SEARLE, CHAPTER ONE, THE CLASSICAL MODEL & ITS WEAKNESSES

One can intelligibly debate theories of rationality, but not rationality itself.

Just as a theory of truth does not give us a method for deciding which statements are true, so also a theory of rationality does not give us an algorithm for deciding which actions are rational.

Standards of rationality are universal across cultures, just as standards of truth are. The fact that there is massive disagreement about what is rational is due to different interests..

The Classical Model: Hume: Reason is & ought to be a slave of the passions. This is Hume’s way of saying that there are no desire-independent reasons for action, a claim that is at the heart of the classical model.

Decision theory: It is always rational to maximize utility. But there are no odds that should incline us to bet the life of our children against the possibility of winning a loony.

Searle's doubts about the classical model:

1. Rational actions are not always caused by beliefs & desires. When I try to decide who to vote for I must presuppose that my beliefs & desires haven’t already determined what I will do. Only the addict is so determined. There is a “gap” between the causes of the action & the action itself. What is the argument for the gap? Consider any case of decision & you will have to presuppose that your choice is not predetermined. You have to presuppose that there are genuine alternatives. Searle voted for Clinton because he went to the same Oxford college, Magdelen. But the psychological reality of the gap does not guarantee a corresponding neurobiological reality.

2. Rationality is not primarily a matter of following rules. The validity of the rules is determined by what we count as rational activity, not vice versa. If a rule made modus ponens inferences valid, then we would need a rule to validate the rule & we would end up with an infinite regress. It is the semantic content that guarantees the validity of the inference, not the syntactic rule. The structure of intentional states & the constitutive roles of speech acts already contain constraints of rationality.

3. There is no separate faculty of rationality. Rationality is internal to language & intentionality. Once you have beliefs & desires & language, then you already have the constraints of rationality. There is no way you can make a statement without committing yourself to justifying you having made it. The constraints of rationality should be thought of adverbially. It is the recommended way of coordinating our intenitionality. This presupposes a gap.

4. Weakness of will is a natural consequence of the gap which must be presupposed. Weakness of the will is always possible because the antecedent causes do not determine the action.

5. There are desire-independent reasons for action. Suppose you go to a bar & order a beer. When he brings the bill you say that you can find no desire to pay it in your motivational set. But Searle says that when you ordered the beer & drank it you were intentionally creating a desire-independent reason for doing something regardless of what you motivational set was. The sheer knowledge of external facts in the world such as the fact that you ordered a beer & drank it can be a rationally compelling reason to pay for it. This thesis that there are no external reasons is closely related to Hume’s claim that you cannot derive Ought from Is.

6. Inconsistent reasons for action are common & inevitable. I want to be here, giving this class, but I also want to be in Mexico City, in Coyocan, drinking a coffee & easting a taco. The task of rationality is to decide between these competing desires.

There are fundamental differences between human rationality & the instrumental reasoning of chimpanzees. Koehler’s ape—putting a box under the banana & using a stick to knock it down—is not a model for all human rationality. We can create, recognize & act on desire-independent reasons for action.