
results of demonstrations? When
not attending to the sequence of steps involved in the proof, but remarking
instead on the history of past errors in proofs of a like nature and the
possibility that we may have been designed so as to make systematic errors in
demonstration. However, while
attending to the steps of the proof themselves, this is not possible. (Princ. I.13) 15.
What is contained in the idea that the mind finds in
itself of God that guarantees that the object of this idea must necessarily
and eternally exist? The
concept of supreme perfection. Though
not stated explicitly here, Descartes believed that a being that does not
exist would be less perfect than one that does exist, and one that exists
only contingently would be less perfect than one that exists necessarily and
eternally. (Princ. I.14) 16.
Why must we conclude that the supreme
being does exist? Because
we perceive that to be a consequence of what we find contained in our idea of
God, in the same way that we perceive having internal angles equal to two
right angles to be a consequence of what we find contained in our idea of a
triangle. (Princ. I.14) 17.
In what way are ideas different and in what way are
they all alike? They
are all alike in being “modes” of thinking (different ways in which the act
of thinking is “modified”). They
differ in depicting different things.
(Princ.
I.17) 18.
What is required to give someone the idea of an
intricate object? What assures us that
this must be so? An
equally intricate object. (Princ. I.17)
We are assured of this by the “light of nature” (this is a second reference
to the oracular source of knowledge mentioned in I.11), which on this
occasion declares that causes must actually contain as much or more than is
found in their effects. In this case,
the cause of an idea must contain all the real qualities represented in the
idea, or something greater than those qualities. (Princ. I.18) 19.
How can we have an idea of supreme perfections if we
are ourselves imperfect? Because
it was put in us by a supremely perfect being, who must therefore exist. (Princ. I.18) 20.
Why must the whole world be continually recreated
from one moment to the next? Because
whatever presently exists becomes past and what is past no longer
exists. This means that the bare
passage of time suffices to destroy everything, and would do so were there
not some cause continually recreating it with each passing moment. (Princ. I.21) Descartes, Principles I.24-50
1. What is the way
to acquire the most perfect scientific knowledge? We
are to start from knowledge of God, considered as an all-perfect being and as
cause of everything else, and then attempt to deduce from this what sorts of
things God would have caused to come to be. (Princ.
I.24)
2. What things are
to be regarded as finite, what things as infinite, and what things as
indefinite? Finite
things are those that have some limit.
Indefinite things are things that have no limit so far as we can tell,
or things that are such that, for any given limit, they can be imagined to
extend beyond it. Examples are space,
time, and the things that occupy space and time. God alone is to be regarded as infinite,
only God is properly known to be without all bounds. (Princ.
I.26-27)
3. Distinguish
between two different ways in which God could be considered as cause of
things and give Descartes reasons for asserting that we can only have
knowledge of one of these sorts of cause. Principles
I.28 speaks of efficient and final causes.
A final cause is a cause that acts to achieve some purpose. While God undoubtedly created the universe
in order to achieve some purpose, Descartes maintained that we have no
knowledge of what that purpose might have been and are therefore in no
position to consider God as final cause of the universe. However, he did think that certain things
have been revealed to us about God’s nature that put us in a position to draw
conclusions about the manner in which God acts to do things and the general
sorts of things that God would act to bring about. When we do this we consider God just as an
“efficient” or prior cause that acts in a law like way on things to modify
them, though its reasons for so doing so are not specified.
4. What sorts of
effects should we consider God to be the cause of, and what sort of effects
should we not consider God to be the cause of? We
should consider God to be the cause of those effects that are evident to our
senses (the universe and the things in it).
Consistent with the answer to the previous question, we should not be
speculating about what goals God might have aimed at achieving in creating
these sensible things. (Princ. I.28)
5. In what sense is
God not the cause of our errors? The
strict and positive sense. What this
means is further explained in Princ. I.31. (Princ. I.29)
6. Under what
conditions would God deserve to be called a deceiver? If
he gave us a power of knowledge that led us to false beliefs even when we
were using it correctly. (Princ. I.30)
7. What can we be
certain of once we have established the existence of God? All
the truths of mathematics and the other demonstrative sciences, but also
everything that is clearly and distinctly apprehended in sensory experience,
regardless of whether we are awake or dreaming, so long as we just focus on
what is really clearly apprehended in it. (Princ.
I.30)
8. On what does
error depend? Our
will. (Princ.
I.31) As specified in more detail
later (Princ. I.33-35), error arises when we make a
judgment about something we have not accurately perceived. This is something the will gives us power
to do.
9. Why do errors
not require the concurrence of God for their production? Because
they don’t arise from anything God has given to us, but rather from something
God has refrained from giving to us.
As Descartes put it, they arise from something negative or privative —
something lacking. (Princ. I.31) 10.
Why is God not to be blamed either for not having
given us an infinite intellect or for not having limited our powers of will? God
is under no obligation to his creatures to put everything he possibly can
into them. Were that the case God
would be restricted to only creating rival gods. He is likewise only to be praised for
giving our wills infinite scope since this is what alone has made us free
agents and so beings of a higher order than automatons. (Princ.
I.36-37) 11.
How is freedom of the will to be reconciled with
divine preordination of all things? We
don’t know. But this is actually the
key to the reconciliation rather than an admission of defeat. Descartes did propose to explain how to
effect such a reconciliation in Princ. I.41, and he
meant it. The reconciliation is
effected by saying that while we are sure that God’s power is infinite, and
sure as a consequence that he must have forseen and
preordained all things, we cannot presume to fully understand this power,
precisely because it is infinite and a grasp of infinities is beyond us. Just as it is beyond us to say whether an
infinite number is even or odd, so it is beyond us to say how God’s infinite
power is exercised. This means that
something that we very clearly and distinctly perceive, such as our own will,
can neither be rejected nor supposed to be inconsistent with divine
preordination. Because the manner of
divine preordination is incomprehensible and freedom undeniable, we must
accept that freedom is somehow consistent with preordination. 12.
What must we do to avoid error? Restrict
assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive. (Princ. I.43) 13.
How do we know whether or not we have clearly and
distinctly perceived something? If
it is really clearly and distinctly perceived, it is beyond your power to
refrain from assenting to it. This is
because the understanding determines the will when it perceives clearly and
distinctly and only leaves it free to assent or deny when it does not. (Princ. I.43) 14.
What is meant by clear and distinct perception? To
be clearly perceived, a thing must be perceived in such a way that you can
tell it apart from other things (by analogy, when a visible object stimulates
the eye sufficiently to make it stand out from its surroundings, it is seen
clearly). To be distinctly perceived,
a thing must be perceived in such a way that you can tell its parts apart
from one another (by analogy, a visible object is seen distinctly when you
can not only tell it apart from its surroundings, but tell its parts apart
from one another). (Princ. I.45) 15.
Identify two ultimate classes of things and three
classes of affections of things. Thinking
things, also called minds or thinking substances, and material things, also
called bodies or extended substances.
There are affections of thinking things, which are the various
modifications of the acts of willing and perceiving, affections of extended
things, which are the various ways extension can be modified (shape, size,
position, order, motion), and finally affections arising from the close union
of thinking and extended things: appetites, emotions, and sensations. (Princ. I.48) 16.
How is it that eternal truths or common notions
might not be clearly conceived by everyone? Because
they have conflicting preconceptions gained from erroneous childhood inferences.
(Princ. I.50) Descartes, Principles I.51-76
1. What is a
substance? A
thing that exists independently of anything else. (Princ.
I.51)
2. In what sense
are bodies and created minds substances? They
only depend on God for their existence, not on anything else. (Princ. I.52)
3. What is required
in order to know a substance? Experience
of one or more of its attributes. (Princ. I.52)
4. What is it about
thought and extension that makes the one the sole principal attribute of mind
and the other the sole principal attribute of body? All
the other attributes of mind are merely modifications of our manner of
thinking, and all the other attributes of body are merely modifications of
extension. Though very radical, this
claim is here presented without any exposition or defense. It entails that mass, solidity, hardness,
ductility, brittleness, viscosity, salinity, acidity, and many other material
qualities, not to mention colour, taste, and heat and cold, are actually only
ways in which extension is “modified.” (Princ.
I.53)
5. What sort of
“things” are duration, order, and number? They
are different “modes” or modifications of the existence of substances of any
sort. (Princ. I.55)
6. From what do
universals arise? The
fact that we make use of a single idea to think of all the individuals that
resemble one another in some way. (Princ. I.59)
7. What is a
universal term? A
term used to name ideas of the sort described in the previous answer. (Princ. I.59)
8. Distinguish
between genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. A
genus is a universal idea (an idea of the sort described in the answer to
question 6). A species is a universal
idea that represents just one specific kind of individual thing that is
represented by the universal idea. The
differentia is the distinguishing property of the species, the thing that
makes it a member of that species rather than of some other that falls under
the genus. Properties are things that
follow from the differentia, and therefore are further things that all
members of the species must have.
Accidents are things that members of the species may or may not have.
(Princ. I.59)
9. Distinguish
between real, modal, and conceptual distinction. A
real distinction is a distinction between different substances or, in the
case of extended substances, between the spatially distinct parts of those
substances. In these cases the things
being distinguished can be thought of one independently of the other. E.g., God apart from anything else, mind
apart from body and body apart from mind, and any part of body apart from the
surrounding parts. A modal distinction
is either a distinction between a mode and a substance or between two modes
of the same substance. In this case,
the mode cannot be conceived apart from the substance it is distinguished
from, though the substance can be conceived apart from the mode. Even where two modes of the same substance
are considered, they can be conceived apart from one another, but neither of
them can be conceived apart from the common substance they belong to. (Distinctions between modes of different
substances are better regarded as real distinctions.) Conceptual distinctions are distinctions
between substances and their attributes or between attributes of the same
substance. In this case we cannot form
a clear idea of the distinguished things in separation from one another. (Princ. I.60-62) 10.
When is the distinction between extension and body
conceptual and when is it modal? It
is conceptual when we consider extension as the principal attribute of body,
since in this case we cannot clearly conceive the substance, body, without
conceiving its attribute. It is modal
when we are considering some specific way in which extension is modified (as
of this size or shape or that, in motion or at rest). In this case we can very well conceive the
substance having some other modification instead. (Princ.
I.63-64) 11.
What have we taken for certain and indubitable from
early childhood? That
bodies existing outside us have qualities that resemble those given in our
sensations, and in particular that there is something on the surfaces of
bodies that resembles our sensations of colour. (Princ.
I.66) 12.
Where does the pain of a stubbed toe exist? In
the mind (not in the toe). (Princ. I.67) 13.
When are pain and colour clearly and distinctly
perceived? When
they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts. (Princ.
I.68) 14.
Why are pain and colour not
clearly and distinctly perceived when judged to be real things
existing outside of the mind? Because
then we have no way of understanding what they are. (Princ.
I.68) (This extraordinary claim is not
further justified at this point.
Descartes’s view may have been that we don’t understand how to account
for colour and pain as modifications of extension, but that would beg the
question of why we should think that extension is the only attribute of body
when our senses tell us that it has other attributes as well. It is not clear why Descartes’s charge that
we don’t understand what colour and pain are couldn’t be answered by saying
that they are exactly what they appear to be: colours on the surface of
bodies, and pains located in bodily organs.
If this is not good enough, then it is not clear why it should be good
enough to say that they are sensations existing in minds. We have no more idea how minds can taken on colours than we do how bodies can take them on.) 15.
What must our judgments of colour be like in order
to avoid error? We
must judge that there is something we do not know in whatever things it may
turn out to be that affect our senses that causes our sensations of colour. (Princ. I.70) 16.
Do infants see objects as coloured? No. They experience all of their sensations
only as states of themselves. (Princ. I.71) 17.
What initially led us, as children, to suppose that
objects exist outside of us? Moving
around and discovering that the shaped things we perceive do not move with us
and so appear to have an external existence. (Princ.
I.71) 18.
What initially led us, as children, to attribute our
sensations to external objects? Moving
around and discovering that objects with characteristically different shapes
seemed to be responsible for causing particular sensations. (Princ. I.71) 19.
On what basis did we originally ascribe reality to
objects? Not
on the basis of whether or not they are extended, but with reference to how
capable they are of harming or benefiting us. (Princ.
I.71) 20.
Identify four main causes of error. Preconceptions
or false judgments formed in childhood; an inability to forget those
preconceptions; difficulties in attending to things that cannot be sensed or
imagined; and a tendency to use words in place of thinking of what they mean.
(Princ. I.71-74) Descartes, Principles II.1-23
1. Why would God be
a deceiver if material things did not exist? Because
we have ideas of them and we also have the idea that these ideas are not the
products of our own will but are caused by something that is like what the
ideas represent. Since God is not like
these ideas (not being an extended body), he would be deceiving us were he to
give them to us or allow anything that is not similar to them to give them to
us. (Princ. II.1)
2. What do pain and
other sensations teach us? That
there is a particular body to which we are closely conjoined, and that some
external bodies are beneficial, others harmful to our union with this body. (Princ. II.2-3)
3. What is
hardness, as far as our senses are concerned? The
sensation of strain we get in our muscles when we try to push or squeeze
something and it does not yield. (Princ. II.4.)
4. Why does the
nature of body not depend on weight, hardness, colour, or other such
qualities? Because
it can be conceived to exist without them, from which it follows that it is
at least modally distinct from them (so that they are at best “accidents” and
not properties or primary attributes).
Descartes would have wanted to go further and maintain that the
distinction is real as well as modal. (Princ. II.4)
5. Why do
preconceived opinions about rarefaction and empty space confuse the truth
that the nature of body is just extension? Because
they lead us to suppose that body must be something more than space. The first leads to this consequence
indirectly, by leading us to suppose that the extension can vary while the
body remains the same, so that body must be something more than extension,
whereas the second leads to it directly, by saying that the one can be
separated one from the other and so cannot be the same as it. (Princ. II.5)
6. What makes some
bodies denser than others? Their
shape. Rare bodies have pores or
holes. (Princ. II.6)
7. Why should we
think that the extension constituting a body is exactly the same with that
constituting a space? Because
we cannot identify anything else that is essential to a body and that it
could not exist without. (Princ. II.11)
8. What are we
thinking of when we think of the extension of the place that a body occupied
after it has moved away from that place? A
surface (perhaps defined by the outer surfaces of the immediately surrounding
bodies) that has the same size and shape and that is in the same position
relative to certain landmark bodies. (Princ. II.12)
9. What is the
point of Descartes’s example of the man on the ship? That
place is nothing absolute but is merely defined relative to surrounding
bodies that we consider to be immobile (though from other points of view they
may not be immobile, but something else may be and there may be nothing that
is absolutely fixed and that therefore forms an ultimate frame of reference).
(Princ. II.13) 10.
Distinguish between internal and external place. Internal
place is the extension of a body, considered as a property of that body that
moves around with it wherever it goes.
External place is the surface common, at any point in time, to a body
and the bodies that immediately surround it, and considered merely as a mode
that any of a number of bodies could indifferently have. As long as this surface continues to have
the same size and shape and to be in the same position relative to landmark
bodies considered to be at rest, we consider the external place to the same,
even though the body in the place may change, or the body stay where it is
and the immediately surrounding bodies change (as with a ship on a river
being held in the same place while the wind blows in one direction and the
stream flows in the other. (Princ. II.15) 11.
Why can there be no such thing as a vacuum? Because
extension is a property and it is a complete contradiction that there should
be any property where there is nothing to have that property. Consequently, where there is extension
there must be body. (Princ. II.16) 12.
Why could even God not remove all body from a vessel
while preventing any other body from taking the place those contents had
occupied? Because
extension just is body, so where there is extension there must be body. To remove all body whatsoever from a vessel
would be to remove the extension from between the walls of the vessel, that is to cause them to collapse onto one
another. (Princ. II.18) 13.
Why can there be no more matter in a vessel filled
with lead or gold than in one filled with air? Because
the quantity of matter does not depend on the kind of material or its weight
or density but simply on how much space it takes up. (Princ.
II.19) 14.
What do Descartes’s claims about space have to do
with his argument against the possibility of atoms? (The title of the article claims that the
argument depends on the position on space, but the article itself only talks
about what follows from the power of God.) The
argument also depends on the claim that any atom, however small, must be
conceived to take up some space. That
is a consequence of the simple identification of space with body that
Descartes had been arguing for over the preceding articles. If it does not take up some space, it just
isn’t a body. But if it does take up
space, then it can be conceived to have a right half that is in a different
place from its left half and so is divisible, at least by the power of God. (Princ. II.20) 15.
In what sense are all materials (gold, lead, salt,
sulphur, mercury, water, air, etc.) identical in kind? What accounts for all the differences
between what are falsely considered to be different kinds of materials? They
are all made of the same thing, namely extension. The only differences arise from how this
extension is cut up into parts, and how these parts are shaped, ordered, and
moving. Descartes, Principles II.33-40 and 64; IV.189-199
and 203-4; Discourse VI (AT VI: 63-65)
1. What relevance
does the fact that there can be no vacuum and no rarefaction or condensation
(in the sense of a gain or loss of volume by a material that completely fills
the space it occupies throughout the change) have for the theory of motion? It
implies that the only motion can be rotation of a “ring” of matter. (Princ. II.33)
2. Why must matter
be indefinitely divisible? To
make it possible for motion of irregularly sized or shaped rings of matter to
occur without creating a vacuum between moving parts or causing rarefaction
or condensation. Since the planets
move in ellipses, Descartes had to account for this phenomenon somehow. (Princ. II.34)
3. What might the
“bodies as wide as the space at E” referred to in article II.35 be? Planets
orbiting around the sun in elliptical orbits.
4. What might
Descartes be referring to when he speaks in article II.36 of changes (sc. in the quantity of motion in the
universe) that we know to take place either by experience or revelation? Possibly
changes produced by the free volitions of human minds to move or halt their
bodies.
5. Why must the
quantity of motion in the universe be preserved? Because
God, being a perfect being, is constant in the way he acts. For Descartes this means that having once
decided to create something, God will preserve that thing in existence. Why constancy should have to be expressed
in this particular way is unclear. One
might be constant by letting the quantity of motion continuously decay, or
continuously increase, or continuously oscillate. (Princ.
II.36.)
6. Is it natural
for bodies that have been set in motion to slow down and stop? What is it that teaches us the answer to
this, sense experience or understanding? No. We know this by understanding (specifically
by a deduction from the constancy of God).
Sense experience teaches us that things naturally tend to rest, but
this is only because all the bodies on the earth run into things that slow
them down before long. (Princ. II.37)
7. What is the
result of movements caused in the brain by the nerves? The
soul or mind is affected in different ways, corresponding to the different
movements. (Princ. IV.189) God will have pre-ordained that particular
movements will always particular sensations, and will have set things up so
that, when the senses are functioning normally, the sensations are ones that
impel us to act in ways appropriate to preserve the mind/body union.
8. Propose a
Cartesian remedy for depression (sadness not caused by any obvious
misfortune). Since
Descartes attributed this feeling to a thickening of the blood around the
heart, causing nerves from the heart to transmit impulses to the brain that
are ordained to cause a feeling of sadness (Princ.
IV.190), a remedy would consist in doing something to thin the blood. Perhaps drinking copious amounts of water.
9. What conclusion
should be drawn from the fact that people complain of feeling pains in a limb
that has been amputated? That
pains do not actually occur in the body parts where we think they are felt,
but only in the brain (or mind) where they arise as a consequence of motions
transmitted by the nerves (in this case, the stumps of the severed nerves
being moved in the same way they were previously moved when the limb was
being affected painfully). Moreover,
that the same is the case of all of our sensations, which are likewise felt
only as a consequence of motions in the nerves, as may be shown by further
experiments of a like nature. (Princ. IV.196-97) 10.
Why should we think that the nerves do not transmit
anything but motion to the brain (e.g., that the visual nerves do not transmit
colour, the olfactory nerves smell, the tactile nerves heat)? Because
anatomy tells us that the nerves are all alike. If they served to transmit different
qualities, we would expect to find differences between them. (Princ. IV.198) 11.
Where does the feeling of titillation or pain, and
the appearance of light and sounds originate? In
the mind. In the external world and in
the body, brain, and nerves there is nothing but parts in motion. (Princ. IV.198) 12.
What makes it unlikely that the colours we sense are
produced by colours actually existing on the surfaces of bodies? If
you are struck on the eye in a dark room, you see flashes of light even
though there is nothing coloured around you.
This shows that colour is experienced as a consequence of motion in
the object affecting the organ, not as a consequence of colour in the object
affecting the organ. (Princ. IV.198) 13.
What is the major guide Descartes relied upon when
deciding what hypotheses to formulate about the workings of the small parts
of nature? By
imagining the simplest shapes bodies could have and the effects of
collections of these shapes in motion (e.g., that balls slide past one
another and so make things fluid; that pointed particles pierce and divide;
that hook and eye shaped particles coalesce).
Observation of the workings of the machines we ourselves construct
assists in doing this. (Princ. IV.203) 14.
Is there a role for experimentation in Cartesian
science, and if so what is it? There
is no role for experimentation at the foundations of science, where the first
principles governing the motion of matter and its nature are presented. These principles are arrived at simply by
clear and distinct perception on the part of the understanding. (AT VI:
63-64) But when it comes to
understanding the particular operations of particular bodies, we see that
there many alternative mechanisms that might possibly produce the same result
(just as there are many different ways to build a clock that still tells the
same time). The only way to determine
which of these many different mechanisms is the actually operative one is to
try to devise some sort of experiment capable of distinguishing between them,
that is, a test situation that will turn out one way if one mechanism is the
responsible one, and a different way if it is not. It is here that experimentation and sensory
experience end up having a role to play. (AT VI: 64-65) Cartesian
Science (Discourse V, AT VI 40-45; Discourse VI, AT VI 63-65; Matthews,
99-108; Principles of Philosophy II.1-23 available in course packet or
in The Continental Rationalists
electronic database)
1. What is
hardness, as far as our senses are concerned?
(This question and the following two are on the reading from Principles II.) The
sensation of strain we get in our muscles when we try to push or squeeze
something and it does not yield. (Principles II 4.)
2. Why must the
quantity of motion in the universe be preserved? Because
God, being a perfect being, is constant in the way he acts. For Descartes this means that having once
decided to create something, God will preserve that thing in existence. Why constancy should have to be expressed
in this particular way is unclear. One
might be constant by letting the quantity of motion continuously decay, or
continuously increase, or continuously oscillate. (Matthews, 99-100,
Principles II.36.)
3. Is it natural
for bodies that have been set in motion to slow down and stop? What is it that teaches us the answer to
this, sense experience or understanding? No. We know this by understanding (specifically
by a deduction from the constancy of God).
Sense experience teaches us that things naturally tend to rest, but
this is only because all the bodies on the earth run into things that slow them
down before long. (100-101, II.37)
4. Are there any
random or chance occurrences in nature, according to Descartes? (This question and the following two are on
Discourse V.) No. Everything happens in accord with laws that
are strictly followed. (AT VI 41)
5. In giving his
account of the nature of matter in Discourse
V, what features or properties did Descartes explicitly identify as ones he
had no use for and did not need to suppose matter to have? Aristotelian
forms and sensible qualities really existing in things (42-43), and also
weight (44).
6. How did
Descartes respond to the objection that it is contrary to the creation story
of the Bible to suppose, as he did, that all God needed to do to make the
solar system, the Earth, the arrangement of water and minerals on the Earth,
the weather, and the life on Earth, was institute certain laws and set an
originally chaotic arrangement of matter in motion? He
has two answers. The first is that he
is merely describing a way God could have created the world and does not mean
to deny that God actually created it in the more laborious way described in
the Bible. The second is that since
sustaining the world from moment to moment actually requires that it be
recreated at each successive moment (since the mere passage of the present
into the past is continually destroying what now exists), it detracts nothing
from God’s power or his governing role in creation to suppose that he could
well have created the world in a different way. (45)
7. What do the
nerves transmit to the brain? (This question and the following three are on
the reading from Principles IV) Nothing
but motion. Certainly not sensible
qualities. (Matthews 105, IV.198)
8. Where does the
feeling of titillation or pain, and the appearance of light and sounds
originate from? From
within the mind. In the external world
and in the body, brain, and nerves there is nothing but parts in motion.
(105, IV.198)
9. What makes it
unlikely that the colours we sense are produced by colours actually existing
on the surfaces of bodies? If
you are struck on the eye in a dark room, you see flashes of light even
though there is nothing coloured around you.
This shows that colour is experienced as a consequence of motion in
the object affecting the organ, not as a consequence of colour in the object
affecting the organ. (105, IV.198) 10.
What is the major guide Descartes relied upon when
deciding what hypotheses to formulate about the workings of the small parts
of nature? By
imagining the simplest shapes bodies could have and the effects of
collections of these shapes in motion (e.g., that balls slide past one
another and so make things fluid; that pointed particles pierce and divide;
that hook and eye shaped particles coalesce).
Observation of the workings of the machines we ourselves construct
assists in doing this. (106-7, IV.203) 11.
Is there a role for experimentation in Cartesian
science, and if so what is it? (This
question is on the selection from Discourse
VI.) There
is no role for experimentation at the foundations of science, where the first
principles governing the motion of matter and its nature are presented. These principles are arrived at simply by
clear and distinct perception on the part of the understanding. (AT VI:
63-64) But when it comes to
understanding the particular operations of particular bodies, we see that
there many alternative mechanisms that might possibly produce the same result
(just as there are many different ways to build a clock that still tells the
same time). The only way to determine
which of these many different mechanisms is the actually operative one is to
try to devise some sort of experiment capable of distinguishing between them,
that is, a test situation that will turn out one way if one mechanism is the
responsible one, and a different way if it is not. It is here that experimentation and sensory
experience end up having a role to play. (AT VI: 64-65) (Matthews
137-39, 146-158)
1. Why is mechanics
a more fundamental science than geometry? Geometry
does not tell us how to produce the figures, such as straight lines and
circles, that it works with, since it is really just the study of how to
measure these figures, but mechanics, being the science of motion and what
can be produced by motion (geometrical figures are typically taken to be
produced by the motion of points, for instance) does tell us how to produce
figures. (M 137)
2. What is rational
mechanics? The
study of motions and the forces required to produce them. (M 137-38)
3. What are the
chief things that a rational mechanics of natural powers is concerned with? Attractive
and repulsive forces, such as those responsible for the motions associated
with the phenomena of gravity, levity, elasticity, and hydraulic pressure. (M
138)
4. What is a
natural philosopher supposed to uncover from an investigation of the
phenomena of gravity, levity, elasticity, hydraulic pressure, and other such
motions? The
forces responsible for those motions. (M138)
5. What does
“reasoning from mechanical principles” consist of, according to Newton? Starting
from certain very general instances of motion and deriving the “forces,”
i.e., the laws describing the manner in which these motions occur; then using
these laws to account for all the particular instances of motion we see
around us. (M138)
6. What did Newton
speculate is the likely cause of all natural phenomena? Attractive
and repulsive forces operating between the particles of bodies in virtue of
some causes hitherto unknown. (M 138)
7. What determines
whether a quality is to be considered “universal” or not? If
it is present in all the bodies our senses ever reveal to us (“is universally
present in experiments”) and does not come in differing degrees of intensity.
(M146)
8. What are the
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever? Extension,
hardness, impenetrability, mobility, inertial mass, mutual gravitation (i.e, tending to move towards one another, not gravity
understood as a property of heaviness since that is subject to remission),
and possibly divisibility (though he later ruled this out). (M 147)
9. How do we know
that bodies are extended? By
our senses. (M147) 10.
How do we know that even bodies so small we cannot
see them are still extended and hard? We
know they are extended by induction from the bodies we do see, supposing that
since these are extended those must be so as well. We know they are hard because some of the
bodies we feel are hard, and it is impossible for soft parts to make up a
hard body, whereas a soft body can easily have hard parts arranged in some
sort of lattice formation. (M147) 11.
List some of (i) It cannot give a consistent account of the speed
of the parts of the vortices carrying the planets. (ii) It cannot
account for the motion of comets.
(iii) It cannot account for the regularities in the design of the
world, such as the fact that the planets and moons all orbit in the roughly
same plane. (M148-49) 12.
How did Newton reply when asked to explain what
causes gravitational attraction, and makes it always proportional to mass and
inversely proportional to distance? By
saying that all we can know is that gravity works this way, because
experience generally teaches us so, but that we cannot explain its cause and
have no business formulating hypotheses on the matter. (M152) 13.
How did By
mentioning that they might be due to pressure exerted by a special kind of
matter that permeates all things (a “subtle, elastic spirit”), but that we have
no clear evidence on those matters yet. (M152) 14.
Did No. He rather maintained it is always decaying
due to the “stiffness” of bodies in collision. (M153-54). 15.
What are the main active principles? The
cause of gravitation and the cause of fermentation (M154). Also the cause of cohesion (M155). 16.
What properties did Solidity,
mass, hardness, impenetrability, motion, size, and shape. (M155) 17.
Why did Because
were the fundamental particles of which compound bodies like earth or water
are composed to be divisible, it is likely that these compound bodies would
not continue to have the same character over time, so that earth and water
would be different at later times, not being built from the same kinds of
parts. But we have no evidence that
any kinds of materials are changing their qualities. (M155) 18.
How did By
maintaining that he was not speaking of the causes of these qualities, but
merely attempting to bring the observed phenomena under laws, justified by
induction, and then use those laws to explain other phenomena. (M156) (Matthews
139-146)
1. Under what
notions do common people conceive space and time? Relative
ones, which is to say that they conceive distances in space relative to landmark
bodies presumed to be at rest, and intervals of time relative to certain
cyclical events, as the rising and setting of the Sun or the changes of the
seasons. (M139)
2. Does it make
sense to say that an hour could take more or less time to pass? It
does. An hour is 1/24 of the time it
takes for the Earth to rotate on its axis.
Were the Earth to speed up in its rotation, an hour would take less
time to pass, were it to slow down, it would take more time. A reason to think this would not make sense
is that were the Earth to speed up or slow down, it would have to speed up or
slow down relative to some other measure of time, such as the length of time
it takes for the Earth to orbit around the Sun, and then we would have to ask
whether it was really the case that the Earth sped up in its daily rotation
or whether it was instead its annual rotation that slowed down. The only way to deal with such questions,
it might be charged, is to simply pick some cyclical sequence of events, such
as the time it takes for the Earth to rotate on its axis, and stipulate that
it is the fundamental unit of measurement for all other processes. In that case it would be impossible by
definition for the Earth to speed up or slow down
in its rotation, though other things could speed up or slow down relative to
the Earth’s rotation. This was not,
however, Newton’s view. In his view
time itself exists apart from all the events that occur in time and passes
with perfect uniformity so that it is the ultimate standard with reference to
which all cyclical processes can be said to occur. Any measure of time defined relative to
some cyclical process could, in principle, speed up or slow down relative to
the passage of absolute time. (M139)
3. List the
properties of absolute space. Homogeneity. Immobility. (It is “always similar and
immovable.”) Possibly indivisibility
as well, since that follows from the fact that one part cannot move relative
to any of the other parts. (M140)
Earlier (M139), absolute space was also described as “true” and
“mathematical,” in contrast to relative space, which is “apparent” and
“common.” Later (M141) immutability is
added to the list.
4. How is relative
space determined? By
the position of certain bodies. (M140)
5. How can absolute
and relative space be the same in figure and magnitude, but different
numerically? Because
a relative space can move around from one place to another in absolute
space. This happens when the bodies
relative to which positions in the relative space are determined are
themselves in motion in absolute space.
For example, a body can be supposed to be at rest relative to the
Earth and so to occupy a place of the same figure and magnitude as itself (so
a place that is numerically identical or coincident with it). But if the Earth moves in absolute space,
then the body would actually occupy a successive series of places in absolute
space — places that are the same shape and size that is, but that are
numerically different from one another because outside of one another. (M140)
6. How does
absolute motion differ from relative motion? Absolute
motion is change of place in absolute space, relative motion change of place
relative to certain bodies. (M140)
7. Why is it absurd
that the parts of absolute space should move or change position relative to
one another? Because
motion is change of place, and absolute motion change of place in absolute
space. A motion of a part of absolute
space would have to be a change of place of a part of absolute space. But absolute space just is the order of
places relative to which all motion ultimately occurs. If the places were to move, they would move
out of themselves, as it were, to a different space, presupposing a yet more
basic and immobile system of places that remains in station behind those that
are moving, in which case the moving ones just are not absolute. Whichever places are ultimately immobile,
those are the absolute ones. (M141)
8. Why do we
consider relative places and motions instead of absolute ones? Because
the absolute ones cannot be seen or otherwise distinguished by our senses, so
we have no choice. (M142)
9. Why should we
not rest content with relative places and motions in philosophical
disquisitions? Because
there may be no body that is absolutely at rest, meaning that no space
defined relative to body will provide a proper frame with reference to which
to determine whether bodies are changing their state of motion. (M142) 10.
How can we distinguish absolute rest and motion from
relative rest and motion? By
their properties, causes, and effects. (M142) 11.
Why can true and absolute motion not be determined
by motion relative to surrounding bodies taken to be at rest? Because
those bodies may themselves be in motion. If they are, then like a shell that
contains a kernel, the inside bodies will partake of that motion even if they
appear to be at rest relative to the surrounding bodies. If, on the other hand, the internal bodies
are in motion relative to the surrounding bodies then their true motion will
be a sum of the actual motion of the surrounding bodies and their motion
relative to the surrounding bodies. In
some cases (when the surrounding bodies are moving in the opposite direction
with the same speed), the contained bodies may actually be at rest, even though
they appear to be in motion relative to the surrounding bodies. (M142) 12.
What are the causes by which true motions are
distinguished from relative motions? The
accelerative forces impressed on bodies. (M143) 13.
How can a true motion be preserved when the relative
remains unaltered, and the relative preserved when the true alters? True
motion can be preserved when relative alters by causing the surrounding
bodies to move. In this case the
contained body appears to move relative to the surroundings, even though it
is really at rest and the surroundings in motion. Relative motion can be preserved while true
changes by causing both the contained body and the containing body to move
together. In this case there is no
change of their relation to one another, even though they take on new motion
in absolute space. (M143) 14.
What are the effects that distinguish relative from
absolute motion? The
endeavour to recede from the axis of circular motion. In a purely relative circular motion (where
the surrounding bodies are the ones that rotate and the contained one is
stationary) there is no evidence within the contained body of an endeavour to
recede from the axis of rotation. But
in a real circular motion, where the body really is rotating in absolute
space, its parts endeavour to recede from the axis of rotation, as can be
evidenced by distortion of shape. (M143) 15.
What does the ascent of the water up the sides of
the spinning bucket prove? That
the water is not just in motion relative to its surroundings but really in
motion because its parts are endeavouring to recede from the axis of
rotation. (M144) 16.
Why can true circular motion not be determined by
rotation relative to any ambient bodies? Because
motion relative to ambient bodies is only relative motion, and we can have
relative motion where there is no true motion as proven by the absence of an
endeavour to recede from the axis of rotation. When the bucket starts spinning and the
water does not there is great relative motion (relative to the sides of the
bucket, though not to the Earth or the fixed stars), but no true motion. This is evidenced by the fact that the
parts of the water do not attempt to recede from the axis of rotation even
though we see from other circumstances that they are not welded together and
are perfectly well capable of receding from the axis of rotation when the
motion is real. Given that there can
be cases of relative motion where there is no true motion, we can never be
sure that any ambient bodies we might pick on are not the ones that are actually
rotating. Pick the Earth, pick the
fixed stars, or go out as far as you want.
The only thing this proves that it is the water that is really
rotating and not the ambient bodies that you picked is the endeavour to
recede from the axis of rotation. (M144) 17.
What is wrong with Descartes claim that the planets
are at rest in their vortices even though the vortices are in motion around
the Sun? As
long as the motion of the vortices is real motion, the Planets partake of it
and will likewise attempt to recede from the axis of rotation along with the
parts of the vortices, showing that they are really moved as well. (M144) 18.
Why is it a matter of great difficulty to tell true
motions apart from apparent? Because
the parts of absolute space cannot be sensed or observed by us. (M145) Locke, Essay Epistle and I.i.1-4,6-8;
I.ii.1-9,12,14-16; I.iii.1-6,9,22,24-25; I.iv.1-5,8-9,24-25 (Innate Ideas) the first five questions of this and the following
chapter overlap
1. What was the
main question that the Essay concerning human understanding was
written to answer? To
determine the scope and limits of our powers of knowledge, or, as Locke put
it, what objects our understandings are and are not fitted to deal with
(Epistle: Nidditch, 7; Winkler, 2), and the origin,
certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and
degrees of belief, opinion, and assent (I.i.2).
2. What has so far
served as the main impediment to the advancement of knowledge? The
imprecise use of words. (Epistle: Nidditch, 10; Winkler, 2)
3. In what does the
“Historical, plain Method” consist? To
examine the things we are originally conscious of, and the manner in which
this original material is worked up by our minds into beliefs. Also to use this information to determine
how much of what we believe can be asserted as knowledge, and how much we are
entitled to affirm on faith or as a matter of probability. (I.i.3)
4. What are the
main consequences of a failure to inquire into the limits of what can be
known by our understanding? Dispute
and scepticism, since we end up employing our faculties trying to answer
questions they are not able to answer, end up indulging in wild speculations,
disagree with one another because we can perceive no standard of truth, and
end up doubting ourselves and our abilities and questioning everything. (I.i.7)
5. What does the
term, “idea,” stand for? Whatever
it is that is before the understanding or that the mind can be said to be
working with, when we think. This is
not a very helpful definition, but it is all that Locke said. Most problematically, it leaves it unclear
whether ideas are objects, like pictures, that are somehow looked at by the
mind, or whether they are rather actions whereby the mind reaches an
understanding. (I.i.8) For a
particularly clear expression of the former, see II.xi.17.
6. What is the
argument from universal consent? That
the fact that there are certain things that are believed by all people in all
times proves that these things are innately known. (I.ii.2)
7. What, in
general, is wrong with the argument from universal consent? The
premise is false, since there are no principles that are known by all human
beings whatsoever, and even if the premise were true, the conclusion would
not follow because the universal knowledge may be based on some very common
and evident experience. (I.ii.4 and 3)
8. What is wrong
with supposing that there might be certain truths that we have always known
and that were imprinted on our minds at birth, but that we are unconscious
of? If
you do not have to be actually conscious of a proposition in order for it to
be able to be considered to be in your mind, then there is no clear criterion
for determining what is in your mind and what is not, and in principle any
proposition could be said to be in your mind as long as it is true and is the
sort of thing you are capable of knowing.
But if all that it means to say that you have innate knowledge of a
proposition is that you are capable of knowing that proposition, then the
claim is trivial and uninteresting and does not say anything that someone who
believes that all knowledge is learned from experience could not just as well
accept. (I.ii.5)
9. Did Locke deny
that we have innate capacities? No. He thought that we have the innate capacity
to know certain propositions, and that no one would deny this. (I.ii.5) 10.
What is wrong with supposing that there might be
certain truths that we have always known and that were imprinted on our minds
at birth, but that we need to employ reason to discover what they are? Because
reason is by definition the capacity to deduce something we do not know from
other things that we have previously come to know. So if something is known by reason, then by
defintion it must have previously been unknown and
so cannot have been innately known by us. (I.ii.9) 11.
What is wrong with supposing that there might be
certain truths that we have always known and that were imprinted on our minds
at birth, but that they only come into our consciousness when we attain the
age of reason? First,
it is false, since there are no principles that are known by all human beings
who have attained the age of reason.
Second, it is improbable, since there is no good reason why innate
truths should suddenly pop into the mind just because our reasoning capacity
has developed, especially since, as the answer to the previous question has
shown, that capacity is unrelated to those truths. (I.ii.12,14) 12.
What is there about the fact that there are some
truths that we come to know very early in life that actually goes to prove
that these truths are not innately known? The
fact that these truths concern the ideas that are most commonly and readily
obtained from experience. This
indicates that the truths are not known innately, but by gathering ideas from
experience and comparing them with one another. (I..ii.15) 13.
Did Locke believe that there are absolute truths
concerning what is right and wrong, or did he hold that moral rules are
purely conventional? He
thought that there are absolute moral truths.
He just did not think that they are innately known. The fact that different moral rules are
accepted in different cultures is simply evidence for the fact that it is not
obvious what the correct moral rules are. (I.iii.1) 14.
What reasons did Locke offer for rejecting the view
that criminals still accept the truth of moral principles even though they do
not act in accord with them? First,
that people’s practice is the best indication of what they really believe,
and that even if it were not, the fact that their actions and even their
explicit statements of what they value reject moral principles makes it
impossible to say with any certainty that they do in fact still assent to
those principles. Second, that if
something was really innately known as a practical principle then it ought to
influence action. This because a
practical principle just is a principle concerning what to do. A belief in a practical principle is
therefore the same as a belief that one ought to act a certain way and hence
as an inclination act in that way. A
principle that is believed without being acted upon is not really a practical
principle, concerning what ought to be done, but a speculative one,
concerning what is or is not the case.
So the possibility of assenting to a principle while not acting on it
would imply that the principle is not in fact accepted as a practical
principle. (I.iii.3) 15.
Did Locke deny that we have innate dispositions and
tendencies? No. He supposed that we have innate
dispositions to take pleasure or displeasure in things, and innate tendencies
to desire or reject certain things. He
only denied innate knowledge and innate ideas. (I.iii.3) 16.
What are the main factors inducing people to take
principles upon trust? An
inadequate opportunity to reflect caused by the demands of meeting the needs
of life in those who are less affluent.
In the rest, one or more of ignorance, laziness, indoctrination,
impatience, or having already accepted the principle that principles ought
not to be questioned. (I.iii.24-25) 17.
What special reason does a consideration of the
“parts” of principles give us for thinking that there could be no innate
principles? The
parts of principles are ideas. But
most of the ideas that purportedly innate principles are made up of are so
complicated and abstract that it is implausible to suppose they could be
innately known. But if the ideas are
not innately in us, the principles they compose cannot be so either. (I.vi.1) 18.
What are the principal considerations leading Locke
to deny that ideas are innate? Observation
of children, whom he claims give every indication of only having those ideas
they have previously acquired from experience. (I.iv.2) 19.
What is Locke’s principal reason for denying that
the idea of God is innate? It
is not had by all peoples. (I.iv.8) Locke, Essay Epistle and I.i.1-4,6-8;
II.i.1-8,20,23-25; ii, viii.1-6, iii-vi; vii.1-2,7-10 (Sensation) the first five questions of this and the preceding
chapter overlap
1. What was the
main question that the Essay concerning human understanding was
written to answer? To
determine the scope and limits of our powers of knowledge, or, as Locke put
it, what objects our understandings are and are not fitted to deal with
(Epistle: Nidditch, 7; Winkler, 2), and the origin,
certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and
degrees of belief, opinion, and assent (I.i.2).
2. What has so far
served as the main impediment to the advancement of knowledge? The
imprecise use of words. (Epistle: Nidditch, 10; Winkler, 2)
3. In what does the
“Historical, plain Method” consist? To
examine the things we are originally conscious of, and the manner in which
this original material is worked up by our minds into beliefs. Also to use this information to determine
how much of what we believe can be asserted as knowledge, and how much we are
entitled to affirm on faith or as a matter of probability. (I.i.3)
4. What are the
main consequences of a failure to inquire into the limits of what can be
known by our understanding? Dispute
and scepticism, since we end up employing our faculties trying to answer
questions they are not able to answer, end up indulging in wild speculations,
disagree with one another because we can perceive no standard of truth, and
end up doubting ourselves and our abilities and questioning everything.
(I.i.7)
5. What does the
term, “idea,” stand for? Whatever
it is that is before the understanding or that the mind can be said to be
working with, when we think. This is
not a very helpful definition, but it is all that Locke said. Most problematically, it leaves it unclear
whether ideas are objects, like pictures, that are somehow looked at by the
mind, or whether they are rather actions whereby the mind reaches an
understanding. (I.i.8) For a
particularly clear expression of the former, see II.xi.17.
6. What are the two
sources of ideas? Perception
of objects received through the senses and reflection on the operations on
our own minds. (II.i.2-4)
7. What exactly is
conveyed to our minds by our senses? Something
that manages to produce perceptions in the mind. The relation between these perceptions and
either their causes or objects existing in the world outside of us is so far
unspecified. (II.i.3)
8. What are the
“originals” from which our ideas “take their beginnings?” External
material objects and the operations of our own minds. Note how Locke simply assumed the existence
of an external world, without troubling about Cartesian doubt or thinking it
needed to be addressed. He seems also
to have assumed some degree of resemblance between our ideas and
objects. This is implied by the
reference to them as “originals” from which, presumably, ideas are made like
copies. (II.i.4)
9. What evidence
did Locke offer for supposing that all ideas originate from either sensation
or reflection? He
hoped we would all agree that, upon performing a survey of the ideas in our
minds, we do not find any that we did not either directly encounter in
experience or construct from simpler ideas that we did encounter in
experience (II.i.5)
He also claimed that a study of children shows no evidence that
they were born with any ideas already in them (II.i.6). Finally he observed that those brought up
in very narrow environments, where there is little variety or change in the
objects of experience, never manage to overcome the deficiencies of their
circumstances to develop wider collections of ideas than just those they have
managed to experience or build up by simply modifying ones they have
experienced. (II.i.7) 10.
Do we only ever experience one simple idea at a
time? No. Locke was explicit that the senses of sight
and touch, in particular “often take in from the same object, at the same
time, different ideas.” He instanced
motion and colour as well as softness and warmth. He did hold, however, that the different
simple ideas are perfectly distinct from one another, even though given
simultaneously. (II.ii.1) 11.
What makes simple ideas simple? They
exhibit one uniform appearance, that is, there is no variety in their
content. (II.ii.1) 12.
Is it possible for us to spontaneously create ideas
on our own? We
can spontaneously create complex ideas by mixing together simple ideas we
have previously been given in experience, but we cannot ourselves create new
simple ideas. We must instead learn of
them through sensation and reflection. (II.ii.2) 13.
Do we have ideas of privations? No. Some of our ideas might be caused by
privations (or better, objects that have slowed or stopped motions in our
sense organs), but the ideas arising from these causes are as apparently
positive as any other. (II.viii.1-2) 14.
What did Locke consider to be the likely causes of
our ideas of white and black? The
kind and arrangement of particles on the surfaces of things. (II.viii.2) 15.
Did Locke think it is even likely that any of our
ideas could be caused by privations? No. Not unless the state of rest or the state
of moving in the opposite direction should be considered to be a privation
rather than a positive state of being.
It is most likely, Locke thought, that all of
our ideas of sensation are caused by motions communicated to our sense organs
and that changes in those ideas are due to changes in the motions.
(II.viii.1, 4, 6) In that case, every
idea whatsoever will be due to some real, positive cause, namely an
alteration in the state of motion of the parts of the sense organs. 16.
What is solidity and how does it differ from
hardness? Solidity is one of the simple ideas received from
the sense of touch. It is a feeling of
resistance that we get from bodies when we press against them. For this reason, we think of this feeling
as coming from a force of resistance to penetration present in the
bodies. Hardness, in contrast, has to
do with the degree to which the parts of a body resist being moved relative
to one another. Things that are soft
or fluid may nonetheless be very solid because they resist being compressed
(e.g. water or hydraulic oil), so hardness is not the same as solidity.
(II.iv.1 and 4) 17.
Why does the mind consider solidity to be a feature
even of bodies that are too small to see? Because
of induction from what is universally the case with those bodies that it is
able to see. (II.iv.1) 18.
What does it mean for a body to fill a space? To
fill a space is to exercise a repulsive force to resist the entry of any
other body into that space. A body
that can be compressed, therefore, cannot be said to fill the space it
occupies fully. (II.iv.2) 19.
How does the extension of body differ from that of
space? Space
does not resist penetration, has inseparable parts, and is immovable. An extended body is solid, has separable
parts, and is movable. (II.iv.5) Locke, Essay II.viii.7-26 (Primary and
Secondary Qualities)
1. Explain the
difference between qualities and ideas. Qualities
inhere in bodies, ideas in minds — notwithstanding
the apparently contrary indications of Locke’s occasionally sloppy usage
(“Ideas … as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such
perceptions in us” — he should have said, “as they are taken to be
modifications of matter”), (the Powers to produce those Ideas in us, … as
they are Sensations or Perceptions in our Understandings” — he should have
said “as they are distinguished by the Sensations or Perceptions they
cause”).
(II.viii.7-8)
2. What features
must a quality have if it is to be considered primary? It
must be one that remains in a body regardless of what changes it may undergo,
and one that our senses inform us is universally present in all our ideas of
bodies. (II.viii.9)
3. How do the
secondary qualities differ from the primary, if at all? In
virtue of the way particles with just the primary qualities are arranged, the
collection of those particles can acquire a power to affect our senses in a
particular way. This power is the
secondary quality, though it is something that results from the primary
qualities of the aggregate of particles. (II.viii.10)
4. How do the
tertiary qualities differ from the primary and the secondary, if at all? Tertiary
qualities are derivative from the primary qualities in the same way that
secondary qualities are. They are
powers that the arrangement of the solid, shaped, movable, insensible parts
of bodies gives to those bodies. But
whereas the secondary qualities are powers to bring about different
sensations in us, the tertiary are powers to bring about alterations in other
bodies.
(II..viii.10)
5. How is it
possible for one body to act on another? Locke
initially supposed that the answer is that this is only possible by
communication of motion on contact (impulse). (II.viii.11)
However, in later editions of the Essay he acknowledged that
6. Given that
external objects are not only not united to our minds but even sometimes set
at some distance from us, by what means do we come to perceive their original
qualities? Generally
by some stream of insensibly small particles emanating from the surfaces of
the bodies, hitting our sense organs, and bringing about motions in our
nerves that are transmitted to the brain.
Note that on this account, what comes to be present in the brain as
the cause of our ideas of the primary qualities of bodies does not resemble
those qualities, except for being also extended, solid, and moving. (II.viii.12)
7. When Locke wrote
in II.viii.15 that “the Ideas, produced
in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all,” what
were the ideas he was referring to, and what were the secondary qualities
that he had in mind? The
ideas are our ideas of colours, smells, tastes, sounds, and other sensible
qualities. The secondary qualities are
certain powers that bodies acquire, in virtue of the arrangement of their
solid, shaped, and moving parts, to bring about these ideas in us. (II.viii.15)
8. What produces
the idea of the motion and shape of a piece of manna in us? What produces the ideas of sickness, acute
pains, and gripings in those who have eaten a piece
of manna? What produces our ideas of
the whiteness and sweetness of the manna? In
all cases, it is the solidity, shapes, motions and arrangements of the
insensibly small parts of the manna, acting in concert. (II.viii.18)
9. What is the only
effect that the pounding of an almond can produce in the almond? What effect does the pounding of an almond
produce in us when we perceive it? All
that pounding can do to the almond is break up it into parts and change the
shape, size, and relative position of those parts. Yet we perceive its colour and taste
differently. (The implication, of
course, is that if all that is really happening is a change in the way the
parts of the almond are shaped and arranged, then our perceptions of colour
and taste must be consequences of the shape and arrangement of its parts,
rather than of the presence of real qualities of colour and taste in the
almond.)
(II.viii.20) 10.
Under what conditions do we have an idea of the
thing as it is in itself? When
we have ideas of the primary qualities of its parts. This requires that the parts be large
enough for us to perceive, which is the case almost
exclusively with machines of our own manufacture. Locke’s idea seems to have been that when
you understand how the parts that go to make up a thing are shaped, arranged,
and moving, you know everything there is to know about the thing as it is in
itself. You know precisely how its
extension and solidity must be modified, and you know how it will change over
time and interact with other things.
But when you don’t see down to the constitution of the constituent
parts, you don’t know any of these things.
You can’t even be sure that the thing has exactly the size, shape,
solidity, etc., it appears to have, since our sense perceptions of these
qualities are sometimes distorted by factors such as distance and viewing
angle. So you don’t know the thing as
it is in itself.
(II.viii.23) 20b Essay II ix.1-4,8-9; x.1-2;
xi,1,4,6,8,9,15,17 (Perception)
1. Can we have
ideas that go unnoticed by us? No. Locke’s position at the close of II.ix.4 is just that there can be unnoticed
stimulation of the sense organs. When
that happens there simply is no idea produced.
2. What is the idea
immediately imprinted on the mind when we see a black or golden globe? A
flat or plane circle, variously coloured and reflecting light to varying
degrees. (II.ix.8)
3. What makes it
“evident” that this is all there is to the immediate idea? Locke
took this to be evident from painting.
Probably this is an allusion to the fact that when a painter looks
very carefully at a globe in order to depict it, he or she will notice that
it does not in fact appear to be of one uniform colour. Then, when the painter replicates the
colouration on a flat surface, the result takes on a bit of an appearance of
depth. Locke was probably
extrapolating from this to infer that all we really see is multi-coloured
planes. (II.ix.8)
4. What was Molyneux’s question and what was his reason for answering
this question in the negative? Whether
an adult who has been blind since birth, who knows how to identify
geometrical shapes by touch, and who is suddenly made able to see would be
able to tell, just by looking at a globe and a cube, which is which. Molyneux thought the subject would not be
able to make the identification because a newly sighted person would have no
good reason to suppose that, just because an object feels a certain way, that
therefore it must look a certain way.
So, even if the person could identify round and square visual shapes,
the person would have no reason to suppose that what feels round would also
have to look round. It may also be
that Molyneux thought that the feeling of a cube with angles prickling the
palm would be nothing like the visual appearance of a cube, so that perhaps
the blind person would not even see any reason to label the shapes on the
visual field with the same geometrical terms used to name two-dimensional
tangible shapes. However, there is no
reason to think that he believed that the blind person would not see colours
to have extension and shape at all. (II.ix.8)
5. What moral did
Locke draw from Molyneux’s negative answer to this
question? That
it illustrates the extent to which ideas that we think we immediately
perceive as a result of sensory stimulation may in fact have been created by
unnoticed mental operations that transform more primitive and more
immediately given ideas. (II.ix.8)
6. Explain Locke’s
distinction between the role played by “perception of sensation” and “idea of
judgment” in visual perception. What
is immediately perceived as a consequence of sensation and what is judged? A
“perception of sensation” is an idea that is immediately perceived as a consequence
of sensory stimulation. Not all ideas
are perceived through sensation. Some
are created by mental operations (such as combination or abstraction)
performed upon previously given ideas.
These ideas are said to arise from judgment. In visual perception, the main perceptions
of sensation are light and colours. We
have learned by experience that the qualities of light and colour are
influenced in various ways by the distance, figure and motion of bodies (e.g.,
bodies seen at greater distances look to have fainter and more confused
colouration). As a result, we often
take the immediately perceived light and colour to be signs that serve as the
basis for a judgment about distance or other spatial properties that are not
immediately perceived. Often, the
judgment occurs so rapidly and easily that we fail to notice the immediately
perceived ideas that served as its premises, and mistakenly think we are
immediately perceiving the distance or other spatial properties when in fact
we are inferring it. (II.ix.9)
7. What is wrong
with viewing memory as a storehouse for ideas we have had in the past? What is memory if not a storehouse? Ideas
can only exist while they are being perceived. When we cease to actively perceive them
they cease to exist and therefore they cannot be supposed to remain in some
storehouse. Rather than be a
storehouse for ideas not currently being perceived, memory is a capacity to
recreate previously perceived ideas, together with the idea that they have
been had before. (II.x.2)
8. How is it that
particular ideas can be made to become general?
9. By considering them in
isolation from the other ideas along with they happen to be perceived,
particularly those ideas having to do with location in time and space. (II.xi.9) Locke, Essay II. xii; xiii.1-5; xxii.1-5,9;
xxiii.1-11,15-20 (Substance)
1. What is the
difference between a complex idea and an idea of relation? In
a complex idea various simple ideas are combined together in such a way as to
be considered to make up one thing. In
an idea of relation they retain their individuality and are merely compared
with one another.
(II.xii.1)
2. Identify two
different ways in which simple ideas come to be united in complex ones. Some
are observed to be so united, others are united by an act of imagination even
though they are not presented together in experience. An example of the first would be the
complex idea of an apple, that of the second the complex idea of a unicorn.
3. What is the
difference between a substance and a mode? A
substance is a thing that can exist on its own. A mode is something that cannot exist, even
for an instant, apart from some other thing.
E.g., red is a mode because where ever there is red there must be some thing which is red.
Red cannot exist all on its own, independently of any
thing. That makes it a mode. (II.xii.6 and 4)
4. How do we arrive
at our ideas of mixed modes? In
any of three ways: by arbitrarily combining various simple ideas in our own
minds (invention), by finding simple ideas to be combined in certain ways in
experience, or by means of words, when we hear a certain name for a mixed
mode defined in terms of a certain combination of names for various simple
ideas. (II.xxii.2-3,
9)
5. What gives unity
to the various simple ideas in a mixed mode and makes them appear as one,
single idea rather than an aggregate of distinct ideas? The
only things that are unified or one in a mixed mode are the one act of the
mind in considering all the simple ideas together and the one name assigned
to the mixed mode. Locke considered
the act of mind to be what first creates or gives rise to the unity, and the
name to be the mark or sign of this unity. (II.xxii.4)
6. What conclusion
do we tend to draw from the fact that different simple ideas are constantly
observed to occur together in our experience? That
that these various simple ideas all belong to or better are all produced by
one thing.
(II.xxiii.1)
7. What is our
notion of pure substance in general an idea of? Some
sort of support or holder for the different qualities that produce those
different simple ideas that go commonly together in our experience. That is, something in which qualities such
as extension, solidity, and powers inhere. However we have no clear idea of the nature
of this substratum or of how it manages to hold or support qualities. (II.xxiii.2)
8. What is our
notion of particular substances an idea of? Some
particular internal constitution or essence in this support or holder that
determines the particular qualities that it supports or holds, and that also
determines the way these qualities will change over time. (II.xxiii.3)
9. What leads us to
distinguish material substances from spiritual substances? Our
inability to figure out how our ideas of reflection could belong to body or
be produced by it, combined with a disposition to want to attribute these
ideas to some sort of substance. (II.xxiii.5) 10.
What is our notion of matter an idea of, and how
does it differ from our notion of spirit? Our
notion of matter is the idea of some support or holder for those qualities of
bodies that affect our senses, that is, some substratum of the bundles of
ideas we receive in sensation; our notion of spirit that of some substratum
that performs the various operations exhibited in our ideas of reflection. (II.xxiii.5) 11.
What makes one person’s idea of a particular kind of
substance more perfect than another’s? It
includes more of the ideas that the substance in fact brings about in us. (II.xxiii.7) 12.
What are the primary ideas we have peculiar to body?
to spirit? Cohesion
and solidity or a power of communicating motion as a consequence of impact
(“impulse”) in the former case, and a power of thought (notably of
experiencing sensation as a consequence of impact on the sense organs) and a
power of communicating motion by will in the other. (II.xxiii.17-18) Locke, Essay
II.xxi.1-5,7-11,13-15,22-25,29-33,40-48,51-53,56 (Power)
1. Is the idea of
power a simple or a complex idea? According
to Locke it is simple. Though Locke
admitted that the idea of power, understood as the ability to either undergo
or produce change, involves the thought of a relation to action or change, he
did not consider this to be enough to make it an idea of a relation. His excuse is that all ideas involve some
relation. In taking this position he
was suggesting that the idea of power is not just the idea of a relation
(say, of constant conjunction) between types of earlier and later states, but
is an idea of some separate thing bringing about the change. (II.xxi.3)
2. What gives us
our clearest idea of a power to begin motion? Reflection
on what we experience in ourselves when we will to move our bodies. (II.xxi.4)
3. What is will? The
power a person has to either bring about or change thought, or move a body
part. (II.xxi.5)
4. What makes an
action voluntary or involuntary? Voluntary
actions are those that follow upon a directive of the will, involuntary are
those that are not effects of the will. (II.xxi.5)
5. Why can beings
that have no will not be said to be free?
Why can beings who have will and who are doing what they will
nonetheless be said to be necessitated? Freedom
is a power to either do or not do what is directed by the will, so it only
exists relative to the will. Beings
that have a power to either perform an act or not but that do not have will
(a power to prefer one course of action to the other) are not free. Beings that have will but are either
incapable of doing what they prefer or even incapable of doing the opposite
of what they prefer are necessitated. (II.xxi.8) The case of lacking freedom even
though you do what you will to do is illustrated by II.xxi.10.
6. Explain the
difference between the power of will and the power of liberty. The
power of will is the power to bring about an action merely by deciding and
making the effort. The power of freedom
is the further power to prevent that action, supposing you had willed not to
perform it. (II.xxi.15)
7. What determines
the mind to will what it does? The
most pressing among those things that make us uneasy which we think we are
capable of removing. (II.xxi.40)
8. What is required
for a great good to determine the will? Contemplation
of that good. Ordinarily we are
distracted by the need to eliminate pains and other sources of uneasiness,
which are more pressing and more readily resolved than great goods. The only way a great good can come to
influence the will is if we contemplate it and its advantages long enough to
become uneasy as a consequence of our lack of the good. (II.xxi.45-46)
9. What is the
source of what is improperly called free will and of such liberty as we have? A
power we have to suspend desire.
(II.xxi.47) 10.
What causes us to be able to suspend action pending
due examination of what is most conducive to our real happiness? Whatever
necessitates us to be strongly interested in pursuing our ultimate happiness.
(II.xxi.52) 11.
Why is it that we do not all always act in such a
way as to obtain real happiness? Sometimes
extreme uneasinesses (arising from pain or strong
passions) overwhelm us and do not allow us to suspend action
(II.xxi.53). Sometimes too hasty a
choice of what is really conducive to happiness (II.xxi.56) Locke, Essay II.xxvii.1-14 (Identity)
1. What is
requisite if we are to be sure that one thing is different from another,
e.g., that someone has a twin? Seeing
the one in a different place from the other at the same time. (II.xxvii.1)
2. What are the
three kinds of substance? God,
finite minds or souls, and bodies. (II.xxvii.2)
3. Why is identity
not a problem where God is concerned? Because
there is only one, omnipresent, eternal God.
So there can be no question whether or not a later God is the same as
an earlier one. (II.xxvii.2)
4. Are there any
exceptions to the rule that two different things cannot be in the same place
at the same time? Yes. Any of the three different kinds of
substances may coexist in a place. So
God, a soul, and a body could all be together in a place at the same time. But no two things of the same kind could be
in a place at the same time. Two or
more bodies could not be together in the same place at the same time, nor
could two or more minds. (II.xxvii.2)
5. Under what
condition would our ideas of identity and diversity have no foundation and be
of no use? If
it were possible for two things of the same kind to be in the same place at
the same time, then two or more things could be one thing, and then it would
be impossible to apply the concepts of identity or diversity. (II.xxvii.2)
6. What determines
the identity of particular instances of modes or relations and distinguishes
different instances of the same mode (e.g., different right-angle isoceles triangles of the same colour and size) from one
another? What sorts of modes and
relations can have no identity? The
same thing that determines the identity of substances: their having a common
point of origin in space and time determines their identity and their being
at different places at the same time determines their diversity. The modes or
relations that cannot have this sort of identity are those that only exist in
succession, like motion and thought, since in this case at each moment a
different feature of the mode or relation comes into existence. (II.xxvii.2)
7. If a mass of
atoms has its parts rearranged, is it still the same mass? If it loses or gains a part, is it still
the same? Rearrangement
does not affect the identity of a mass, but loss or addition of even one part
does.
(II.xxvii.3)
8. What makes an
oak tree different from a mere mass of matter? Its
parts are arranged in a particular way and engaged in performing those
operations that are characteristic of that form of life. (II.xxviii.4)
9. What
distinguishes one plant from another of the same species, e.g., one oak tree
from another? The
fact that at some one moment, the organization of life-function performing
parts characteristic of that species of plant exists in a different,
organized collection of matter than does that of any other then existing
member of the species. (II.xxvii.4) 10.
What determines that the organization of
life-function performing parts that is present at any one instant in any one
collection of matter is identical to one earlier or later organization of
life-functioning parts characteristic of that species of plant rather than
some other, e.g., that the bush in this pot in winter is identical to the one
that was in the garden in summer? That
the organization of life-function performing parts that exists now preserves
the same life as the earlier organization.
So, starting from the earlier moment and considering what particles
entered the organization and what ones left it, as long as the alterations
continued to preserve the same life, the plant is the same. (II.xxvii.4) 11.
How does the identity of animals and plants differ
from that of machines? In
machines the organization of parts need not continually function to carry out
the purpose for which the machine was designed, so the machine can stop
running and start again and still be considered to be the same machine
whether stopped, started, or stopped again.
But for the organization of parts in a plant or animal to cease to
perform the life functions, the plant or animal would be considered to have
died and to no longer be the same thing, but a corpse. (II.xxvii.5) 12.
What is wrong with supposing that what makes people
the same from one moment to the next is that they look the same? People
look very different when they are newborn from what they look like when they
are adult, and very different again when they are old and shrivelled up. But we still think they are the same
people. (II.xxvii.6) 13.
What is wrong with saying that what makes someone
the same human being from one moment to the next is that they continue to
possess the same soul? For
all we can tell, souls may be reincarnated into different bodies, perhaps
even animal ones. That would mean that
we would have to consider someone who lived and died long ago to be the same
human being as someone who is alive today, or even to consider some animal to
be a human being. And that is
obviously not tenable. (II.xxvii.6) 14.
What was Locke trying to get at at
II.xxvii.8 by claiming that a creature with a human body will always be
considered a human being, even if it is so impaired as to be incapable of
thought or sensation, whereas a cat or parrot who could speak and
philosophize would still be considered a cat or parrot? His
point was that what makes you the same living creature from one moment to the
next has nothing to do with your cognitive abilities but is simply a function
of what sort of body you have. 15.
How do we distinguish our self from the selves of
other thinking beings? By
means of consciousness, which Locke understood as a perception or awareness
of the existence of all of our other thoughts or perceptions, including past
ones. I consider whatever thoughts or
sensations I am conscious of to be what my self is, and whatever thoughts or
sensations I am not conscious of to belong to other selves. (II.xxvii.9) 16.
What determines how far my self exists backwards in
time, that is, what determines whether I will consider any past thought or
action to be identical with a thought or action of myself? My
present self extends as far back in time as I can remember and those thoughts
and actions that I can remember are what constitutes my past self. (II.xxvii.9) 17.
Does identity of self presuppose identity of
thinking substance? No. Just as a succession of substances,
preserving the same organization of parts, can constitute the same animal
life, so a succession (or collection) of substances, retaining the same
memories, can constitute the same self. (II.xxvii.10) 18.
What grounds do we have for affirming that the same
person cannot be successively present in different thinking substances? None
other than the reflection that it would be incompatible with the goodness of
God to allow this to happen, since then a soul might be punished at the last
judgment for crimes it never committed.
But this is a matter of faith, and to get knowledge of the
impossibility of this sort of transfer would require knowledge of the precise
nature of the relation between a thinking substance and its thoughts and of
the causes of memory and dreams, and this is knowledge that we do not
have. (II.xxvii.13) 19.
What grounds do we have for affirming that different
persons could be successively present in the same thinking substance? This
would involve nothing more than stripping a thinking being of all of its
thoughts and memories and having it start again with an entirely new set of
experiences. There is no evident
impossibility in this.
(II.xxviii.14) Locke, Essay III.iii.1-4,6-13,15-18 (Abstract Ideas)
1. What does the
meaning of words depend on? At
Essay III.iii.2 Locke remarked that the “signification
and use” of words depends on their being associated with ideas. So the meaning of a word, for Locke, is the
idea it is taken to stand for.
2. What is the
purpose of language? It
is used to communicate the ideas you are having to another person. By speaking or writing words that name your
ideas, you hope to arouse similar ideas in the mind of the person who
understands those words. (III.iii.3)
3. How do words
come to have a general meaning? (Keep
your answer to #1 in mind when dealing with this question.) By
being made to stand for general ideas.
(III.iii.6)
4. How do ideas
come to be general? By
a process of abstraction performed upon particular ideas. These ideas are given to us in perception
as collections of many simple ideas occurring together and standing in
certain relations of time and place to other collections of ideas perceived
at the same time. What we do is
isolate (i.e., abstract) particular simple ideas from the collection and then
combine just those ideas with one another to form a general idea. What makes the idea general is that it can
be used to refer to a number of other collections of ideas that also exhibit
the particular simple ideas we have abstracted (though they would exhibit a
number of other simple ideas as well). (III.iii.6)
5. Why is it
particularly important that relations of time and place be removed when ideas
are made general? This
one is not answered in the text and requires some ingenuity: Because in the chapter on identity Locke
identified location in space and time as the primary means by which one thing
is individuated from another.
6. What do general
words signify, according to Essay III.iii.12?
Why do they not signify a number of things? Sorts. That is, groups or classes to which many
things belong. That they signify
groups or classes to which a number of things belong rather than directly
signifying a number of things, is indicated by the fact that they are
singular terms. If they signified a
number of things they would not have singular grammatical forms, but plural
ones (e.g., insects rather than insect, or animals rather than animal).
7. What is the real
essence of an individual substance? That
in a thing that makes it express the qualities and powers it does. (On Locke's hypothesis, this is the fine
constitution of the small corpuscles making up the thing.) (III.iii.15)
8. What is the
nominal essence of a genus, sort, or kind of substance? The
abstract idea that is used to define the genus, sort or kind. This idea is a list of simple ideas (and
perhaps simple and complex modes) that a number of perceptions of things may
have in common. Whatever things give
us perceptions that satisfy what is demanded on this list are considered to
be of that genus, sort or kind for that reason. It is in this sense that the abstract idea
makes the genus, sort or kind what it is: it determines what things will be
included and what will be excluded. (III.iii.15)
9. Are there any
things whose real essences may be known by us? Yes. Simple ideas and modes, since in these
cases the real essence, which makes the thing what it is, is just the nominal
essence. The real essence of a triangle,
for instance, is just what we define a triangle as being, and that is a
collection of simple ideas taken to be common to all triangles. But in substances the real essence and the
nominal are quite distinct. (III.iii.18) 24b Locke, Essay III.vi.1-9,12,14-19,23,25-26,28 (Essence)
1. Locke observed
that what appears like a star to us may look like a sun to the inhabitants of distant planets. Why does
this show that our classifications of things into sorts depends on what complex ideas we
receive from them rather than on
natures or essences in things that make them what they are? Because
it is one and the same object that appears as a sun to those close by and a
star to those far off. So its nature
cannot be different and if it is nonetheless sorted into different groups by
viewers at these different distances it is because of the different ideas
they get of it at those distances. (III.vi.1)
2. How did Locke
distinguish between real and nominal essence? The
nominal essence is the abstract idea we have formed of those complex ideas
that each thing must give us in order to be considered to be of that
sort. The real essence is that in the
thing (perhaps a “constitution of insensible parts”) that makes it give us
all the characteristic ideas we get from it — those included in our abstract
ideas, as well as any others that may be common to all the members of the
group, even though we have not noticed it. (III.vi.2)
3. What is the
nominal essence of human being? the real essence? The
nominal essence is voluntary motion, sense, and reason in a body of a certain
shape. The real essence is the
constitution human beings must have in order to give us the complex ideas
listed in the nominal essence. (III.vi.3)
4. What must be the
case before a particular individual can be
considered to have an essence? The
individual must be considered as belonging to some group or other. E.g., when Socrates is considered as a
person, his essence is consciousness, when as a human animal, power of sense
and motion attached to a body of a certain sort, when as a male, possession
of certain sex organs, etc. But
considered just as an individual, Socrates has no nominal essence. (III.vi.4)
5. Can individual
particulars, considered just in themselves and apart from reference to any group, have real essences? why or why not? No. The real essence is the foundation of those
complex ideas that we get from all the members of a group. So unless you specify what group you want
to consider a particular as belonging to (e.g., as horse, as male, as thing
with four legs that you sit on) you will not be able to specify what in its
particular constitution is the foundation for those qualities. (III.vi.5)
6. Distinguish
between real essence and real constitution. The
real constitution is the foundation for all the qualities that a particular
thing exhibits and hence for all the ideas we get from it (III.vi.8).
The real essence is that part of the real constitution responsible
just for the ideas that are listed in the nominal essence (as well as for
whatever other properties might necessarily follow from this part of the real
constitution). (III.vi.6)
7. What
significance did Locke attach to the fact that we cannot explain why lead and iron are malleable, but antinomy and stones not, or why lead and antimony
are fusible, wood and stones not? It
means we do not know the real essences that give these substances these
properties. (III.vi.9)
8. What did Locke
mean by saying that there are no “chasms” or “gaps” in the visible corporeal world? (Note that he did not mean to deny that there is empty space or vacua.) The
chasms and gaps he is talking about are gaps between species of things. His claim is that between any two kinds of
things we always seem to be able to find individuals that are of an
intermediate kind, in that they exhibit some of the features of both kinds. (III.vi.12)
9. What
significance did Locke attach to the fact that different people understand the same kinds of things to have different nominal essences? It
indicates that these essences are created by the understanding, which in
different people picks on certain similarities rather than others, depending
on their “care, industry, or fancy” (III.vi.29, i.e., their degree of
attention, their concerns, their past experience).
(III.vi.26) 10.
If it is up to the understanding to construct
nominal essences, then why are
sheep-headed oxen and other fantastic arrangements
of complex ideas not considered to be nominal essences? Because
the understanding is guided by what ideas we observe to commonly go together
in perception, and we make no such observations. (III.vi.28) Locke, Essay IV.i; ii.1-7,14; iii.1-14,17-18,21 (Knowledge)
1. What are the
only objects the mind can immediately contemplate? Its
own ideas.
(IV.i.1)
2. What is our
knowledge of the coexistence of ideas particularly concerned with? Substances. We are concerned to determine what ideas do
and do not belong together in our complex ideas of substances. (IV.i.6)
3. Are we capable
of having knowledge of objects that exist outside of the mind? According
to the definition of knowledge in IV.i.2, all our knowledge is just of relations between our ideas. IV.i.7 claims that we can also, at least in some cases, know of the actual
existence of objects “agreeing” to certain of our ideas. But note that in the strict sense,
knowledge of real existence is merely knowledge that there is something
corresponding to our ideas that exists outside of the mind. To know that there is something
corresponding to our ideas and to know what this thing is and how completely
it resembles our ideas are two different things. Just to know that there is something
related to an idea without knowing what this thing is does not seriously
overstep the definition given in IV.i.2.
4. What
considerations led Locke to maintain that when you merely remember having
demonstrated a conclusion, but do not review the proof, you still have
knowledge of that conclusion rather than mere belief? He
came to think that the person who just remembers the result of a past
demonstration is, in the very act of remembering it, performing a
demonstration of that result, though a demonstration of a different kind from
the original demonstration. (In this
demonstration the person first remembers that a certain conclusion was in the
past perceived to follow from certain premises, then thinks that as long as
things do not change or cannot change [because they are immutable], what was
once perceived to be true of them must continue to be so, and from these two
premises draws the previous conclusion again with all the force of a
demonstration.) (IV.i.9)
5. What are the
intervening ideas responsible for our remembered knowledge of the results of
past demonstrations? The
thought of the “immutability of the same relations between the same immutable
things,” i.e., the thought that if the things have not changed from what they
were before, then their relations will have to be what they were perceived to
be before. Also the thought that
certain relations were perceived before. (IV.i.9)
6. On what
fundamental principle does our knowledge of all general propositions in
mathematics depend? Why must we rely
on this principle? The
principle that, where immutable (unchangeable) things are concerned, what has
once been perceived to be true of them will always be so. We must rely on this principle if we are to
think that what we have proven of a figure or number in one particular
instance will remain true of that figure in all other instances. And were we not able to generalize from one
particular instance to others, all our mathematical knowledge would be of
particular propositions, not of general ones. (IV.i.9)
7. Can memory ever
be mistaken? While
this hardly seems correct, Locke seems to have thought that it is not really
possible to misremember something, since he defined memory as “but the
reviving of past knowledge” at IV.i.9. However, in the last
sentence of IV.i.9 he did recognize
that it is possible for memory to fade and become unclear over time, so that
it is no longer possible to remember what one once knew, or remember and
hence know it as clearly. This
imperfection of memory does not degrade it from the status of knowledge,
however. (It is not tantamount to an
admission that memory may ever be mistaken.)
It merely makes it a more “imperfect” form of knowledge than
intuition, whatever that means.
8. Explain the
difference between intuition and demonstration. In
intuition the relation between two ideas is directly and immediately
perceived by the mind. In
demonstration it can only be perceived by means of an intermediate chain of
ideas, each of which is intuited to be appropriately related to its
predecessor and successor. (IV.ii.1 and 2)
9. Can
demonstration ever be mistaken? No. Locke described demonstration at “certain”
at IV.ii.4, and said that it “removes all doubt” in IV.ii.5, and that it is “very clear” at IV.ii.6.
These statements are incompatible with demonstration ever being in
error. But Locke does seem to have
thought that while demonstration cannot be in error, people can be in error
in supposing that they have demonstrated something when in fact they have
not. This can happen because of
weakness of memory, which leads to a part of the demonstration being left
out. While memory cannot misinform us
(see answer to question 7), Locke’s position seems to have been that we
confuse demonstrations all the parts of which we cannot exactly remember with
arguments that are not in fact complete demonstrations, and so end up
accepting false conclusions. However,
it is not clear that this position is entirely coherent with the
infallibility of memory insisted on in IV.i.9. 10.
What are we ultimately concerned with when we ask
whether a particular idea in our minds corresponds to some object actually
existing outside of us? We
are ultimately concerned with what will give us pleasure and pain. An idea that we ourselves have cooked up in
imagination cannot hurt us, nor can it benefit us, since it comes and goes as
we see fit (except, of course, in certain
dreams). But if the idea comes from an
object, and that object has powers in it to bring about further ideas of
pleasure and pain in us, then we think that, depending on how we behave, we
will get ideas of pleasure and pain (or fail to get them) from that object
independently of our wills. Thus it is
a concern with the connection between our ideas of pleasure and pain and our
ideas of objects that motivates a concern with determining what ideas
actually are of objects existing outside of us. (IV.ii.14) 11.
What effects can we intuit or demonstrate motion to
be able to produce? What effects do we
perceive it to produce? Motion
can be conceived to produce nothing other than motion, but we perceive that
it is somehow able to produce ideas of colours, pleasure and pain, and other
such things in us. (IV.iii.6) 12.
If we were able to determine the primary qualities
of the insensibly small parts of which bodies are composed, would we then be
able to deduce what ideas those bodies are and are not able to bring about in
us? Why or why not? We
could possibly deduce what type (i) ideas we would
get of the primary qualities of bodies, but since there is no apparent
connection between the primary qualities of bodies and our type (ii) ideas of
sensible qualities (which Locke here referred to as “secondary qualities,”
contrary to his official definition), even knowing the real constitution of
bodies would not allow us to deduce what type (ii) ideas those bodies might
or might not bring about in us. (IV.iii.13) 13.
Upon what, ultimately, must we rely for our
knowledge of what qualities and powers may coexist in any given substance? Sensory
experience. Only by seeing the
substance actually exhibit those qualities or powers can we tell. We cannot learn about just a part of its
nature and then hope to deduce the remainder, because most of the qualities
and powers in bodies have no necessary connection with any others, so that
from the fact that a body has certain ones, it does not follow that it has
any others. (IV.iii.14) Locke, Essay IV.iv.1-12;
ix.2-3; x.1-7; xi (Knowledge of
Real Existence)
1. What assures us
that our perceptions of simple ideas are not made up by us but correspond to
powers in bodies? The
fact that we are only able to get these ideas when our sense organs are
suitably affected. Were the ideas
innate or such that we could create them from a mere act of imagination, then
we could doubt whether they correspond to powers in bodies. But since they only first originate in us
after our senses have been affected in a particular way, and no one can get
these ideas without having that happen (even talking to others who have had
them is not enough to make the conception of them arise in the mind, just as
the blind can have no concept of colours), we can be sure that there must be
some power in the objects that affect our senses to produce them. (Essay IV.iv.4)
2. Why can
mathematical principles be regarded as “true and certain” even though they
only describe ideas we have ourselves created in imagination? Because
if any actually existing objects were to exactly conform to what we think as
defining the shapes and numbers we consider in mathematics, whatever we
demonstrate of those shapes and numbers would also have to be true of these
actually existing objects. (IV.iv.6)
3. What is the
basis for our knowledge of general truths? Demonstrations
proceeding on the basis just of what is contained in the ideas involved in
those propositions. Otherwise put,
general principles are known by analysis of their component terms or by
intuiting relations between their component terms. Since these principles are true whether or
not any of the things they talk about actually exists, their truth has
nothing to do with the real existence of things, but only with relations of
the ideas they contain. (IV.iv.8)
4. Are there any
constraints on the power of the imagination in constructing ideas of complex
modes? We
cannot put ideas together in such a way as to create a contradiction. (IV.iv.12)
5. What conditions
must be satisfied in order for our ideas of substances to be considered real
rather than imaginary? What conditions
must be satisfied for them to be considered at least possibly real rather
than fantastic creations that could never even possibly exist? To
be considered real the simple ideas that are combined in the substance must
be actually experienced to go together in perception. To be considered at least possibly real,
that collection of simple ideas must have been experienced to go together at
some point in the past. (Since we do
not know the real constitutions responsible for giving things the powers they
have to bring about the ideas they do, we cannot automatically assume that
just any two simple ideas may be combined together in a substance, for the
real constitutions needed to produce those simple ideas may be incompatible
and incapable of coexisting. The only
way we can be sure the combination of simple ideas is even possible,
therefore, is if we have actually experienced some substance exhibiting
them. The bare fact that they do not
contradict one another is no indication.) (IV.iv.12)
6. Is it possible
to prove our own existence, i.e., give a demonstration of the fact? No. You know of your own existence by intuiting
that your thoughts must belong to some substance. While demonstrations are a chain of
intuitions, in strictness something that is intuitively evident on its own is
not demonstrated. You need more than
one intuition to make a chain. (IV.ix.2 and 3)
7. Did Locke accept
the causal principle (that every effect must have some cause)? If not, why not, and if so, how did he
think we come to know it? Yes. He claimed we know it by
"intuition," which means we must just see its truth immediately by
inspection of our ideas. (IV.x.3)
8. What
significance does the power to produce and remove ideas have for Locke’s
arguments to demonstrate the existence of an external world? The
fact that we cannot produce new ideas on our own (as evidenced by the fact
that blind people can form no ideas of colours or those who have never tasted
pineapple realize what it tastes like) is an indication that there must be
different things in the environment around us that act on our sense organs
and so give them the stimulus to originally produce ideas. The fact that we can call up some ideas out
of memory and send them away again is an indication that those ideas are imagined,
whereas the contrary fact that there are some ideas that we cannot call up or
dismiss at will is an indication that there must be something else that is
imposing those ideas on us. (IV.xi.4 and 5)
9. What
significance do feelings of pleasure and pain have for Locke’s arguments to
demonstrate the existence of an external world? Locke
believed that the imagination could not produce feelings of pleasure and
pain, so that when these feelings accompany an idea, it is a sure sign that
the idea is being perceived and not imagined.
He considered reality itself to consist in whatever can produce
pleasure or pain or serves as a reliable sign for what can produce pleasure
or pain. On this account, if dreams
and fantasies could produce pleasure and pain then they would be as good as
real for us and would have to be treated as such since they would determine
our happiness and change our state of well being. Otherwise put, a dream or fantasy is only a
dream or fantasy if it does not produce feelings of pleasure or pain. The conclusion, once again, is that where
these feelings arise, we can be sure we are dealing with reality. (IV.xi.6-8) 10.
Can I know that objects continue to exist when I am
not perceiving them? No
(IV.xi.9).
We can know that they existed (in the past) if we remember having
perceived them (IV.xi.11), but our
conviction that they exist now can never be more than probable. We can only be certain that they continue
to exist when we are actually perceiving them. — But there is no reason why we should not
rest content with mere probability in these matters. (IV.xi.10) 11.
Can I know that other human bodies think and perform
acts of will? No. For Locke this is something that falls
short even of probability and has to be accepted merely on faith. (IV.xi.12) Locke, Essay IV.xiv-xv; xvi.1,3-14 (Probability)
1. Why did God not
make us capable of knowing more things? To
keep us from becoming too confident and make us more careful and hesitant in
our assertions (IV.xiv.2)
2. Why is judgment
exercised? Because
knowledge cannot be obtained yet the circumstances of life compel us to make
a decision. But also because, even
though a demonstration is available and within our grasp, we are too
impatient, lazy, or stupid to work it out. (IV.xiv.3)
3. Can a
proposition be both certain and probable at one and the same time? Yes,
if it is entertained by two different people.
Certainty and probability do not concern the proposition but the
person who entertains it. If the
person intuits or is able to demonstrate the truth of the proposition, then
it is certain for that person. But
another person may not be able to do this, or may accept the proposition on
the basis of evidence that is less than certain, for example, the say-so of
someone else. (IV.xv.1)
4. How can Locke
say, without contradicting himself, that the testimony of others is one of
the two grounds of probability (IV.xv.4), and that the opinions of others are
no true grounds of probability (IV.xv.6)? When
he talks about the testimony of others as being a ground of probability, he
means their testimony to things that they know because they have
demonstrated, or experienced them.
Opinions are not things they know but things they believe to be the
case on the basis of a judgment based on evidence. In that case, they should
tell us what that evidence is so we can be informed to make our own judgment
and not just tell us what their beliefs are and expect us to swallow
them. We are to accept testimony only
when it is testimony to what someone has experienced or demonstrated, not
just testimony to what someone believes.
5. Under which, if
any, of the following circumstances could a person be said to have violated
Locke’s ethics of belief?
a. a person reaches
a decision without having fully examined the issue
b. a person sticks
to a decision made earlier merely because they remember having decided that
way earlier, and without bothering to remember the evidence for that decision
c. a person sticks
to a decision made earlier without bothering to review new evidence that has
since come in
d. a person sticks
to a decision made earlier even after having been confronted with evidence
that undermines that decision In
none of them. Locke wrote that the
demands of life often compel people to make decisions upon matters when they
have not been able to review all of the pertinent evidence, and that few
actually have the leisure, resources, and patience to be able to collect all
of the relevant information. (IV.xvi.3) No one can therefore be
blamed for reaching a decision upon an incomplete survey of the
evidence. However, people can be
blamed for reaching a decision without sifting matters to the best of their
ability, at the time that they were obliged to reach their initial decision. (IV.xvi.3)
Locke also wrote that retaining all the evidence for a decision once
reached in one’s memory is too hard, and that no one should be expected to
have to do that as long as they can clearly remember that they did reach that
decision in the past upon surveying the evidence to the best of their ability
at the time. (IV.xvi.1) Finally, he wrote that reviewing all the
evidence that is continually coming in would be too burdensome for people to
be obliged to do it, given their minimal amount of leisure time, resources,
and patience and the pressures of everyday life (IV.xvi.3), and that since reliability and
steadfastness are also virtues, people cannot be expected to abandon their
opinions even in the face of contrary evidence, as long as that evidence does
not amount to a demonstration. For,
anything short of a demonstration could be wrong, and any who abandon one
opinion for another merely as the evidence swings back and fourth end up being too inconstant in their opinions. (IV.xvi.4)
6. Is intolerance
ever justified? Hardly
ever. If you have good reason to
suppose that a person could easily have performed a more adequate survey of
the evidence before reaching their initial decision, or if you are actually
in possession of a demonstration that is fairly direct and easy to grasp,
then you might be able to criticize the person for their beliefs, but simply
having stronger evidence does not entitle you to even expect the other person
to consider your evidence. (IV.xvi.4)
7. Explain the
difference between assurance and confidence. To
have assurance you must be told of the occurrence of some matter of fact
(i.e., something concerning the qualities, powers, causes, or effects of some
substance or group of substances) you did not yourself experience (if you did
experience it you would have sensation and not belief). Moreover, all the witnesses must agree that
the matter of fact occurred. Finally,
the matter of fact must be of a type that both you and everyone else have
always observed to be true in the past; that is, it must be a consequence of
a universal law of nature, such as that stones fall or fire burns. For confidence all of these same conditions
must be met except for the last one.
If the matter of fact is one that is sometimes true and sometimes
false, but could as well be true as false or is most often true, then you can
have confidence, but not assurance.
Assurance is thus a higher degree of belief. (IV.xvi.6-7)
8. What are the
main causes of diminution in the probability of testimony to a matter of fact? Conflict
of the testimony with common experience, with the regular course of nature,
or with other testimony. (IV.xvi.9)
9. What are the two
“foundations of credibility?” What
has been commonly observed in similar cases in the past, and the quality of
the testimony in favour of what happened in this particular case. (IV.xvi.9) 10.
What is a “traditional” testament? One
received at second or third or a more remote hand. (IV.xvi.10) 11.
What are some of the main reasons leading people to
misrepresent someone else’s testimony? Passion,
vested interest, oversight, and misinterpretation. (IV.xvi.11) 12.
Is it possible to have any sort of assurance or
confidence about the existence of things that fall outside of anyone’s
capacity to observe, such as the insensibly small, the insensibly remote, or
the hidden mechanisms in causes responsible for giving them the power to
bring about their effects? If so, how
so, if not, why not? We
can have some probable conjecture about these matters based on the assumption
that unobservable things will be relevantly analogous to observable
things. The stronger the analogy, the
greater the probability of our belief can be. (IV.xvi.12) 13.
Why can we have assurance in the occurrence of well-attested
miracles, despite the fact that they are contrary to common experience and
the regular course of nature? Because
if beings exist that are powerful enough to alter the course of nature, we
should expect that they would do so in those circumstances where they have
ends or goals that might be served by such an intervention. (IV. xvi.13) 14.
Besides being contrary to the ordinary course of
observation, what further feature must an event have before it can be
considered a miracle? It
would have to be supposed to serve some purpose that a supernatural agent
could reasonably be supposed to have. (IV.xvi.13) 15.
What is faith? Belief
in the testimony of a being who knows all and would not lie. (IV.xvi.14) 16.
What conditions must be satisfied before we can have
faith in a revelation? We
must know that the revelation in fact came from God, and we must be assured
that we have interpreted it correctly. (IV.xvi.14) Locke, Essay IV.xviii.1-10; xix (Reason, Faith,
and Enthusiasm)
1. Would Locke
consider any merely probable judgment to be known by reason? Would he consider propositions known by
intuition or sensation to be known by reason? At
IV.xviii.2 he defined reason as the discovery of the
certainty or probability of propositions
by means of deductions. However,
judgments based on revelation are also probable, and Locke distinguished
faith from reason in this passage as well.
Thus, for Locke, reason would include demonstration and all forms of
probable judgment other than faith.
But it would exclude intuition and sensation (since they do not
involve “deductions” but rather are immediate forms of knowing) as well as
faith. However, at IV.xviii.3 he used the term “reason” more broadly to
include whatever is taught to us by our “natural” faculties and so here included
intuition and sensation as part of “reason” and excluded only faith.
2. Explain Locke’s
distinction between original and traditional revelation. When
a person is themselves the subject of a religious experience, they have an
original revelation. When a person
believes a certain revealed truth, not because they have themselves
experienced it to be revealed, but because they have accepted someone else's
report (perhaps at second or third or more remote hand), then they get their
belief from a tradition rather than personal (original) experience. (IV.xviii.3)
3. What is required
for us to put faith in a traditional revelation? We
have to know that the tradition that hands this revelation down to us is
reliable (e.g. that books really were written by those who received the
revelation, that copies are accurate, etc.). (IV.xviii.4)
4. What is required
for us to put faith in an original revelation? We
have to be sure that what has been revealed to us did in fact come from God
and was not induced by something else (say delirium caused by too much
fasting, fever, trance, mental disease, or drugs). We also have to be sure that we have
understood the message correctly. (IV.xviii.5)
5. If revelation
tells us something that reason denies, which must we accept according to
Locke and why? Reason. Locke's position is that we are in fact
constitutionally incapable of doing otherwise (except in the case of those
suffering from the mental disease of enthusiasm, which he discusses in the
next chapter). This is because we
cannot help but put our belief in that relation of ideas that we perceive
most clearly. And given the answers
already supplied to questions 4 and 3, there must always be some residual
doubt attached to a traditional revelation — either about the authenticity of
its source or the reliability of its tradition. Nor can this doubt be removed by a further,
original revelation that the traditional revelation is true. For even in that case we would still need
to employ reason to decide if the message really came from God and was
correctly understood, which means we have to put trust in reason before
faith. Thus, the proposition that a
particular revelation is good ground for faith can never be as trustworthy as
the clear perception of a relation between ideas. (IV.xviii.4-6)
6. If revelation
tells us something that reason tells us nothing about, which must we accept
according to Locke and why? Faith. But we must use reason to make sure that
the revelation came from God. (IV.xviii.7)
7. If revelation
comes into conflict with a proposition that our reason judges to be probably
true, which must we accept according to Locke? In virtue of what do we decide which we
must accept? Faith,
supposing that reason demonstrates that the revelation did come from God and
the message has been correctly understood.
Our decision is grounded on the fact that as long as reason is not
able to demonstrate that the opposite of what faith tells us as impossible,
we ought to accept the testimony of a witness who knows all and would not
lie. Insofar as we have reason to
think that God is the witness, we are dealing with such testimony. (IV.xviii.8-9)
8. Could someone
who comes to form a belief after an incomplete survey of all the evidence
still be called a lover of the truth? Yes. They could only be said not to love the
truth if they assented to the proposition with more or less conviction than
was warranted by such a survey of the evidence as they had managed to
perform. For Locke, to love the truth
means merely to not accept a proposition with any more or less certainty than
the evidence that you have examined warrants.
However, that a love of the truth should compel a survey of all the
available evidence is not something he suggests, and is something IV.xvi.1-4
condemns as impractible. (IV.xix.1)
9. What is the
principal cause of intolerance? Lack
of love and respect for the truth.
Someone who does not love the truth is apt to affirm a proposition
with more conviction than the evidence warrants. And someone who is unjustifiably certain of
a proposition is apt to expect others to accept it as well and be indignant
with them if they fail to do so (which is likely if the proposition is not in
fact certain). Moreover, since this
person will have ignored the voice of their own reason, and so imposed a
belief upon themselves in the absence of true evidence, it is only to be
expected that they will exercise the same violence on others. (IV.xix.2) 10.
What is enthusiasm? Putting
faith in a revelation that has not been shown by reason to have come from
God. (IV.xix.3) 11.
Why does enthusiasm destroy the authority of
revelation as well as reason? Enthusiasm
places revelation above reason. But if
we don’t place reason above revelation, we cannot use reason to distinguish
what is truly a revelation from what only pretends to be one and take away
the source from which revelation gains its support. (IV.xix.4) 12.
What is immediate revelation and what considerations
lead people to suppose they have it? Immediate
revelation is like original revelation in being a direct communication of an
individual with God. But unlike
original revelation it is supposed to be evidently a message from God and is
not taken to stand in need of authentication by reason. Thus, it is a form of enthusiasm. If enthusiasm is putting faith in a
revelation that has not been shown to have come from God, immediate
revelation is putting faith in a revelation you imagine to have yourself
received from God, even though you have no rational warrant for doing
so. People believe they have it
because it is not impossible that God might in fact have given it to them,
because if they can suppose that something has been revealed by God they can
avoid the hard work of finding it out by other means, or can maintain it even
though it is strictly unprovable by any other means, and because it flatters
their pride to imagine God has chosen them for a special communication. (IV.xix.5) 13.
What are the chief causes of enthusiasm, according
to Locke? Laziness,
ignorance, and vanity. The enthusiast
is someone who is too lazy, too impatient, or too afraid to embark on the
hard work of doing research guided by reason.
The enthusiast prefers quick and easy answers instead and is willing
to sacrifice love of the truth to get them.
And the enthusiast is flattered by the fancy of having been specially
chosen by God for communication. (IV.xix.8) 14.
What is the main question that must be asked about
an immediate revelation? Did
it come from God, from some other spirit, or from one’s own fancy? (IV.xix.10) 15.
Why can immediate revelation not truly be “seeing?” Because
were it “seeing” I would know it to be so simply by
inspecting the ideas involved and seeing their relation to one another (this
is what happens in intuition) or by having an experience where the ideas are
so connected. In the first case anyone
else with those same ideas should intuit the same thing. In the second case, anyone else in the same
circumstances should sense the same thing.
But in fact, those claiming to have immediate revelations are not
claiming to simply see but to have something revealed to them by God, so that
the case is not actually one of intuiting or sensing but rather one of
accepting something on God’s purported say-so, even though the visionaries
claim to be “seeing.” (IV.xix.10) 16.
How can we know that a revelation has in fact come
from God? By
means of some outward sign such as a miracle. (IV.xix.15) In cases where that is lacking, the
revelation must be conformable to already authenticated revelations. (IV.xix.16) Bayle Dictionnaire, “Pyrrho B” (references are
to the text in ECCO; “r” is right hand column, “l” left-hand column)
1. How does the
position on ethics that Bayle attributed to Pyrrho
differ from Locke’s position on ethics? Locke
believed that ethics could be known by demonstration whereas Pyrrho held that they are merely conventional. In the main text of the Pyrrho
article, Bayle took Pyrrho’s position to naturally
follow from his view that the absolute internal constitution of things cannot
be known, so that we might as well simply accept whatever laws and customs
happen to be in effect in a given society.
While Locke also believed that the real constitution of substances
cannot be known, he took our knowledge of ethics to be based on knowledge of
complex modes, which can be known. (p. 2622 of the main article)
2. Why is
scepticism not dangerous to science or to the state? Because
the scientists are all sceptics already (since none of them believe that we
can know what is ultimately responsible for the phenomena of nature — the
Cartesians believe we can only make hypotheses about it and the Newtonians
that we can only describe its laws, and Locke insisted we cannot know the
real constitution of things), and the sceptics always said that since we
can’t know for sure what is right or wrong or how we ought to behave, we
might as well just follow whatever laws and customs happen to be in effect in
our societies. (p.2619-r
of Note B)
3. Why is it
dangerous to religion? Because
if you have any doubts in religious matters you will lose your faith in the
religion and no longer be willing to observe its rituals or other practices. (2619-r)
4. Why is this
danger only slight? Because
the sceptical arguments are not very effective means of persuading most
people. (2619-r)
5. What shields us
against Pyrrhonian arguments? The
Grace of God which compels those who receive it to believe, the force of
education, ignorance of those arguments, and our natural instincts, notably a
natural instinct to want to have answers to things and to be dissatisfied
with uncertainty. (2619-r)
6. Why would Arcesilaus be more formidable today than in his own time? Because
Christian theology and the new natural philosophy would give him unanswerable
arguments against all those who suppose that it is possible for us to
comprehend things. (2620-l)
7. What were the
ancient sceptics right about, according to the “new
philosophy?” That
sensible qualities are only appearances. (2620-l)
8. What do the new
philosophers attempt to exempt extension and motion from? Why are they unable to actually do this? From
the claim that they, like the other sensible qualities, are only appearances
in us and not true qualities of bodies.
They were not actually able to do this because if bodies can appear to
us to be coloured, hot, cold, and odiferous without
really being so, then they can just as well appear to us to be extended and
moving without really being so. (2620-l)
9. Why do I have no
good proof for the existence of bodies? Bayle’s
argument rests on the premise that bodies cannot be the cause our sensations,
so we cannot infer that bodies exist from the fact that our sensations
exist. Bayle did not say why bodies
could not be the causes of our sensations.
A popular argument at the time was that because minds are such
radically different things from bodies, it is inconceivable how bodies could
act on minds to cause them to have sensations. Another argument would appeal to the
possibility of experiencing objects in dreams. (2620-1) 10.
Why would it prove too much to claim that God would
be a deceiver for giving me ideas of extended things if there are no extended
things in existence? Because
the same argument would also prove that these extended things must have the
qualities our senses reveal them to have, and all the "new
philosophers" deny this. (2620-l) 11.
In what way is a peasant like a Cartesian? Their
beliefs are equally instinctive and equally deniable, so if God does not
deceive peasants by giving them an instinctive belief that fire is red and
hot even though it is not he would not deceive Cartesians by giving them an
instinctive belief that fire is extended and moving even though it is not; on
the other hand, if God would be a deceiver for giving the Cartesians a
natural impulse to think fire is extended and moving, he would be just as
much of a deceiver for giving peasants a natural impulse to think fire is red
and hot. (2620-l) 12.
What entitles us to think that the principle of the
transitivity of identity (that is, that if a=b and b=c, then a=c) is wrong? The
mystery of the Trinity, which teaches us that though the Father is God and
Christ is God, Christ is not the Father.
Since the Christian revelation proves this principle to be true, and
the principle contradicts the principle of the transitivity of identity, we
must conclude that the transitivity of identity is false. (2620-l-r) 13.
Why should I think that even though I am here in Because
the mystery of the Eucharist assures us that one and the same body can be in
two different places at the same time. (2620-r) 14.
How is it that the mystery of the Eucharist
invalidates all the rules of arithmetic? Because
it makes it possible that things we count up as two or more may in fact be
just one thing.
(2620-r) 15.
What assures me of the fact that I existed yesterday? Nothing
more than faith in scripture, which tells us that our souls will be judged
for their deeds during life at the last judgment, a claim that implies we
must last for more than a moment. But
there is nothing in memory or in the nature of things that could provide this
certainty. The doctrine of constant
creation entails that a new soul could possibly be created for each person at
each successive moment of time, and that this soul could have all the memories
of the previous soul implanted in it.
Thus, there need be nothing discernible to memory were I newly
created, and there would be no physical impossibility in such an occurrence. (2621-r) Bayle Dictionnaire, “Zeno F and G”
1. Why could there
be no moment at which a moving arrow moves? Because
if it moves at a single moment it would have to be in two places at once,
which is impossible. It follows that
in a single moment a body can only occupy a space equal to itself, which
means that over any single moment any body must be
at rest and not in motion, since it is not going anywhere in that
moment. (608-l-r)
2. Why is it
impossible for a moving object to go from one extremity to the other? What important distinction between matter
and time is involved in this answer?
What absurd consequence would follow if an object could go from one
extremity to the other? Because
there are infinitely many parts between the extremities and it is not
possible for a moving body to be at more than one of them at a time. Given infinitely many points to be touched
and at least one moment occupied in touching each of them, it follows that
the interval between extremities could never be crossed. This answer supposes that, unlike time, the
space or “matter” between extremities is infinitely divisible — indeed, infinitely
divided or marked off by a moving object, which must pass over or touch on
each of its infinitely many parts in succession. Given this is the case the only way a body
could make it from one extremity to the other is by touching more than one
part of space at once. But that is
absurd because it implies that the body would be in more than one place at
once. (609-1-r)
3. Why could an
hour neither begin nor end if time were composed of an infinite number of
parts? Were
time infinitely divisible, there would have to always be a further moment
between any two given moments. Given
that no two moments can coexist, each must pass before the next can come to
be. But if there are always further
moments between any two given moments, then there will always be some further
intervening moment that first needs to pass before getting from the first of
two given moments to the second, which is tantamount to saying that we will
never get to the second moment because there will always be some intervening
moment that needs to pass first before we get there. Consequently, time could not pass. Since it does pass, it could not be
infinitely divisible. (609-r)
4. Identify three
things that cannot be reconciled with the idea that a moving body might
simultaneously move with two different speeds relative to different
surrounding bodies. A
body in motion cannot be at rest (i.e., it cannot touch the same part of
space twice in succession). A body in
motion can never be in two places at once.
A body in motion can never touch a later place without first having
passed over each of the earlier places in sequence. Granting these principles, and granting
that time is not infinitely divisible, it follows that in an indivisible
moment of time, if the body is really moving, it will have to move from
exactly one place to one other, no more (since then it is in two places at
once) and no less (since then it is at rest and not in motion). But then it simply cannot have different
relative motions. If it moves from
touching one places to touching another on its North side, it cannot move
over any more or any less places on its South side. The only way this could make sense is if
both the places and the times of its motion are infinitely divisible (allowing
for there to be two half times at which it is successively at two half
intervals on the slower side while in the first half time it is at one full
interval on the faster side). But time
at least is not infinitely divisible, as has already been argued. (610-l-r)
5. What are the
only three conceivable types of composition of extension? Extension
might be composed of extensionless points, of
extended but indivisible parts, or of parts that are always further
divisible. (610-r)
6. Why can
extension not be composed of mathematical points? Because
mathematical points have 0 extension and 0 added to 0, however many times,
does not add up to any finite quantity.
So no extension can arise from the aggregation of points. (610-r)
7. Why can
extension not be composed of extended but indivisible atoms? Because
a body cannot be in two places at the same time. Consequently, the only way it can take up
more than a point and so be extended is if it has different parts, one in the
one place and one in the other. But if
the parts are in different places they are outside of one another, which
makes them not the same beings as one another. But then the thing must be divisible, at
least in principle if not in fact because it is composed of distinct beings,
and distinct beings are always separable. (610-r)
8. What is the “sophism”
(fallacy or logical error) in the argument that if extension is not composed
of indivisibles (mathematical points or extended but indivisible atoms) then
it must be infinitely divisible? The
sophism of insufficient enumeration of parts or alternatives. If you are going to argue that because A and B cannot be the case then C must be, then it had
better be that A, B, and C, are all the alternatives that there are. If there is a further alternative that you
have ignored, then from the fact that A and B are not the case, it does not
follow that C must be the case. The
neglected alternative may instead be the case. While it might seem like composition by
indivisibles (of two different sorts) and composition by divisible are the
only alternatives there is in fact a further one: no composition by
anything. That is the alternative negelected here. (611-r-l)
9. What makes the
hypothesis of infinite divisibility the strongest of the three? It
quibbles best. (611-l) When
speaking of infinity we can take refuge in the claim that the infinite is
naturally incomprehensible to human minds and use this claim to cover over
the inadequacies in our argument (610r), and we can take further advantage of
the obscurity of the subject to draw unintelligible distinctions that enable
us to triumph in public disputation. (611-l) 10.
What makes it as clear and evident as the Sun that
matter could not be infinitely divisible? If
matter were infinitely divisible the tiniest imaginable object would have to
contain infinitely many parts, each of which is of non-0 extension (for 0’s
would add up to nothing). And that is
a patent impossibility. Infinitely
many non-0 parts add up to something infinitely large, not anything of any
finite extent, much less something arbitrarily small. (611-1-r) 11.
What is required for an extended substance to
exist? Why can this requirement not be
met if space is infinitely divisible? Contact
of the parts of the substance with one another. If the parts are not in contact, you do not
have one extended substance but many separated by empty space. But then the question recurs about the
extension of those many substances. If
the many substances have zero extension then they are nothing and do not
exist. If they have some extension they are divisible into parts, but the
parts must be in contact with one another, otherwise they once again do not
make up one, extended substance. The
requirement for contact cannot be met in an infinitely divisible space
because however close you take two parts to be to one another, there would
have to be an infinity of other spaces intervening between them. (611-r) 12.
Why can extension exist only in the mind? Because
were it to exist in reality there would have to be contact of the parts making
up the extended thing and that is impossible as has just been shown. So, just as we say that lines are merely
ideal because it is impossible to have something that has length but no
breadth, so we must say that extension is merely ideal because it is impossible
to have something that takes up space and yet does not have contiguous parts. (611-r) 13.
What conclusion did Bayle draw from the fact that a
cannon ball, coated with paint and rolled along a table, will draw a line of
paint on the table? That
the cannon ball must touch the table, notwithstanding what was proven earlier
about the impossibility of the immediate contact of objects. However, this touching would have to
involve two different bodies being in two different places at the same
time. This is because, in an
infinitely divisible space, there can be no such thing as two immediately
adjacent points. Any points that are
adjacent must be separated by an infinity of other points. The only way that two points could touch,
therefore, is if they coexist in the same place. But if space is infinitely divisible, any
“point” of the cannon ball that coexists in the same place as a “point” of
the table must itself be infinitely divisible. So an infinite number of table parts and
cannonball parts must coexist in the same place. Though this conclusion is entirely opposed
to the earlier one, that contact of bodies is impossible, both this
conclusion and the other one follow with equal force from the evidence, thus
further demonstrating the unintelligibility of infinite divisibility, which
leads to such singly paradoxical and mutually inconsistent results. (611-r – 612-l) 14.
Would Bayle have accepted Locke’s distinction
between type (i) ideas of the primary qualities of
bodies and type (ii) ideas of the sensible qualities that bodies cause us to
feel in virtue of the real constitution of their insensibly small parts? No. Locke based the distinction on the claim
that our type (i) ideas are resemblances of
qualities in bodies whereas our type (ii) ideas are not. But Bayle pointed out that all the same
arguments that are used to show that our type (ii) ideas are not resemblances
of any quality in bodies apply just as well to the primary qualities of size,
shape, and extension. (612-l) 15.
Why are geometrical proofs of infinite divisibility
equally effective at disproving infinite divisibility? The
proofs work by showing that for every point on a longer line (the diagonal of
a square or the circumference of the larger of two concentric circles) there must
be a point on a shorter line. (Imagine
radii drawn from the larger circle to the center and apply the principles
that two distinct points determine a unique straight line and that no two
distinct straight lines can intersect at more than one point. This proves that each radius must cut the
smaller circle at a unique point.)
Since the longer line can be made arbitrarily long (the larger circle
can be arbitrarily large) it follows that the shorter line must consist of
infinitely many parts. The trouble
with this line of argument is that it leads to the untoward consequence that
the longer line and the shorter one must both be of the same length, since
they both consist of equal numbers of parts. (612-l) 16.
Give two reasons why infinite divisibility forbids
the beginning of motion. Give one why
a ball rolling down an inclined table could never roll off the edge of the
table. First,
because however slowly a body moves, if it moves and is not at rest it must
be in two places at once. Second,
because before it can get anywhere at all, it has to cross an infinite number
of places in succession, without taking any of them more than one at a time,
since there are always infinitely many points between any two given
points. This means that it will never
be able to finish the job of getting the least bit on down the line. The rolling ball will never drop of the
edge of the table for a similar reason: wherever it is, there will be
infinitely many places between it and the edge of the table, each of which
must be passed over one at a time, requiring infinitely many times to reach
the edge. (613-r) 17.
Why could one body not move faster than
another? Why could we not suppose that
when one body moves faster than another that the slower one stops in its
motion for longer or shorter intervals? Because
if motion exists it can neither be faster nor slower than one place at a
time. If the body moves more than one
place at a time it is in two places at once, which is impossible. If it moves less it is not moving at
all. The possibility of motions being
faster or slower because the apparently slower body really does rest cannot
account for the motion of the parts of wheels. On wheels the parts on the circumference
move much more quickly than the parts towards the center. But if this were accounted for by saying
that the center parts rest while the circumferential ones are in motion, it
would follow that wheels would have to be distorted by motion. Their spokes would have to stretch and bend
as the outer parts moved while the inner parts rested. Yet we observe no such thing. (613-r – 614-l) 18.
Given that motion does in fact undeniably exist,
what is the point of giving arguments to prove that it does not? It
shows that human reason is unable to explain the most evident and undeniable
things, as that there is motion of extension.
Consequently, the mere fact that we cannot understanding something is
no proof that it might be false. This
extends to the mysteries of revealed religion. (614-l) (Abstract Ideas) 1. What is the chief cause of those obstacles and difficulties that have so far prevented us from making any progress in philosophy? False principles, wrongly insisted upon. And among these, particularly the doctrine
that the mind has a power of abstracting ideas. (Introduction §§4 and 6) 2. What is our “most abstract idea of extension” (Introduction 8) an idea of? Just of the taking up of some space, without any specification of how
much space is taken up or what shape this space taken up is or what it is
that takes up the space. 3. What is the one sense in which Berkeley thought it is possible to abstract? The sense of dividing things into their spatial or temporal parts and
considering those parts separately from their surroundings. (§10) 4. What are the “proper acceptations of abstraction” (i.e. the senses in which this ability has been understood according to the tradition Berkeley is attacking)? The ability to form isolated and separate ideas of qualities that
cannot in fact exist on their own, and the ability to form separate and
isolated ideas just of those qualities that a number of different objects
share in common. (§10) 5. What are the two arguments against the traditional conception of abstraction that Berkeley had to offer in Introduction 10? (i) That he personally found it
psychologically impossible, upon introspection, to “imagine,” “consider by
itself abstracted or separated,” “frame,” “conceive,” or “form” ideas of
individual qualities abstracted from concomitant qualities, or the essences
of kinds abstracted from all particularizing features. (ii) That the generality of simple,
illiterate people make no claim to have such ideas. 6. What was Locke’s reason for claiming that human beings are able to form abstract ideas? We use general terms, and Locke maintained that this indicates that
we must have formed abstract ideas of sorts or kinds for the terms to refer
to. (§11) 7. Why did Berkeley find this reason to be inadequate? Just because we use general terms, it does not follow that they must
refer to abstract ideas. The terms
could instead be used to refer to classes of resembling particulars. (§11) 8. How can an idea be general without being abstract? By being made to serve as a sign for a kind of particular, much as a particular
black, one-inch long line segment on a particular piece of paper can serve as
a sign for any segment whatsoever. (§12) 9. What is the argument against the traditional conception of abstraction that Berkeley had to offer in Introduction 13? That it is impossible to form abstract ideas because the ideas would
have to exhibit contradictory qualities. 10. What is the erroneous supposition about the nature of language that lies at the root of the supposition that we have abstract ideas? The supposition that each name in a language can only refer to one
particular idea. (§18) Berkeley, Three Dialogues I, pp. 171-187 (Naïve Realism)
1. What is the
cause of scepticism, according to Philonous?
That is, what is the cause of “professing an entire ignorance of all
things” and of “notions as are repugnant” to “the plain dictates of nature
and common sense?” Believing
in the existence of what philosophers call “material substance.” (172)
2. In what sense
might someone who denies that matter exists be considered a sceptic,
according to Hylas? Not
the sense in which to be a sceptic is to doubt everything, but the sense in
which to be a sceptic is to deny the reality and truth of things. (173)
3. What “things” is
someone who denies the real existence of sensible things denying to
exist? Another way to ask this
question is, “what things are immediately perceived by the senses?” Sensible
qualities or combinations of sensible qualities, where by “sensible
qualities” we mean light, colour, figure, sounds, tastes, odours, and tangible
qualities. (175)
4. According to
Hylas, do sensible things exist only when they are perceived, or do they
exist whether we perceive them or not? They
exist whether we perceive them or not. (175)
5. What is wrong
with supposing that whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense must exist
in the object that occasions our perception? A
very great degree of heat is pain, but pain only exists in sentient
creatures, not in material substances in general (particularly not in fire). (176)
6. Is there any
vehement sensation that can be conceived apart from (i.e., in abstraction
from) conceiving pain, or any pain that can be conceived in general apart
from any particular vehement sensation? Both
Hylas and Philonous agree that there is not. (176-77)
7. Why could a very
great degree of heat not have any real being, according to Hylas? Because
it is no different from pain and so cannot exist outside of the mind of some
sentient creature as a quality of mind-independent material substances. (177)
8. What is wrong
with insisting that moderate degrees of heat and cold are not forms of
pleasure and pain, but instead qualities that could exist unperceived in
material substances? (Grant, for the
sake of argument, that moderate degrees of heat and cold are not, in fact,
pleasant or uncomfortable.) The
same object can cause us to experience very different degrees of moderate
heat and cold at the same time. Since
opposed degrees of the same quality cannot exist in the same object at the same
time, and so must exist only in the minds of sentient creatures. (178-79)
9. Fill in the
blank: Heat is to fire as ____ is to the prick of a pin. What should we conclude from this? Heat
is to fire as pain is to the prick of a pin, from which we should conclude
that heat is no more a quality in fire than pain is a quality in the pin. 10.
What is wrong with maintaining that there are two
kinds of heat and cold and taste and smell, one perceived by us that is
experienced as being pleasant or unpleasant, and another existing unperceived
as a quality in material substances? By
definition, the second kind of heat, cold, taste, and smell are not
immediately perceived by the senses.
But the question at hand is whether the things immediately perceived
by the senses exist independently of being perceived. (180) Recall
that at 174 Hylas declared that he
takes sensible things to be things immediately by the senses, not things
inferred from sensory experience. And
at 175 he declared first, that the
things immediately perceived by the senses are sensible qualities, and
second, that these things exist independently of being perceived. So Hylas, by his own admissions, is
compelled to accept that he means to talk about heat, cold, taste, and smell
as they are immediately perceived by us, and not about some other sort of
qualities not immediately perceived by us. 11.
Give two reasons why we should not say that sugar is
sweet. First,
sweet tastes are pleasant, which is to say that they are particular forms the
feeling of pleasure can take on. But
feelings of pleasure exist only in the minds of sentient creatures and not
unperceived in insentient bodies like sugar.
Second, the same amount sugar can taste sickeningly sweet to one
person and not sweet enough to another.
Since it can’t be both at once, this means that the tastes must be in
the persons and not in the sugar. 12.
Why should sound be said to be in the air rather
than in the body that makes the sound? Because
nothing makes a sound in a vacuum. (181) 13.
What exactly is sound as it is in the air? What, in contrast, is sound in “the common
acceptation of the word?” Which of
these two sorts of “sound” is heard?
Which could be only seen or felt and why could this sort of sound not
be heard but only be seen or felt? Sound
as it is in the air is a certain vibratory or undulating motion of the
air. Sound in the common acceptation
of the word is a sensation that exists only in the mind of a sentient
creature and only when perceived. Only
sounds in the common acceptation are heard.
Since sounds in the air are motions, and we don’t hear motions, sounds
in the air can only be detected by those senses suited to detecting
alterations of place, namely vision and touch. (182) 14.
What is wrong with saying that we see colours “on”
objects, or that corporeal substances have colours “inhering in” them, or
that [immediately] visible objects have colours “in” them? Try to identify two things. First,
this language draws a distinction between immediately visible objects and
their colours, which are conceived to be qualities that those objects have
painted on their surfaces, so that same object might change colour. But all that we immediately perceive by
vision is the colour, not the object it is “on” or “in.” So, in strictness of speech, we should not
say that we immediately see things or substances or objects, but just that we
see visual sensible qualities (colours) or bundles of visual sensible
qualities.
(183) Second, even if we allow that we see objects as well as colours, not
all objects have the colours on or in them that we see to be on or in
them. For example, the brilliant red
and purple clouds we see at sunrise are not on the clouds, which are dark
mist. (184) 15.
Why should we conclude that all colours whatsoever
are only “apparent” in the sense in which the colours on the clouds at
sunrise are only “apparent” and not really in the clouds? Try to give two reasons. First,
because what makes colours merely apparent is that they are seen at some
distance rather than up close, and any object, viewed through a microscope,
will exhibit different colours, and yet different ones at different
magnifications. So all the naked-eye
colours are “seen at a distance” in the same way that the colours on the
clouds are.
(184) Second, because tiny animals can be expected to have tiny eyes which
would give them a microscopic view.
These animals would see the same objects we do as having different
colours. Similarly, we know when we have
jaundice that the change in the colour of the fluid of the eye makes everything
look yellow and this is a reason to think that animals that are differently
constituted than we are, and that have different sorts of eyes, would
experience an object to have a different colour than we experience it to
have. Since objects can’t have different
colours at the same time, it is reasonable to conclude that the colours exist
only in sentient creatures. As the
microscopic case suggests, even if there are some animals that see colours
the objects really and truly have, we are not most likely to be those
animals. (185) 16.
What is wrong with saying that colours are in the
air rather than on or in visible objects (or, why is it no better to say this
than to say that they are on or in visible objects)? Why should it follow that if colours are in
the air they are “invisible” to the eye?
(Hint: the answer here is
similar to #13. Explain what the
difference is between colours as they are in the air and colours as they are
immediately perceived by us and comment on what follows from this.) Colours in the air
would be motions of the particles, or perhaps wave-like impulses transmitted
through some thin, fluid substance.
But we don’t immediately perceive these motions. It is a question for scientific research
whether light is a particle or a wave, and it would not be a question if we
saw which it was. Neither would it be
a question which colour has the longer or the shorter wavelength, as we would
just see it. But if we don’t see these
colours at all then we certainly don’t immediately perceive them, and
the question all along has been who denies the “reality and truth” of
sensible things, taken as the sensible qualities we immediately
perceive. It has turned out that it is
Hylas who does this, and that he does it because he wants to maintain that these
sensible things exist independently of being perceived in material
substances. Hylas has been forced to
deny the reality and truth of any such things in material substances. Philonous, in contrast, who always affirmed
that sensible qualities exist in minds can say that he has not denied
anything. And where the cases of sound
and colour are concerned, he can claim that common sense, vulgar notions, and
ordinary language are on his side, because they all take the colours and
sounds we perceive to be sensations in us and not motions in material
substances. (Immaterialism)
1. What are the
objects of human knowledge? Ideas
— either of sensation, reflection or imagination. (Principles §1)
2. Is there
anything said by Berkeley in Principles
1 that Locke would have disagreed with? Yes. While the account of the objects of human
knowledge being confined to ideas of sensation, reflection, and imagination
is exactly the same as Locke’s (Berkeley’s remarks about extra-ideational
sources of knowledge are not made here), Berkeley went on to claim that
sensible things or bodies are just collections of ideas, whereas Locke wanted
to claim that some of our ideas are resemblances of primary qualities of
mind-independent external substances.
3. What is required
in order for an idea to exist? It
must be perceived by someone. Note
that in conjunction with the answer to #1, this entails that the objects of
human knowledge can exist only when perceived. (§§2-3)
4. What do I really
mean when I say that something I am not now in a position to perceive exists? That
were I to position myself differently, I would get ideas of it. (§3)
5. What are the
limits on my power of abstraction? I
can only abstract from one another those things which are actually or could
possibly be perceived apart from one another.
Since I cannot perceive colour without some shape or shape without
some visible or tangible quality, ideas of pure colours, pure heat and pure
space cannot be abstracted from one another.
Since I cannot perceive a body without some sensation, the idea of the
body and the idea of the sensation cannot be abstracted from one
another. And since I cannot perceive a
sensation without thinking it to be perceived by a mind, the idea of a
sensation and the idea of being perceived cannot be abstracted from one
another. (§5)
6. Why should the
fact that extension in general (i.e., Cartesian intelligible extension like
that the understanding finds in the wax) is inconceivable unless it is
supposed to have some specific shape, size and velocity entail that extension
in general cannot exist outside of the mind? Because
specific sizes, shapes and velocities are relative to the perceiver. The same object will appear to be
differently shaped, sized and moving depending on how big or small the
perceiver is, how the perceiver’s sense organs work, and how the perceiver is
positioned. But if the size, shape and
velocity can vary without any variation in the object, then these things must
be ideas existing in the mind of the perceiver. If extension in general cannot be separated
from these things, then it, too, cannot exist anywhere but in the mind. There are therefore two “inseparability”
arguments for the mind-dependence of extension to be found in Berkeley: the
one described in the lecture and in §10, which appeals to the impossibility
of abstracting extension from colour and temperature and to the generally
agreed upon fact that the latter exist only in the mind, and the other,
described in §11 and just now, which appeals to the impossibility of
abstracting extension from specific shapes, sizes and motions, and to the
perceptual relativity of shape, size, and motion. (§11)
7. Why should we
suppose that neither sense nor reason informs us of the existence of solid,
extended corpuscles located in space outside of the mind? Sense
does not inform us of these things because all it tells us about are our
ideas, not what causes these ideas.
And reason cannot infer that such substances must exist in order to
cause our ideas because it is obvious that we are able to get such ideas when
it is incontestably the case that there is nothing acting on us to produce
them, as when we are dreaming or hallucinating. (§18)
8. What is wrong
with supposing that some sort of solid, extended substance existing in space
outside of the mind and acting on our sense organs when we come into contact
with it, might at least provide us with a plausible explanation of why we get
the ideas that we do? It
is impossible to explain how something which is capable only of aggregating
together in clumps and communicating motion by impact should cause
ideas. So to suppose that this sort of
stuff exists does not help to explain the origin of ideas in the least. You can get as far as it hitting the sense
organs and then something happens which it cannot explain and which could,
for all you know, be going on even in the absence of the sense organs being
hit or even in the absence of any sense organs whatsoever. (§19) Berkeley Three Dialogues I, pp. 187-207 (Primary Quality
Realism; Representational Realism)
1. Why should the
same reasoning employed concerning our perceptions of intermediate degrees of
heat and cold, sweetness, and other sensible qualities lead us to conclude
that there is no extension or figure in objects? It
was reasoned that since what is pleasantly warm or sweet to one person may be
chilly or displeasingly sweet to another that these qualities must be
sensations in the mind of the perceiver and not features that exist in
objects independently of being perceived.
But what looks small, smooth, and round to one observer may look
large, uneven, and angular to another.
Since the object cannot be both at the same time, these qualities, too,
must be merely perceptions in the perceiver. (189)
2. How is time
measured? By
the number of ideas that succeed upon one another within a person’s mind
while a certain event is occurring. (190)
3. Why may the same
motion seem faster to one observer and slower to another? Because
more ideas succeed upon one another in the mind of the one than of the other. (190)
4. If extension
does not exist outside of the mind, why should it follow that motion,
solidity, and gravity cannot exist outside of the mind? Motion
is change of place and so is a modification of extension. Gravitation is a kind of motion. Solidity is resistance or pushing back
against what tries to move into a space, and so involves both motion and
space.
(191)
5. Why does the
fact that sensible qualities cannot exist outside of the mind by itself
entail that the primary qualities, especially extension, cannot exist outside
of the mind? Because
we cannot conceive extension without conceiving some particular size and
shape that is extended, or motion without conceiving some particular extended
shape that is in motion. But we can’t
conceive a shape without conceiving edges or boundaries, and we cannot
conceive an edge or boundary without employing some sensible quality contrast
(such as of black lines on white paper).
Since the one cannot be separated from the other, even thought, it
follows that where the one exists, the other must exist as well, and where
the one does not exist, the other cannot exist. But it has been established that the other
sensible qualities exist only in the mind.
So the same must hold of extension and motion. (194)
6. Granting that
there is a distinction to be drawn between sensation considered as “an act of
the mind perceiving” and the “immediately perceived” “object of the senses,”
what is wrong with saying that the red and yellow of a tulip are not just
immediately perceived to be coexistent with (different parts of) the
extension of the shape of a tulip, but have a real existence outside of the
mind in some unthinking substance? Why
does the distinction between sensations and objects do nothing to avoid this
problem? The
problem is that we don’t immediately perceive the unthinking material
substance in which the colours inhere. We just perceive the colours and the shape
of the tulip. Drawing a distinction
between the act of the mind in perceiving and the object perceived is of no
help here because the unthinking material substance is just not among the
objects perceived. We are still stuck
in a situation where all we can talk about is relations between sensible
qualities that, as has already been established, exist only insofar as they
are perceived and are in no position to declare that we have any form of
acquaintance with mind-independent objects. (195)
7. What is wrong
with saying that anything that is involved in a perception that is additional
to the act of the mind in perceiving may exist outside of the mind in an
unthinking substance? Try to identify
two things. First,
it is simply false that there is any such thing as an act of the mind that is
involved in perception. This is because,
in perceiving, the mind is purely passive or acted upon. So everything that is involved with
perception must be additional to the (non-existent) act of the mind in
perceiving. But then, if we want to
maintain that these non-active components may exist outside of the mind in an
unthinking substance, we saddle ourselves with the absurd consequence that
perceptions as a whole may inhere in unthinking substances. The dark mist may have perceptions of
brilliant red and purple, by this consequence, not just be brilliant red and
purple or appear brilliant red and purple to people at a distance watching
the sunrise. As Philonous put it,
“does it not follow from your own concessions, that
the perception of light and colors, including no action in it, may exist in
an unperceiving substance?” (196-7) Secondly, even if there were an action as well as
an object involved in every perception, it would follow that there is an
action and an object in pain perceptions.
But then, if the object may exist outside of the mind in an unthinking
substance, pain could exist outside the mind in an unthinking substance (197).
8. What is wrong
with reasoning that even though we can’t understand how the qualities we
experience in perception could exist outside of minds, we also can’t conceive
how things like whiteness or sweetness could exist on their own, without inhering in some mind-independent material
substance that supports their existence? Since
we don’t perceive this material substance, but just the qualities, we must
infer it exists by appeal to the qualities.
We are told that the qualities cannot exist on their own but need to
be supported by something else as if they were peanut butter and jelly that
needs to be held up by some bread spread out underneath them. The trouble with this is that supporting
from underneath is a spatial relation, which presupposes extension. But extension is itself among the qualities
that are said to be in need of “support.”
To evade this, it might be said that the sort of support that is needed
is not a “gross literal” support, but that the term is being used
metaphorically. But then it needs to
be explained precisely what sort of “support” qualities need, beyond being
perceived, in order to be sustained in existence. And no such explanation is forthcoming. (197-199)
9. What is wrong
with supposing that even though individual sensible qualities might only
exist insofar as they are perceived by minds, multiple qualities might
support one another in existing together outside the mind? Try to identify two things. First,
the earlier arguments of Dialogues I have established that there is no
way that qualities can exist outside of the mind, not just that qualities
cannot exist in isolation outside of the mind. And a pre-eminent argument even turned on
the inseparability of sensible from primary qualities rather than drawing any
conclusion just about their isolated existence. (199-200) Second (and as a single argument on which Philonous is content to rest his
entire case) it is not possible to conceive any quality, or any collection of
qualities, that could exist outside of the mind. The best we can manage to do is conceive
sensible qualities or objects existing without conceiving anyone else
standing around to perceive them. But
then we ourselves conceive them all along.
So there is nothing our powers of conception can do to establish the
existence of things apart from being conceived by any mind, and it is
therefore impossible to conceive how sensible things could exist unconceived
of. (200) 10.
What is wrong with maintaining that sensible objects
must exist outside of the mind because in vision we see them existing at some
distance away from us? Try to identify
three things. First, we have the same visual experiences of light and colours in dreams as we do when awake and yet everyone would agree that when we dream there are no things outside of us. Since the dreaming and the waking experiences are indistinguishable in what they immediately present to us (light and colours), the one no more proves the existence of outer objects than the other. (201) Second, the objects that we see continually change as we approach or recede from them so that it is very often the case that when we get up close what we see is nothing like what we saw from a distance. This means that we cannot properly say that we saw the same thing from a distance that we saw from up close. We saw quite different things. What we saw from a distance was not the close object seen from some distance away, but an entirely different visible appearance that only appeared at that distance and that was in fact in us at that distance. Rather than see objects off in the distance, we see things that only are where we are, but that we have learned to associate with other, quite different visible appearances that we would experience if we were to will certain body motions and wait for a certain time. Confirmation of this can be gleaned from the widespread opinion that someone born blind and newly made to see would not see anything as if it were distant from them. (201-2) Third, “distance is a line turned endwise to the eye.” A line turned endwise to the eye touches the eye in a point. It makes no difference how long the line is. It still touches the eye only in a point and so affects it in the same way. As long as the illumination is sufficient, a firefly, a lighthouse beacon, a meteor, a star, and a supernova all affect the eye in exactly the same way, regardless of their vastly different distances from it. So it is just wrong that we see objects as if they were set at a distance from us. We do not see this immediately. We only judge this on the basis of inference from other information. Since childhood, the inference has become so quick and easy that we don’t notice it. But Molyneux’s subject would not draw it, nor do infants. It is still an inference and not immediate vision. (202) Fourth, the things we infer to be at a distance from us are all visible figures. But it has been established that visible figure cannot exist apart from colour, and that colours can only exist in the mind. (202) 11.
What is wrong with maintaining that ideas are
pictures, images, resemblances, or signs of other things that exist outside
of the mind, so that by immediately perceiving the ideas we are also
mediately perceiving the objects they signify? A
picture or sign can only suggest something other than itself to someone who
has come to know the object pictured or signified in some other way, such as
in a past life or by some other form of knowledge. More mundanely, objects perceived by one
sense can lead us, in virtue of an association based on past experience to
think of other things that were perceived by other senses along with them on
other past occasions, as when hearing the sound of a coach’s wheels on
cobbles leads us to think of a coach and so say that we hear (rather than
see) the coach, the hearing being a kind of mediate visual perception by
means of sound. But this only works
because we have immediately seen coaches in the past. We have not immediately seen
mind-independent objects. All of our
experience is only of our own perceptions, not of external objects taken to
resemble those perceptions. So we are
in no position to consider our perceptions to be signs of any such objects. (203-5) 12.
What is wrong with maintaining that it is at least
possible that our ideas may be pictures, images, or resemblances of other
things that exist outside of the mind, even if we cannot know for a fact that
they are? Because
ideas exist only when they are perceived, they are temporary and fleeting
entities that change with every slight body motion or blink of an eye or
shift in focus of attention.
Alterations in the state of health also have an influence. Visual ideas, notably, change with every
change in distance, but so likewise do sounds, smells, and heat and
cold. Other changes are brought about
by changes in the air or the quality of the light. But it is thought that material substances
remain unaffected by changes in us.
This means that of all the ideas we receive at most only a few and
perhaps not any at all would be true copies or images of the supposed
external objects. Even more seriously,
all ideas are sensible whereas the supposed material substances are insensible. But something that is sensible cannot be
anything at all like something that is insensible, any more than what is
coloured could be like what is invisible, or what is flavourful like what is
tasteless. Nothing can be like a
sensation or idea but another sensation or idea. (206) 13.
What principle must be denied in order to escape the
scepticism that Hylas is driven into at the close of Dialogues I? Hylas
began by committing himself to three principles: that sensible things are
things immediately perceived by the senses; that what is immediately
perceived by the senses are the sensible and primary qualities of light,
colours, figures, sounds, tastes, odors, and tangible qualities; and that
sensible things exist outside of the mind and independently of being
perceived. By the end of Dialogues
I Hylas has been forced to deny the “reality and truth” of sensible things,
that is forced into what he defined as a second sort of scepticism. But he has been reduced to this conclusion
only because he insisted on maintaining that sensible things exist outside of
minds and independently of being perceived, as qualities of material
substances. Had he rejected this
principle, he would have been able to avoid scepticism about sensible things
by maintaining that the “reality and truth” of those things consists in their
existing in minds. This is Philonous’s
non-sceptical, but anti-materialist position. (Spiritual
Realism)
1. What are the
objects of human knowledge? Ideas
— either of sensation, reflection or imagination. (Principles §1)
2. Is there
anything said by Berkeley in Principles
1 that Locke would have disagreed with? Yes. While the account of the objects of human
knowledge being confined to ideas of sensation, reflection, and imagination is
exactly the same as Locke’s (Berkeley’s remarks about extra-ideational
sources of knowledge are not made here), Berkeley went on to claim that
sensible things or bodies are just collections of ideas, whereas Locke wanted
to claim that some of our ideas are resemblances of primary qualities of
mind-independent external substances.
3. What is required
in order for an idea to exist? It
must be perceived by someone. Note
that in conjunction with the answer to #1, this entails that the objects of
human knowledge can exist only when perceived. (§§2-3)
4. What do I really
mean when I say that something I am not now in a position to perceive exists? That
were I to position myself differently, I would get ideas of it. (§3)
5. Why can one idea
not be the cause of another?
6. How many
different kinds of substance are there? Just
one: mental substance.
7. What does our
freedom of will strictly allow us to do, according to Berkeley?
8. What made
Berkeley think that our ideas of sense are not produced by ourselves? The
fact that we have no power over them (they come and go independently of what
our wills dictate). (§29)
9. How did Berkeley
distinguish ideas of sense from other ideas? By
their appearance (they are clearer and more distinct, draw our attention more
forcibly, and are better able to excite feelings of pleasure and pain, or
attraction and aversion), and also by their manner of occurrence (they happen
in certain regular patterns or sequences, eg., fire
burns and heavy things fall down, and they occur independently of our wills).
(§30) 10.
The
law of gravitation is a description of the manner in which God produces ideas
of bodies in us from moment to moment.
The laws of nature are in general descriptions of the order in which
God produces ideas. (Since God, being
supremely constant, always produces ideas in the same way, these laws are
never violated.) The only force in
nature, therefore, is God, who acts by producing ideas of nature in us in
accord with certain laws. (§30) 11.
Did Berkeley follow Locke in believing that the
existence of other finite minds must be accepted on faith? No. He thought that there is a causal argument
that establishes that the existence of other finite minds is at least a
likely hypothesis. Among our ideas of
reality are ideas of other human bodies.
And these human bodies appear to be moved by causes which indicate
that they are actuated by distinct and separate intelligences. The most likely way to account for this,
according to 12.
In what sense do we see God? By
seeing a collection of ordered, regular, magnificent, beautiful, vast,
detailed and harmonious ideas of reality, that testify to the ongoing
activity of a supremely wise and beneficent agent responsible for creating
them. (§§146-148) Hume, Enquiry 4 (Sceptical
doubts about our powers of knowledge)
1. How are
propositions expressing a relation between ideas discovered? Hume
said “by the mere operation of thought.”
By this he seems to have meant that all we need to do is think about
the two ideas being related, and we should be simply able to see, from
comparing them with one another as regards to their content, that they stand
in the relation. Or, if we can’t simply
see how they are related, we should at least be able to demonstrate this
fact. (Enquiry §4
¶1)
2. In what way is
the “evidence” (or evidentness) of a true matter of
fact, such as that the sun will rise tomorrow, different from that of a
relation of ideas, such as that equals added to equals are equal? Even
though the matter of fact is true, it is not necessarily true. We can imagine it turning out to be false
and the thought of its falsity is not incoherent or self-contradictory. But we cannot consistently think that
equals added to equals are unequal. So
the relation of ideas is not just true, but necessarily true. Unlike the matter of fact, it could not
even possibly be false. (4.2)
3. What assures us
of the truth of matters of fact? (Identify
three things). The
present testimony of the senses, memory, and causal inference (i.e. inferring
past causes from presently sensed or remembered effects, or past, present or
future effects from presently sensed or remembered causes). (4.3-4)
4. Why would
someone who found a watch on a deserted island infer that it had once been
inhabited? Because
we presume that there is a connection between our present experience of the
watch and the prior existence of inhabitants.
This connection is causal. We
think that the watch must have been created by some person, and that it can
only be present on an uninhabited island if some person left it there. (4.4)
5. What is it,
according to Hume, that leads us to suppose that two
different things are related to one another as cause and effect? Experience
that the one is constantly followed by the other. (4.6)
6. Why should we
think that it is not possible, by simply examining and analyzing a cause, to
deduce what its effect will be? Give
two reasons, the second one specific to the case of those causal relations
that “have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world, bear
a close analogy to the whole course of nature, and supposedly depend on
simple qualities of bodies rather than an unseen microscopic constitution of
parts.” (i) when we see a cause for the
first time, we have no idea what effect will result from it until we witness
that effect occurring. Similarly for
witnessing an effect and not knowing what its cause was. The implication is that it is only
experience of the effect actually following upon the cause that teaches us of
the connection between the two, not deduction of the one from the other. (4.6-7) (ii) Cause and effect are two different things, not one and the same
thing. But where two different things
are concerned, the affirmation of the existence of the one and the denial of
the existence of the other can never amount to a contradiction. To say P exists and P does not exist is a
contradiction and impossible. But to
say C (say, a cause of some kind) exists and E (say, an effect of some kind)
does not exist can never make a contradiction. But if there can be no contradiction in
having C and not having (or coming to have) E, then the existence of E can
never be deduced from that of C by deductive reasoning. The only way to discover the connection is
by experience and not by analysis and deduction. (4.11).
Hume later (4.20) added a third reason. It seems that we never infer the existence
of a causal connection from just one case, but usually require a number of
“experiments” before we come to accept it (any exceptions are drawn under
circumstances that very closely resemble those of causal relations we already
have come to trust). But if the connection
between cause and effect were deduced by reason alone, we ought to know it
after just one occurrence. Later
occurrences merely repeat the information given in the first one, they do not
add to it. This is an indication,
therefore, that we do not deduce the effect from the cause or vice versa, but
from the experience of frequent, regular conjunction between two events.
7. What is wrong
with saying that someone who understands the laws governing such things as
elasticity, gravitation, cohesion, and impact might be able to tell what
effects some causes will have without having to rely on experience? Because
it is only through experience that they learn that certain bodies return to
their previous shape after distortion, that others stick together in certain ways, that all bodies gravitate toward one another, and
that motion is transmitted upon impact.
So anyone who relies on these principles in predicting what will
happen next is still drawing inferences from past experience. (4.11-12)
8. What is wrong
with saying that we learn about the connection between a cause and its effect
by experience? It
does not tell us how experience leads us to this conclusion. (4.14)
9. What is the
“negative” thesis Hume proposed to establish in Enquiry IV.ii? That
there is no reasoning or process of understanding (by which, as becomes clear
later, he means any intuitive or demonstrative relation) that leads us from
our experience that one type of object is regularly followed or preceded by
another type to the conclusion that the one is the cause or the effect of the
other.
(4.15) 10.
What does past experience directly and certainly
inform us of? What can it not inform
us of? It
informs us of what happened in the past (for instance, that one type of
object has always preceded or followed another in the past). It does not inform us of what will happen
in the future (for instance, the objects will continue to be so related in
the future). (4.16) 11.
Did Hume believe that, from the proposition that an
object has always been followed by a certain effect in the past, we may
justly infer that similar objects will continue to be followed by similar
effects in the future? Yes. He just did not think that this inference
can be justified by intuition or demonstration. (4.16) 12.
Did Hume believe that we do in fact always draw the
inference described in the previous question? Yes. (4.16) 13.
Did Hume believe that the inference is justified by
intuitive or demonstrative reasoning? No. (4.16) 14.
Why can there be no demonstrative argument that
allows us to take the premise that a cause has led to a certain effect in the
past to entail the conclusion that similar causes must lead to similar
effects in the future? Because
the course of nature could change (and there is no contradiction in this
possibility.
(4.18) 15.
What is wrong with arguing that since a cause has
led to a certain effect in the past, and since the future generally resembles
the past, then the cause will likely continue to lead to the effect in the
future? This
begs the question. Why should we
suppose that the fact that things have been a certain way in the past sets
any rule for how they will continue to be in the future? This is precisely what is at issue and it
is only if we presuppose that it is not at issue and that the future must
resemble the past that the argument of this question can have any force with
us. (4.21) 16.
What conclusion did Hume draw from the fact that
peasants and children and even animals are able to do causal reasoning? That
causal reasoning cannot be based on any difficult, obscure or sophisticated
thought process. (4.23) Hume Enquiry 5.1-9, 9 (Naturalism)
1. What is the one
passion that is not frustrated by the sceptical philosophy? The
love of truth. (Enquiry 5.1)
2. Why do we not
need to be afraid that sceptical doubts will render us incapable of making
decisions about how to act in common life? Because
our natural instincts will induce us to act even if the sceptical philosophy
shows us that we have no rational justification for choosing to act as we do. (5.2)
3. Why would a
rational being, brought suddenly into this world, not at first be able to
reach the idea of cause and effect? Because
all the being would see is one event following another. It would not see any connecting link
between events that pulls one after the other, and it could not justly infer
that simply because one event has occurred after another on one occasion in
the past that therefore the first caused the second. (5.3)
4. What is the
consequence of this being’s observing events of a certain type to always be
followed by events of another type? It
supposes that the existence of the one implies the existence of the other. (5.4)
5. What is the
principle that induces us to infer the existence of one object from the
appearance of another? The
fact that we are so constituted that the repetition of a particular activity
induces us to further repeat that activity.
In other words, the fact that we are creatures of habit. We have
habits of thought as well as habits of action. So when we have been trained by experience
to see two things in connection, and we subsequently see one of them, we
cannot help but believe in the other as well.
(5.5)
6. What can we say
about what ultimately causes us to develop habits? Nothing. All we are in a position to declare is that
when a certain sequence of events has been repeatedly observed to take place
in the past, the appearance of one of those events will lead us to habitually
think of the others and suppose them to exist. But we have no idea why witnessing a
repetition should have this effect on us.
All we know is that this effect does regularly arise in us as a
consequence of having repeatedly witnessed a certain sequence of events. (5.5)
7. What makes the
hypothesis that we are determined by custom to infer causes from effects
superior to the hypothesis that we are determined by reason to do so? When
we infer causes from effects, we will often hesitate to infer a causal
connection from just one experience of the cause being followed by its
effect. We typically demand evidence
of a repeated and constant conjunction between the two types of events. This is a feature of our thought that
cannot be explained by supposing that the inference depends on reasoning,
that is, on intuiting the content of ideas, discerning relations between
ideas given their intuited content, and demonstrating consequences based on
our intuitions of these relations.
Repetition of the same ideas over and over again does not add anything
to their content and so cannot enable us to draw any conclusion by means of
reasoning that we could not draw the first time we witnessed the ideas, prior
to any repetition. But if we suppose
that causal inference is due to custom, then that explains why repetition has
such an influence on us. The
repetition is what establishes the custom. (5.5)
8. What two things
are necessary if we are to believe in the existence of an object that we are
not now perceiving? (i) We have to have an impression of some other object
given to us by our senses or an idea of it delivered by memory, and (ii) we
have to have in the past experienced some customary conjunction between this
other object and the object that we believe to exist. (5.7)
9. What is it that
ensures that these two things will necessarily and unavoidably produce the
belief? Our
natural instincts (as opposed to our reasoning ability). (5.8) 10.
How did Hume propose to confirm his theory
concerning the foundation of our inferences from experience in Enquiry IX? By
showing that it accounts for how animals come by their beliefs in the
existence of unperceived objects.
Since animals bear a degree of analogy to human beings, showing that
something is the case for animals supports the likelihood that it is the case
for human beings as well, just as showing that blood circulates in gorillas
and chimpanzees establishes a likelihood that it does in human beings as
well. (9.1) 11.
What convinced Hume that animals get their knowledge
of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, etc. from
experience rather than from innate instincts? Young
animals appear not to have this knowledge and seem only to acquire it through
experiencing the appropriate objects. (9.2: 70) Also because animals may be trained to do
or not do things by experience of rewards and punishments, even if those
things are contrary to their natural instincts. (9.3) 12.
What convinced Hume that animals do not get their
knowledge of unperceived objects by reasoning that like effects will always
follow like causes, or that the course of nature will not change? They
don’t appear to be smart enough to formulate such arguments. (9.5) 13.
Why would “nature” (i.e. a wise designer) have
preferred to make causal inference depend on custom rather than reasoning? Because
reasoning is difficult to do and often fails us because we do it too slowly
or improperly. The business of drawing
causal inferences is too important for everyday life, and needs to be done
too quickly to be trusted to such a slow and fallible operation as
reasoning. Custom is quicker, broader,
and easier in its application. (9.5) 14.
If custom is the cause of causal inference, how is
it that we can sometimes draw inferences from just one experiment? When
we have lived for a while and gained a broad experience of many different
sorts of things, we become accustomed to expect that more or less the same
thing that has happened in certain circumstances in the past will happen in
those circumstances in the future.
That is, we form a sort of general habit. In contrast to our specific habits, which
lead us to associate some specific type of thing with some specific other
type of thing (e.g., stones with falling, fire with burning, water with
suffocating, etc.) this general habit leads us to associate any thing in general with whatever has once been observed
to follow from that thing. We are led
to form this habit because, by and large, that is just what we
experience. Nature is generally
uniform in its operations, and it is less likely that, when the same circumstances
recur, something different will happen than that the same sort of thing will
happen again. So, the short answer is
that a broad and general experience of an underlying uniformity in nature
leads us to form this habit. (Note u) 15.
How did Hume distinguish what animals believe by
instinct from what they learn from experience? Instinctive
beliefs lead animals to do things that much exceed the degree of intelligence
we would be inclined to ascribe to them based on a broad survey of what they
are able to learn. Moreover, it is not
altered by experience. (9.6) 16.
Why should we think that there is nothing unique or
special about animal instincts? Because
our own tendency to draw inferences based on analogy to what we have
witnessed in the past is itself based merely on an
animal instinct.
(9.6) Hume, Enquiry 2, 3.1-3, 5.10-22 (Belief)
1. What are
impressions? All
the more lively perceptions of the mind. (Enquiry §2 ¶3)
2. In what sense is
the imagination confined within narrow limits? It
must work with the materials supplied to us by our senses and experience and
cannot originate any absolutely new simple ideas. (2.4)
3. Why does the
idea of God not falsify Hume’s claim that all of our ideas are composed of
materials originally obtained from impressions? Unlike
Descartes, Hume thought that this idea can be created by simply taking
impressions of our mental, moral, and physical capacities and multiplying
them. (2.6)
4. What
significance did Hume attach to the fact that a blind person can form no idea
of colours? It
implies that we do not have the ability to create ideas that do not copy
impressions we have previously received. (2.7)
5. How did Hume
propose to eliminate jargon from metaphysics? By
investigating what the words employed in metaphysical disputes stand
for. Metaphysical terms should stand
for ideas, and all ideas must have been copied from impressions. If we can’t identify the original
impressions, we can dismiss the terms as meaningless. (2.9)
6. For each of the
following identify the associative principle that leads the mind from
thinking of the first idea to thinking of the second. a.
the idea of the book leads us to remember its author
causality (effect to cause) b.
The idea of fire leads us to think of the sun resemblance c.
the idea of fire leads us to think of melting wax causality (cause to effect) d.
the idea of Texas leads us to think of Mexico contiguity (in space) e.
the idea of the ides of March leads us to think of
Julius Caesar contiguity (in time, as
this was the day on which Caesar was assassinated)
7. What is the
difference between fiction and belief? When
we believe, there is some sentiment that attaches itself to the idea of what
we believe. This sentiment must be
excited by natural causes and is not within our control. (5.11)
8. Why does belief have
nothing to do with the peculiar nature or order of ideas? Because
if it did, the imagination, which can alter the content and order of ideas as
it sees fit, could produce belief at will, and this is not the case. (5.12)
9. Identify the two
factors responsible for getting a lively idea of an absent friend from a
picture. There
must be a resemblance between the picture and the friend, and the picture has
to be actually seen or remembered. (5.15) 10.
What significance did Hume attach to Roman Catholic
claims that performing rituals before images and statues enlivens their
faith? He
considered this to be evidence that the relation of resemblance can enliven
belief in an object — or at least draw our attention to the resembled object
more readily by communicating vivacity from a presently sensed object (the
statue) to a resembling idea (the saints).
“Sensible objects, have always a greater influence on the fancy than
any other; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas
. . . which they resemble.” (5.16) 11.
Why do our ideas of home become more
lively as we get closer to it? Because
we receive impressions of the contiguous regions. A thought of the contiguous region would
not produce a lively idea, though it would lead us to think of home. But an actual impression produces a lively
idea. (5.17) 12.
Explain the analogy between the effects of causation
and those of resemblance and contiguity on our beliefs. Just
as, when you have an impression, that impression both brings to mind any
ideas you may have that resemble it or are of objects contiguous to it, and
enlivens those ideas, so, when you have an impression, that impression both
brings to mind ideas of its effects and its causes and creates a belief in
the past or impending existence of those causes and effects. (5.18) 13.
What accounts for the fact that there is a
pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of
our ideas? The
fact that we are naturally so constituted as to habitually believe objects to
continue to occur in succession if they have customarily occurred in that way
in the past. (5.20) 14.
Why is it better that our abilities to infer causes
from effects and effects from causes should be due to “some instinct or
mechanical tendency” rather than to reason? Reason
takes years to develop, is not as infallible in its working and takes longer
to figure out what to do. (5.22) Hume Enquiry 6 (Probability)
1. Does anything
ever happen by chance? No.
(Enquiry 6.1)
2. Why do we treat
certain events as if they were the products of chance? Because
our ignorance of the true cause of those events leaves with no choice but to
take the circumstances surrounding their past occurrences as likely
indications of their reoccurrence, in proportion to how often this regularity
has been observed in the past. (6.1)
3. What is the
“very nature” of chance events? A
chance event is one of a number of alternative outcomes that are considered
equally capable of occurring in a given circumstance. (6.3)
4. What happens
when the mind is carried more frequently to one sort of event when surveying
the various possible or chance outcomes of a cause, such as throwing a die
with a number of faces that concur in having the same number on them? We
believe that event will occur. (6.3)
5. What accounts
for the “sentiment of belief” that we get when several “views” concur in the
same event, i.e., when several of the chance outcomes of a cause are the
same? That
is just how we are made. Hume
attributed the origin of the belief to an “inexplicable contrivance of
nature.” (6.3)
6. How do “philosophers”
account for the failure of causes to produce their usual effects? By
appeal to the operation of hidden causes (typically, some small circumstance
that needs to be present or absent for the cause to be followed by its effect
but that typically goes unnoticed). (6.4)
7. In cases where a
cause has not always been observed to be followed by the same type of event,
what do we imagine happening after the cause, when we witness it again in the
future? We
imagine all the different sorts of events that have been observed to follow
from that cause in the past. But we
also imagine those events in their proportions. That is, if one type of event has only been
observed to follow from the cause once, we imagine just one of it, where if
another type of event has been observed to follow from the cause a hundred
times, we imagine one hundred copies of it.
We then believe that event which is imagined most often, with a degree
of belief that is proportional to its frequency in the total sample. (6.4) 36b Hume, Enquiry 7 (Necessary
Connection)
1. Which of our
ideas are always clear and determinate?
Which are ambiguous, and why? Those
of the mathematical sciences are clear and determinate. Hume attributed this to the fact that they
copy impressions that are given in sensation, but it might be more accurate
to specify that they copy impressions of vision and touch, that is,
impressions of specifically spatial objects.
Because the parts of space are permanent, it is at least possible to
go back to look at spatial things a second time. Things that exist only in time are not like
this. Once the time has passed, we
can’t go back to compare them with other things or check our memories. Hume thought that those ideas that copy our
passions and our impressions of reflection of the operations of our own minds
are ambiguous, and it is largely for the reason that they exist only in
time. Though these latter impressions
are quite distinct, they are difficult to attend to when they occur and
cannot be simply be recreated at will and this makes them hard to contemplate
and reflect upon. (7.1)
2. What is
necessary if we are to discover the precise meaning of obscure terms like
“force,” “power,” “energy,” or “necessary connection?” We
need to identify and examine the impression or impressions from which these
ideas were first derived. (7.5)
3. What do our
senses tell us about the operation of causes from viewing any single instance
of a causal relation between external objects? Just
that the cause is followed by its effect.
But we do not witness any power in the cause in virtue of which it
brings its effect about. We just see
that the effect follows after it. (7.6)
4. What
significance did Hume attach to the fact that we cannot tell, upon seeing an
object for the first time, what its effects will be? It
means that our senses cannot be telling us anything about any power in causes
in virtue of which they are enabled to bring about their effects. For, if we knew of such a thing, we ought
to be able to deduce the effect from it and so predict what the effect will
be in advance. (7.7)
5. What
significance did Hume attach to the fact that the qualities of bodies, so far
as our senses can detect them, are all complete in themselves? Since
they are complete in themselves, contemplating them can’t tell us about any
other thing. But if a body has powers,
those powers are abilities to bring about changes of certain kinds, either in
that body itself or in other things.
So they involve a reference to something else (another thing or a
changed state of the given thing).
Thus, we cannot hope to deduce what powers a body will have simply by
contemplating its sensible qualities. (7.8)
6. Why has it been
thought that we acquire the idea of power from internal sensation or
reflection? Because
we sense in ourselves an ability to move our limbs or make out thoughts come
and go through willing it to happen.
In experiencing volition we therefore appear to be experiencing a
power. (7.9)
7. What do we
really know about the relation between our volitions and the motion of our
bodies? Just
that certain kinds of volitions are regularly followed by certain kinds of
body motions. But we have no idea of
why. This means that we have no idea
of any power in the will that enables it to move the body. (7.10)
8. What
significance did Hume attach to the observation that a person with a newly
paralyzed or amputated limb can have the same feeling of will to move the
limb as a healthy person? That
the feeling and the power to move the limb must be two different things
(because obviously the feeling doesn’t work in this case to bring about
motion). (7.13)
9. What does it
mean to know a power? To
know what it is in the cause that enables it to bring about a particular
effect. (7.17) 10.
What significance did Hume attach to the fact that
we are unable to explain how the mind is able to produce ideas upon a command
of the will? That
we have no conception of any power in us to create ideas. Our feeling of our own will when we desire
to have a certain thought is not a sensation of a power, but merely a
peculiar feeling that is regularly followed by a certain effect (the
production of an idea). (7.17) 11.
Why do “many philosophers” (e.g., Malebranche and
Berkeley) think it necessary to appeal to the immediate agency of God to
explain the occurrence of familiar events when uneducated people only invoke
this cause to explain the occurrence of extraordinary, miraculous and
supernatural events? The
uneducated think that those events that regularly happen before other events
just are the forces or powers responsible for producing those events. (Even though they have no idea of how the
earlier event produces the later one, the fact that the two regularly occur
in succession makes their sequence seem so natural that the uneducated think
that no special explanation is required, and that is just the way things
are.) However, when they encounter
extraordinary events in nature, which by definition do not have any regularly
occurring antecedents, they turn to explain them by supposing they were
produced by some unseen intelligence.
But philosophers, who have inquired into how causes actually work to
bring about their effects, and have found that they cannot identify any force
or power in causes that enables them to make their effects happen, have come
to see even familiar events as being just as inexplicable and miraculous as
supernatural events, and so they have been led to suppose that these
“natural” events, too, must all be produced by some unseen intelligence. (7.21) 12.
What is wrong with the approach taken by these
philosophers? It
insults the power of God to suppose that he could make the universe so that
it would run on its own without constant intervention (7.22: 47); it is
simply too extravagant a hypothesis given the evidence that can be cited in
its support (7.24: 47-48); and, most significantly, it ignores that the force
or power in minds, through their volition, to bring things about is just as
inexplicable as any force or power in natural causes to bring about effects (7.25) 13.
What are the possible sources of an impression
corresponding to our idea of power that Hume examined over the course of Enquiry VII.i? What is the one remaining source he still
had to examine? He
examined single instances of the operation of one body on another; the
operation of the mind on the body; the operation of the mind on its ideas (7.26).
Though he mentioned that there is one remaining source that still
needs to be examined at 7.27, he
did not identify it. However, it becomes
clear from 7.28 that the source is
reflection upon our own passions and sentiments. 14.
What is the difference between observing one single
event to follow upon another and observing one species (i.e., one collection
of similar events or events of the same type) of event to follow upon
another? In
the latter case we suppose that the two events are conjoined as cause and
effect whereas in the former we hesitate to do so. We also suppose in the latter case that the
two events are necessarily connected. (7.27) 15.
What is the impression that our idea of power or
necessary connection is a copy of? It
is not anything we discover in the cause, but rather a sentiment we
experience in our own minds when we contemplate a cause that we have
experienced to be frequently followed by its effect in the past: the purely
subjective, internal feeling of being impelled by habit to form the idea of
the effect. We confuse this sentiment
in our own minds with a property of the cause, and think it is the cause that
is bringing the effect about rather than our own minds that are calling up
the idea of the effect. (7.28) 16.
What do we really mean when we say that one object
is connected with another? Just
that the two have acquired a connection in our thought, not that there is a
physical connection discernible between the two. The connection is only in us, between our
thoughts, not in the objects. (7.28) 17.
What is the difference between Hume’s two
definitions of cause? In what way do
they both come up short of what we might like? The
first talks about the objects involved in the causal relation (that the cause
the one, among two constantly conjoined objects that happens first in the
sequence), the second about its influence on the mind (that the cause is
what, upon its appearance, determines the mind to think of the effect). But neither comes close to identifying a
force or power in the cause in virtue of which it is enabled to bring the
effect about. (7.29) Hume, Enquiry 8 (Liberty &
Necessity)
1. What does our idea
of necessity arise from? The
uniformity, observable in the operations of nature, that is, from the fact
that certain sorts of things are regularly observed to be preceded or
followed by certain other sorts of things.
(Enquiry
§8. ¶5)
2. What is our idea
of necessity an idea of? Constant
conjunction and a disposition of the mind to draw an inference. That is, the idea that a thing is
necessitated is just the idea that it is of a sort that is regularly preceded
by some other sort of thing, and of an impulse felt by the mind to infer the
former from the latter on account of this constant conjunction. So the idea of necessity is not the idea of
being made or forced to happen. It is
just the idea of being regularly preceded by something else. (8.6)
3. What were Hume’s
reasons for saying that all people have always concluded that our voluntary
actions and operations of mind are necessitated? (Find two) First,
that similar human actions are constantly preceded by similar motives, so
there is a constant conjunction between motive and action. Second, that as a matter of fact people
cannot resist drawing inferences from a knowledge of motives to anticipated
future actions, or from a knowledge of actions to the interpretation of
motives for those actions. Since these
are the two components of our idea of necessity, it follows that all people
think that human actions are necessitated. (8.7 and 8.16)
4. What is the
chief use of history? To
discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, that is, what
actions can be expected to follow from what passions, and what passions are
followed by what actions. (8.7)
5. What is the
benefit of a long life employed in a variety of occupations and company? It
tells us what actions, expressions, and gestures are preceded by what
motives, and so allows us to anticipate people’s actions from a prior
knowledge of their motives, even when they try to convince us that they
intend to act differently. (8.9)
6. What is required
for us to be able to see through the tricks of con artists and others who
want to deceive us? That
particular human actions be necessitated in the sense of being regularly
preceded by particular motives. If
there were no regularity in human behaviour, it would be impossible to
predict what anyone would do next, and so impossible to say that someone with
a vested interested in an outcome would act to achieve that outcome rather
than behave altruistically. (8.9)
7. What accounts
for the fact that not all people behave in precisely the same manner in the
same circumstances? The
diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. (8.10)
8. Why is the fact
that there are some actions that seem to have no regular connection with any
known motives not an objection to the thesis that human actions are
necessitated? Because
human actions do not exhibit any greater degree of irregularity than is
observed in occurrences in inanimate nature, and the irregularity in nature
does not induce us to reject causal determinism. So, by parity of example, it ought not to
induce us to accept determinism of human actions either. In somewhat more detail, there are just as
many or more occurrences in inanimate nature that do not appear to us to be
the consequence of regularly occurring antecedents. When we encounter these sorts of things in
nature, we do not abandon our belief that events are caused. Instead, we either think that most events
are caused, that causal laws are generally true, and that the anomalies are
due to some weaknesses in the causes to always bring about their effect, or
else we think that we have simply failed to identify all the circumstances
and that a more exact scrutiny of the case will uncover some previously
unnoticed regularity. The former view
is the (incorrect) view of the vulgar, whereas the latter view, which is strictly
necessitarian, is the view of philosophers and is
proven by constant experience of investigating anomalous cases and finding
that we do always discover some hidden circumstance, so that there appear to
be no irreducibly stochastic occurrences in nature. (8.12-15)
9. What is the
foundation of morals? Character
and sentiment. (8.18. Elsewhere, Hume specified that actions are considered to be morally good or
bad — virtuous or vicious, as he put it — depending on the motives people
have for performing them. These
motives are always sentiments and sentiments are broadly determined by
ingrained character traits. Some
people are quicker to anger, for example.) 10.
Why is it that even though people all believe the
doctrine of necessity and rely on it in their anticipations of how others
will behave, they are reluctant to acknowledge it in words and instead claim
that nothing determines human actions? All
they mean to deny is that there is anything in them that forces them to act
as they do. They deny this because
they feel no such force or power. But
they think (wrongly) that there is a force or power in natural causes that
makes the effects of those causes come about.
This leads them to suppose that they have a freedom that is not to be
found in inanimate nature. As a matter
of fact, however, there is no force or power in natural causes and all there
is to necessity is just constant conjunction of antecedent and consequent
types of events. And there is the same
sort of constant conjunction between human motives and actions. (8.21) 11.
What is meant by attributing liberty to voluntary
actions? That
those actions are consequences of a prior will to perform them (8.23) 12.
What makes actions criminal? Criminal
principles of the mind. In other words,
the motives or reasons people have for performing them. In themselves even actions that have very
bad effects can be innocent if they were not done deliberately. (8.29-30) 13.
Why would denying that human actions are
necessitated by motives mean that a person must be as pure and untainted
after committing the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of birth? Because
we only consider actions to be evil when done from evil motives. If you deny that there was a motive that determined
the action, you make the agent innocent, just as if they were forced by some
external cause to do the action, did the action out of ignorance or
accidentally, or did the action out of haste and without premeditation. (8.29) 14.
What opposite interests are the moral sentiments
based on? The
interest in the peace and security of society and the interest in public
detriment and disturbance. Moral
sentiments of approbation arise when we contemplate personal traits of
character that advance the former interest, whereas moral sentiments of
disapproval arise when we contemplate personal traits of character that
advance the latter interest. (8.35) 15.
How did Hume respond to the objection that insofar
as the doctrine of necessity makes God the ultimate cause of all human
actions, it follows that no human actions can be blameworthy, because God
does nothing without a good and valid reason for doing so? He
claimed that our sentiments of praise and blame are not determined by
reflections on the ultimate cause of actions but are instead aroused by the
characters and motives of the agents who immediately performed them. Even if you have an “enlarged view”
according to which all the evil in the universe is for the best and those who
deliberately do evil are necessitated to have their evil motives, you will
still blame those who deliberately do evil.
This is because our minds have been so formed that we naturally feel
moral sentiments when contemplating the characters and motives of the agents
who performed good or bad actions. (8.35) 16.
How did Hume respond to the objection that insofar
as the doctrine of necessity makes God the ultimate cause of all human
actions, it makes him responsible for their crimes? He
claimed that it is a mystery which mere human reason is unable to
resolve. This is only a valid answer
if it really is a mystery, that is, if the alternative “system” that human
actions are not necessitated but freely chosen doesn’t resolve the mystery
either. Hume claimed that it doesn’t
because even on the alternative view it is supposed that God knows all
(“prescience”) and it is not easy to understand how your actions can be free
if God knows thousands of years before you are born that you will do them. (8.36) Hume, Enquiry 10 (Miracles)
1. What
was the purpose of the miracles performed by the Saviour? They are supposed to prove that he was on a mission from God. Just as an ambassador carries letters of
introduction from the government to a foreign country to serve as
credentials, so miracles, which only God can perform, serve as signs that a
particular person is God’s ambassador.
God is supposed to really be the one working the miracles at the
behest of the prophet, to prove the prophet’s mission. (Enquiry §10. ¶1)
2. Why
did Tillotson say that our evidence for the truth
of Christianity is less than our evidence for the truth of our senses? Because Christianity is ultimately based on the sensory experiences
of the Apostles, who purportedly witnessed the miracles that prove that
Christ was God. And a report of someone
else’s sensory experiences, handed down by a tradition (and so converted to
hearsay) can never be as certain as your own sensory experiences. (10.1)
3. Why,
according to Tillotson, would it be contrary to the
rules of just reasoning to believe in a scriptural doctrine that contradicts
sensory experience? Because it can never be reasonable to accept a conclusion if there is stronger evidence for its opposite (“a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger”). But the evidence for a scriptural doctrine can never be stronger than the evidence of one’s own senses (see 2 above). (10.1)
4. What
is the one condition under which a scriptural doctrine could be accepted even
though it contradicts sensory experience? If God’s grace (i.e., the “immediate operation of the Holy Spirit”
bringing something into one’s breast) forcibly compels someone to believe
against all reason, in the sort of way Bayle alluded to. (10.1)
5. What
is the difference between a proof and a probability? A proof is a causal inference founded on a uniform past experience of a particular cause always being conjoined with a particular effect. A probability is a causal inference founded on an experience of a particular cause being conjoined with a particular effect in most but not all cases. (10.4)
6. How
is reasoning from human testimony (i.e. supposing that something is the case
because someone has told us that it is the case) like reasoning from effect
to cause? In both cases we are guided by past experience of a constant or
regular conjunction between events. In
the former case it is hearing a report and ascertaining that the report is
true, in the latter it is between witnessing an object and witnessing its
cause or effect. (10.5)
7. How
do we proceed when we find from past experience that a certain kind of report
is not entirely reliable? We balance the circumstances of the case that are indicative of the
truth of the testimony against those that are indicative of its unreliability
and we incline to the side that is stronger, but with a degree of certainty
proportioned just to the amount by which the evidence in favour of the
stronger side exceeds that in favour of the weaker. (10.6)
8. List
some circumstances that might incline us to repose greater trust in human
testimony and some that might lead us to give it less trust. Greater trust arises if there are a number of independent witness
(i.e., witnesses who have not communicated with one another beforehand) all
giving the same story, if the witnesses are known to be honest, if they have
no interest in the case, if they are expert in the field and were in a
position to make clear observations, if there is no chance of their having
being deceived, and if they would have a great deal to lose were they
discovered in a lie or proven to have been duped. Lesser trust arises if there are few
witnesses, if they communicated with one another in advance, if they
contradict themselves or one another, if they have something to gain by
testifying in the way that they do, if they are known to be dishonest or have
nothing to lose by being detected in a lie, if they have no expertise in the
area, were not in a position to make accurate observations, or could easily
have been duped, or if they deliver their testimony with too much hesitation
or too much confidence. Other circumstances
might be mentioned as well. (10.5, 7) 9. Why is testimony to an unusual event regarded as less credible the more unusual the event is? Because an unusual event is one that our own experience tells us does not normally occur in those circumstances. Thus, when we hear anyone testify to such an event, their testimony, which ought to make us inclined to believe the event occurred, conflicts with our own experience, which makes us inclined to believe the event likely did not occur. The more unusual the event, the greater the conflict. Since conflicting pieces of evidence cancel one another in proportion to their strength, and since the more unlikely the event, the greater the conflict with our own experience, a larger portion of the strength of testimony to very unusual events must be devoted to cancelling the evidence of our experience, and that means less strength is left over to incline us to believe. (10.8) 10. Why does the testimony of credible witnesses to an unusual event produce a “mutual destruction of belief [in what most likely happened in that case] and authority [i.e. trust in the report of the witnesses]?” Because, by definition, an unusual event is one that turns out contrary to what most of our experience tells us it should. This means, therefore, that our experience gives us a strong inclination to suppose that the event turned out in a different way, which is to say that we form a suspicion that the witnesses are either deceived or attempting to deceive us. If, however, our experience also goes to prove to us that witnesses of that sort are likely to be telling the truth, then the two inclinations cancel one another out, and we are left not knowing whether to distrust our natural assumptions about what most likely happens in that sort of case, or to distrust the witnesses to the unusual event. If one of these options is even slightly more likely than the other, we will opt for it, though with a great diminution in the degree of our conviction. (10.8) 11. Why is it that from the very nature of the fact there is always a direct and full proof against the occurrence of any miracle? Because a “proof,” as Hume defined the term, is just a uniform past experience whereas a miracle is by definition what is contrary to a uniform past experience. Thus a miracle always has a proof (i.e., a uniform past experience telling against it). For example, if it is a miracle that a bush burns and is not consumed, this is because all our past experience, without exception, tells us that wood is consumed in fire. If all our past experience did not show that wood is consumed in fire, then this event would not be miraculous, but merely marvellous. But if all our past experience does show that wood is consumed in fire, then that past experience constitutes a “proof” against the occurrence of the miracle. (10.12) 12. What would it take to counterbalance this proof and establish that a miracle has occurred? It would have to be the case that it would be more likely that events occurred as the witnesses to the miracles described than that they are lying or were duped. But since the witnesses are reporting the occurrence an event that is contrary to what a uniform past experience tells us should have occurred in those particular circumstances, we already have a proof, from past experience, against the occurrence that they are testifying to. It is not impossible that we could have a stronger proof of the reliability of the witnesses than of the impossibility of the event, but it would have to be based on something other than just experience of the proportion of times witnesses of that sort have told the truth and of the number of times events of the sort reported have not turned out as reported. But barring that eventuality the two proofs would cancel one another out, inducing us to doubt both the credibility of the witnesses and the certainty of our past beliefs to an equal extent, so that we would be unsure which was right. (10.13) 13. Why are we more readily tempted to accept stories that are utterly absurd and miraculous, even though we readily reject any fact that is unusual or incredible in an ordinary degree? Miraculous events evoke surprise and wonder in us, which are agreeable sentiments that the mind likes to indulge in. Because of this the mind has what Hume called “a sensible tendency towards belief” in miraculous events. That is, its natural desire for pleasure pushes it in the direction of believing the miraculous tale (because such belief would increase its sentiments of awe and wonder). And even if it cannot push us so far as to make us actually believe the event, it makes us want to recount it to others and try to convince them of it (so that we can experience surprise and wonder at second hand, by witnessing it in others). (10.16) 14. Why do miracles not happen these days? Miracle stories are still told all the time. But they are generally exploded because not all people are as easily taken in as they once were. (10.20-23) 15. Why is it the case that, even if we could demonstrate that an almighty God exists, this would not make it any more likely that miracles occur? Because just as we have no conception of any force or power in any other cause adequate to allow us to predict ahead of time what its effect will be, so we have no conception of the nature of God adequate for us to determine what God will or will not do. The only way we can know this is after the fact, through either our own experience or reports of the experiences of others, and this throws us back on having to base our belief in miracles on the testimony of witnesses rather than on a contemplation of the necessary effects of the divine nature. (10.38) 16. Whose position on the foundation of religious belief did Hume endorse at the close of Enquiry X, Locke’s or Bayle’s? Bayle’s. Locke believed that the testimony of witnesses to the occurrence of miracles could give us reason to suppose that a particular revelation had come from God and could so establish a foundation for faith. But Hume denied that any testimony could be adequate to establish that a miracle has occurred, and maintained that the testimony that has in fact been given for the historical miracles of Christianity falls well short of the standard that would be needed even to lead us to suspend disbelief. He at least paid lip service to Bayle’s conclusion that belief is accordingly based on nothing more than God’s graciously (or “miraculously” as he put it) compelling some to believe even against all the evidence. (10.41) Hume, Enquiry 12 (Scepticism)
1. What is
antecedent scepticism? The
recommendation that we begin our philosophical inquiries by doubting all of
our opinions and even all of our cognitive faculties until such time as we
have been able to conclusively demonstrate their validity by deduction from
absolutely certain first principles. (Enquiry §12 ¶3)
2. Why, according to
Hume, is Cartesian scepticism incurable? He
maintained that there is no first indubitable principle upon which all our
beliefs can be based, and that even if there was we could not make any use of
it, because as long as we distrust our cognitive faculties we cannot make any
certain deductions from the first principle. (12.3)
3. What is
consequent scepticism? A
doubt of the truth of our previous opinions and the reliability of our
cognitive faculties that arises from a profound inquiry into the basis of
those opinions and the manner of operation of those faculties. (12.5)
4. What are the
“trite topics” employed by the sceptics in all ages, and what is Hume’s
estimate of the value of these topics? The
trite topics are the classic perceptual relativity arguments, such as the
ones found in the “modes” of the Ancient sceptics. Hume thinks these topics are only adequate
to prove that the evidence of the senses must be relativized to circumstances
and subjected to the corroboration of the other senses and of reason. (12.6)
5. What do we take
external objects to be when we follow the blind and powerful instinct of our
nature? The
images presented by our senses. (12.8)
6. What does the
slightest philosophy teach us that external objects are? Something
distinct from the images or perceptions presented to us by our senses that
can remain the same even when those impressions change. (12.9)
7. What could cause
the perceptions of the mind besides external objects? The
mind itself (as it in fact does when dreaming), or some other spirit, like a
God or demon, or some alien entity that we can’t even conceive of. (12.11)
8. Why can
experience not tell us what causes our perceptions? Because
all we ever experience is the perceptions themselves, not the objects that
cause them. (And, of course, if you have never experienced the cause of an
effect in the past, then none of your current experiences of the effect can
lead you to draw any inferences about what it is. The identity of causes can never be deduced
ahead of time, simply by inspecting their effects.) (12.12)
9. What did Hume
mean by calling the sensible qualities secondary? That
they exist only in the mind as its perceptions, and not in bodies. (12.15) 10.
Why must the primary qualities exist only in the
mind? Because
we cannot conceive how there could be such a thing as shape or size without
colour or solidity, and we cannot conceive solidity without conceiving of
either some tangible quality or moving colour patches being turned back by
another colour patch. Thus, the
notions of pure extension and pure solidity apart from all sensible qualities
make no sense. Insofar as we
understand anything by these notions, therefore, they refer to something that
can only exist where the sensible qualities exist, namely, in the mind. (12.15) 11.
What is the chief objection against all abstract
reasoning? The
fact that the ideas of infinitely divisible space and time are fundamentally
incoherent and generate paradoxes. (12.18) 12.
What are the popular objections to our knowledge of
matters of fact and why are they weak? The
popular objections appeal to the existence of widespread disagreement about
matters of fact, be they between different times and cultures, different
people, the same person at different time, or different faculties of the same
person at the same time. They also
appeal to the fact that we have often made mistakes in our judgments of
matters of fact. Hume supposed that
our instinctive tendency to draw inferences about matters of fact in light of
our past experience is too strong to be blocked by these sorts of
considerations. While a recognition of
conflict and past error over matters of fact might give us an academic
appreciation of the weakness of our powers of inference, we will be
instinctively impelled to go ahead and use those powers anyway. Hume may also have wanted to suggest that
as long as our natural instincts induce us to make judgments about matters of
fact that turn out to be most often correct (that is, that allow us to
subsist, and get by in life), the relatively fewer number of cases where we
have been misled will not be able to induce a natural distrust of our
instinctive inferences. As long as our
inferences from cause and effect have generally proven to be reliable in the
past, they will have the weight of the evidence of experience on their side
and the contrary cases that the popular sceptical objections draw to our
attention will not be numerous enough to “destroy that evidence.” (12.21) 13.
What do the philosophical objections to our
knowledge of matters of fact assert? That
any conclusions we draw about matters of fact that lie beyond the reach of
our senses and memory are based on nothing more than the observation of a
constant conjunction in the past combined with a natural instinct to transfer
that experience to the future, and that this instinct could possibly mislead
us since there is no good reason why the future should resemble the past. (12.23) 14.
What is the most that a Pyrrhonian
can manage to do with his or her arguments? Induce
a temporary surprise, confusion, and dismay by showing us that there is no
foundation for beliefs we nonetheless must have and are naturally compelled
to have (12.23),
but also give us a more lasting sense
of the weakness of the human knowing powers (12.24), and a disposition to restrict our knowledge claims to matters closely
analogous to those we have experienced in the past (12.25). 15.
What are the two main useful results that might
follow when excessive scepticism is in some measure corrected by common sense
and reflection? They
will lead dogmatic reasoners to be more diffident
of their conclusions and more tolerant of the views of others (12.24), and lead us all to confine our
investigations to topics that better fall within our capacities and refrain
from distant and high inquiries (12.25) |
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