

## CANADIAN PRESSURE GROUPS: TALKING CHAMELEONS

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### STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOUR

The functions that pressure groups perform have much to do with both the organizational form they take and the way they behave. We might be tempted to claim that their form follows their function, were it not for the fact that structure is also greatly influenced by such things as the kind of resources made available by the group's members, their determination to promote their common interest through exerting influence and, always, the characteristics of the political system itself. We shall return to these influences after we have looked at the more fundamental aspects of pressure group structure and behaviour.

Earlier, we defined pressure groups as 'organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest'. The fact that they are *organizations* is crucial. In political life there are many interests and over time a considerable number exert influence in the policy process, but unless they have access to more resources than most individuals and the majority of companies, they lack the ability to sustain their influence. Unaggregated demand, as political scientists call the political demands of individual persons and corporations, tends to occur sporadically and on a piecemeal basis. Often it is sufficient to achieve or avert specific decisions, such as a spot rezoning in a city plan, but it rarely influences public policy. This is because the process of policy formation is extremely complex, involving many participants, taking place over a long period of time, and usually consisting of innumerable decisions. For most of those who want to take part in this process the only feasible way to do so is to band together, to share costs, to deploy at appropriate times the different

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talents that participation requires, even simply to maintain continuity as the process unfolds—in other words, to organize.

Not all pressure groups organize in the same way or to the same extent. Much depends on what they want to achieve by engaging in the policy process, on the resources they can put into lobbying, and on their understanding of the mechanics of policy-making. Since the way in which all these factors come together has a lot to do with the policy consequences of the work of pressure groups, it is important to try to understand the relationship between the levels of organization pressure groups attain and their behaviour in the policy process.

Our goal here is not simply to understand the behaviour of pressure groups; the way in which they behave can also tell us a great deal about policy-making in specific political systems and even about the political system itself. For example, studies of Canadian pressure group behaviour have led some students to conclude that administrators in Canadian governments have a far greater influence in policy-making than our earlier work on political parties, parliamentary institutions, and legal frameworks had led us to believe.

To understand these aspects of pressure group life we must arrange what we know about them in meaningful patterns. There are various ways to do this. One that is used by many scholars is to classify all groups according to the *kinds of causes* they promote. This usually results in two broadly defined lists: in one, the groups that pursue the self-interest of their members; in the other, the groups that pursue more general, public interests. Some important insights have come from using this approach. For example, as a result of the debate triggered by studies such as *The Logic of Collective Action*,<sup>1</sup> which argues that interest groups only survive if they can offer their members advantages (selective inducements) that can be obtained nowhere else, we now know a great deal about the internal forces that motivate pressure group behaviour and we appreciate more than we ever have before the problems that beset public interest groups. A practical consequence of this improved understanding has been the trend in several countries toward giving public interest groups special assistance in arguing for the public interest before regulatory and policy-making bodies.<sup>2</sup>

Useful though this approach is, it has serious weaknesses. In the first place, the classification system itself is 'messy', for there are far

<sup>1</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

<sup>2</sup> See Peter H. Schuck, 'Public Interest Groups and the Policy Process', *Public Administration Review*, 37/2 (1972), 132-40.

too many groups that work simultaneously for both selective benefits and the public interest, and it is often difficult to categorize them, there is often a very fine line between self-interest and public interest.<sup>3</sup> More important, however, this method takes a one-sided view of the relationship between pressure groups and governments. Although it admits that pressure group activity is often triggered by government action, such as the creation of a new programme or the ending or and old one, it tends to explain the subsequent behaviour of such groups either in terms of competition between rival groups or in terms of what one writer has called their 'interior life'. In other words, the approach focuses on the effort group members are willing and able to make to convince policy-makers of the rightness of their cause. This concern is very necessary, but it has to be put in perspective. The other partner in the relationship—government—affects pressure group behaviour just as much as does membership commitment, organizational sophistication, and so on. In fact, most pressure groups are *chameleons*: those that take their lobbying role seriously adapt their internal organizations and structure to suit the policy system in which they happen to operate. That is why pressure groups working only at the provincial level in Canada are often quite different from those that concentrate their efforts at the federal level, and why both differ dramatically from their counterparts in Eastern Europe, the Third World, and even the United States.<sup>4</sup>

Several years ago this writer developed a conceptual framework that does try to look at pressure groups from the perspective of the *influence of government* as well as from that of the internal dynamics of groups. This approach starts with the assumption that pressure groups have functions to perform that are as necessary to the development of government policy as those performed by political parties, bureaucracies, executives, and courts. However, the way in which they perform those functions is as much determined by the shape of the policy system as it is by the knowledge, the enthusiasm, the financial capacity, and the other internal characteristics of individual groups.<sup>5</sup> For example, a policy system like Canada's, in which legislatures do not have a large say in policy development, will encourage pressure groups to develop quite differently from those that emerge in a system such as found in the United States, with its emphasis on congressional power.

<sup>3</sup> Terry M. Moe, *The Organization of Interests* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

<sup>4</sup> Suzanne D. Berger (ed.), *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

<sup>5</sup> A similar view is put forward by Henry W. Ehrmann in id. (ed.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958).



*Institutionalization*, this approach argues, gives us the key to understanding pressure group behaviour. If we can come to understand how it is that some groups survive in a political system and become influential and organizationally sophisticated, while others quickly disappear, then we can learn a great deal about their interior life and about their particular policy environment.

An institution is a sophisticated entity, one that not only works to achieve the goals laid down for it, as any organization should, but that actually embodies the values it is built around. Like any organization, it begins life as a collection of individuals gathered to achieve certain objectives. Sometimes such groupings have organizational shape—the members have structured relationships with one another that permit them to carry out specialized tasks—but often they are simply a group of people who want to accomplish something. Gradually, if they stay together, they elaborate an organizational structure, and if they are successful their organization develops into an institution, 'a responsive, adaptive organism' that, to its members and many of those it deals with, has a philosophy, a code of behaviour, and sense of unity related to the values it has come to embody. The Greenpeace Foundation is a good example of such an organization. It is not only sophisticated as an organization with an international structure, but it stands very firmly for certain beliefs and acts accordingly. As a pressure group it is highly institutionalized, even though it is not popular with governments.

When we apply the concept of institutionalization to pressure group analysis we must be very aware of a point made by an early student of institutions, Philip Selznick. 'As institutionalization progresses,' he maintains, 'the enterprise . . . becomes peculiarly competent to do a particular kind of work.'<sup>6</sup> In the case of pressure groups this means that they must become 'peculiarly competent' to carry out the four functions we have already discussed, especially the function of communication. The institutionalized group knows what government is thinking about, what it needs to know, and how to get that information to it at the right time, in the right place, and in the most acceptable form. This means a great deal more than simply button-holing politicians at cocktail parties. It means the group must have an expert staff—or a helpful, well-informed membership—able to communicate with government officials at bureaucratic as well as elected levels, on a continuing basis. The need for this particular competence has led this writer to claim that

<sup>6</sup> Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 139.

one of the defining characteristics of institutionalized pressure groups is 'an extensive knowledge of those sectors of government that affect them and their clients'. In its entirety that definition describes institutional pressure groups as:

groups that possess organizational continuity and cohesion, commensurate human and financial resources, extensive knowledge of those sectors of government that affect them and their clients, a stable membership, concrete and immediate operational objectives associated with philosophies that are broad enough to permit [them] to bargain with government over the application of specific legislation or the achievement of particular concessions, and a willingness to put organizational imperatives ahead of any particular policy concern.<sup>7</sup>

We cannot explain this definition completely here, but we should note several things about it. First, it is very unlikely that any real group could be described in these particular terms. It is an idealized version of a certain kind of group; it is a model with which to compare the various types of groups we come across. Second, because the idea of institutionalization suggests a progression and because this particular model can be used as a bench mark against which other groups can be compared, it becomes possible to think of pressure groups as falling along a continuum. At one extreme we can place institutional groups like those in our model, and at the other we can put those groups that have the opposite characteristics. These, we would argue:

are governed by their orientation toward specific issues . . . and have limited organizational continuity and cohesion, minimal and often naive knowledge of government, fluid membership, a tendency to encounter difficulty in formulating and adhering to short-range objectives, a generally low regard for the organizational mechanisms they have developed for carrying out their goals, and, most important, a narrowly defined purpose, usually the resolution of one or two issues or problems, that inhibits the development of 'selective inducements' designed to broaden the group's membership base.<sup>8</sup>

We call these 'issue-oriented' groups and can readily identify them. They spring up at a moment's notice, usually in reaction to some government action or a private sector activity that only government can change. (They are often seen in city politics confronting developers, highway builders, and planners.) Usually, they disband when their goals are either won or convincingly lost, but occasionally they keep on playing a part in politics and slowly

<sup>7</sup> A. Paul Pross, 'Canadian Pressure Groups in the 1970s: Their Role and their Relations with the Public Service', *Canadian Public Administration*, 18/1 (1975), 124.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.



become recognized voices in policy-making. In order to do this, they have to become more highly organized, developing their 'peculiar competence' to communicate their policy views to government. Since the early 1970s, a number of environmental groups have done this, in effect engaging in the process of institutionalization. They do not, of course, become institutional groups overnight. In fact, very few achieve that status, and most we could describe as either fledgeling or mature, depending on how closely they seem to conform to the models at either end of our continuum.

... The organizational development of each kind of group helps define its relationship to the policy process. For example, the issue-orientated group with its supporters participating out of concern for a particular issue usually has a small membership that tries to make up in devotion to the cause what it lacks in resources or staff. Lack of staff is this type of group's most serious deficiency, at least in the Canadian setting, because it generally means that the group does not have expert knowledge about what government is doing or thinking about the issue of concern. Its members tend, therefore, to work in an information vacuum. Not only do they not know what government is thinking, they tend not to know who in government thinks about their particular issue. Their reactions, therefore, tend to be gut reactions directed at the most likely figure in sight, usually a politician, and expressed vociferously in the media.

In the long run these methods do not work. A specific decision may be turned around, but to change policy—which is a mosaic of many decisions—groups need to be close to government thinking, able to overcome the barriers created by administrative secrecy, and knowledgeable about where and when to intervene. In Canada, particularly, where public information legislation was until recently quite antiquated and group participation in policy-making has been considered a privilege, not a right, government officials have in the past been able to undermine any groups too inclined to publicly attack policy simply by withholding vital information. It may be that recent changes in the policy process, particularly in the diffusion of power that has become the norm in Ottawa, is altering this condition. Nevertheless, for many years the authority of information control made government agencies the dominant partner in their relations with pressure groups and forced those issue-orientated groups that did survive to follow a pattern of institutionalization that took them very rapidly from the placard-carrying stage to the collegial and consultative relationship favoured by government.

Yet, though confrontation has been, and perhaps still is, dysfunctional for groups in the long run, in their early life it can be

very important, sometimes essential. Since they generally emerge in response to a policy issue, new groups cannot, by definition, have participated in the deliberations that led to the decision they are concerned about. Thus, they enter the policy process at a stage when events are moving beyond their ability to stop them, and only the most drastic measures will have any effect. In these circumstances, confrontation may be the best available strategy, as it makes use of the media's ability to influence the only decision-makers who may still be able to change the course of events—the politicians.

The group that outlives this early 'placard-carrying' stage generally has done so by changing its relationship to its members and by adapting to the policy system. One of the first steps in this adaptation is that the organization must stop being concerned with only one issue and instead take up several causes. Many environmental groups took this route, starting up to prevent the destruction of a particular nature amenity, then switching their concern to large issues. With a broader range of interest the group attracts a wider membership. While the new members may lack the fervent sense of commitment of the group's founders, and may be less inclined to sound a strident ideological note when the group tries to communicate with government, a wider membership base usually broadens the group's financial resources, bringing stability and a strengthened capacity to engage in the information game. Here again group-oriented and policy-oriented developments may take place in tandem. With a steady budget the group may take on a modest staff, a move that usually ensures that finances are better managed and that the members are served more consistently. Financial capacity usually also means that the group can afford to hire professionals—lawyers, public policy experts, public relations specialists—who can help it acquire the information it needs to participate in the policy process. These are the first steps in institutionalization. From this point on, the nature of the organization does not change a great deal. It simply becomes more complex, more capable of adapting to changes in the policy system, and to the disappointment of founding members, more remote and professional, guided increasingly by its paid staff.

Once started on the road to institutionalization the pressure group more readily wins the attention of government officials and, at the same time, is more apt to adapt to meet shifts in government policy process. This largely follows from the decision to hire professionals. Because they are familiar with the way in which policy is made, these people guide the group away from some lines of action and encourage others. In Canada and most European countries this generally means that groups become more and more intimate with



the details of bureaucratic decision-making and less and less inclined to use the media except when formal hearings necessitate the presentation of rather general briefs that are intended to create an image rather than promote a specific policy. In the United States, on the other hand, lobbyists can expect to have to argue both in public and in private. With these differences in strategy go differences in organizational structure.

As these comments suggest, the processes of pressure group institutionalization offer us a particularly useful way of discovering the differences between policy systems and even tracing the evolution of our systems over time. In Canada, for example, because we have pressure groups, we often mistakenly think they behave in the same way as American pressure groups. This sometimes leads to the notion that our policy system is becoming more like that of the United States. It is quite true in some respects, particularly when issue-oriented groups exploit the media, that there is more than a superficial resemblance between Canadian and American pressure group behaviour. As soon as we look at the behaviour of more established groups in both countries, however, we see major differences. For example, even well-established American groups readily take part in public debates over policy, while their counterparts in Canada see an appeal to public opinion as a last resort.<sup>9</sup>

Why the difference? In the American system congressional politics plays a large part in policy development, with policy tending to be formed by the congressional committees responsible for a particular field, the administrative agencies carrying out policy, and the interest groups affected by it. Much policy discussion is conducted in private, but there is also an important public element involving committee hearings where rival demands are vigorously presented and where even the most secure, discreet, and established lobby must put its case to the general public as well as to the policy makers.<sup>10</sup>

Canada has had no such public forum. Debate in Parliament has been tightly controlled by the government, and even committee hearings have offered few opportunities for airing grievances, much

<sup>9</sup> For a fuller discussion of this point see W. T. Stanbury, *Business-Government Relations in Canada* (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), ch. 7.

<sup>10</sup> See Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1976); Robert Presthus's two-volume comparative study on Canada and the United States, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973) and *Elites in the Policy Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); and Mildred A. Schwartz, *The Environment for Policy-Making in Canada and the United States* (Montreal: C. D. Howe Institute, 1981).

less changing policy. The basic form of public policy has been worked out between the political executive and senior administrators. Consequently, lobbyists and others wishing to influence public policy have chosen to do so by approaching and persuading civil servants and Cabinet ministers rather than parliamentarians. There are innumerable consequences to this, some affecting pressure groups, others the policy process itself, most of which we cannot discuss here. Suffice it to say that the end effect of this system is that 'legitimate, wealthy, coherent interests, having multiple access to the legislative process, would tend to be more influential than less legitimate, poor, diffuse interests, having few sources of access to the legislative process'.<sup>11</sup>

It may be that changes in parliamentary procedure, in the structure of policy-making, in the availability of government information, and in our constitutional framework are causing important modifications in this system of pressure group politics, making groups less dependent on bureaucracy and more capable of engaging in open and public debate. At the moment, we have only a few hints that this is the case and no very clear idea as to what the future may bring. However, probably we can assume that a tendency for pressure groups to become more numerous and more publicly active will continue to grow.

#### PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE POLICY PROCESS: THE ROLE OF POLICY COMMUNITIES

We sometimes think of pressure groups in the singular, acting alone to bring off a policy coup or to thwart some scheme cooking in the 'policy shops', as government policy analysis units are often called. At other times they are described *en masse*: collaborating, competing, and generally rampaging across the policy stage. In general, however, their participation in the policy system is continuous, discreet, and multifaceted.

The first responsibility of any pressure group is to attend to the immediate needs of its clients. This usually means dealing with quite routine problems: alleviating the too stringent application of regulations, negotiating a minor shift in policy, bringing about the slight extension of a service. Such minor irritations along the public sector-private sector interface bring pressure group representatives

<sup>11</sup> Fred Thompson and W. T. Stanbury, 'The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in Canada', Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, Occasional Paper No. 9, p. viii.



into daily contact with government officials and, while not inspiring in themselves, familiarize them with the subtle changes in administrative routine and attitude that eventually crystallize into a change in policy.<sup>12</sup> When formal policy discussions begin, the understanding developed through these routine contacts is of immense value.

The policy process itself is hard to define: the origins of policy are often obscure and the roles of those who take part are seldom exactly the same from debate to debate. Even so, we do have some general notions as to how the key policy actors—politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists—relate to one another, and this helps us develop a rough picture of the part pressure groups play in the process.

The first point that we must bear in mind is that the entire political community is almost never involved in a specific policy discussion. Specialization occurs throughout the policy system. The existence of pressure groups gives us the most obvious evidence of this, but specialization occurs elsewhere as well. Government departments, however large and multifaceted they may appear to be, are confined to a precisely defined territory. Even the political executive finds that only the really big issues are discussed by the entire Cabinet. All the rest are handled by individual Cabinet ministers or by specialized Cabinet committees. Richard Crossman, once a member of the British Cabinet, remarked in his diary that 'we come briefed by our departments to fight for our departmental budgets, not as Cabinet ministers with a Cabinet view'.<sup>13</sup> Only prime ministers and presidents play roles that encourage them to consider policy in the round, and they live with such tight schedules that only the most urgent and significant issues come to their attention.

Out of specialization come what we call 'policy communities'—groupings of government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including academics, who for various reasons have an interest in a particular policy field and attempt to influence it. Most policy communities consist of two segments: the subgovernment and the attentive public. To all intents and purposes the subgovernment is the policy-making body in the field. It processes most routine policy issues and when doing so is seldom successfully challenged by interlopers. The subgovernment is what

<sup>12</sup> There are useful descriptions of these relationships in Kwavnick, *Organized Labour and Pressure Politics* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in Jeremy J. Richardson and A. G. Jordan, *Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post-Parliamentary Democracy* (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co., 1979), 26.

has been called 'the durable core of any policy arena'.<sup>14</sup> It consists of the government agencies most directly engaged in setting policy and regulating the field and a small group of interests—generally associations but occasionally major corporations—whose power guarantees them the right to be consulted on virtually a daily basis. Their power wins them a place at the policy table, but government also needs their expert knowledge of the technical aspects of policy.

The power of the inner circle is used to limit the participation of others in policy debate. Those who are excluded congregate in the 'attentive public'. This outer circle includes those who are interested in policy issues but do not participate in policy-making on a frequent, regular basis. The academic community often plays this role, as do journalists working for specialized publications and, of course, a range of organizations and associations whose interest is keen but not acute enough to warrant breaking into the inner circle.

The attentive public lacks the power of the subgovernment, but it still plays a vital part in policy development. Conferences and study sessions organized by professional and interest associations offer opportunities for officials at various levels to converse with the grass roots of their constituency and with journalists and academics who have been studying public policy. Most have views on government performance and are quick to put them forward. Though most are heard sceptically, sometimes patronizingly, they contribute to the process through which government and people gradually amend, extend, and generally adapt policies and programs to the changing needs of the community. Similarly, the newsletters, professional journals, and trade magazines that circulate through the policy community give both the subgovernment and the attentive public plenty of opportunity to shore up, demolish, and generally transmogrify the existing policy edifice. In this turmoil of theories and interests, officialdom—which is almost never monolithic, nearly always pluralistic, and seldom at peace with itself—discerns the policy changes government must make if it is to keep nearly abreast of circumstance. The main function of the attentive public, then, is to maintain a perpetual policy review process. . . .

Pressure groups, along with individual members of the attentive public, are the most mobile members of the policy community. With their annual meetings, their newsletters, their regional organizations, and above all, their informal networks, they have an ability to

<sup>14</sup> John E. Chubb, *Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983), 8–10, quoted in William D. Coleman, *Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 277.



cross organizational lines denied other more formal actors, such as government departments. They can, therefore, act as go-betweens, provide opportunities for quiet meetings between warring agencies, and keep the policy process in motion. These services, together with their ability to evaluate policy and develop opinion, make pressure groups integral members of the policy community.

Before we conclude our comments on the policy community, we have to remember that the most prominent of its members are not primarily interested in making or reformulating policy. Rather, for them, the policy community is a protective device, limiting rather than expanding the opportunities for the public at large to achieve major policy changes. Thus, it is the goal of the subgovernment to keep policy-making at the routine or technical level. If it achieves this, the subgovernment can keep interference to a minimum. Often, however, circumstances outside its control—economic changes, the development of new technologies, changing public concerns—are more than the subgovernment can handle through its system of formal communications and informal networks. Controversy develops, new issues emerge, and more and more interests want to take part in policy-making. Policy debate broadens as levels of conflict rise, so that eventually central issues are taken out of the hands of the subgovernment and policy community and resolved at the highest political levels—by Cabinet and by the First Ministers' Conference. When this occurs, the policy community, as well as policy, is often vastly altered.

#### PRESSURE GROUPS AND DEMOCRACY

Many people feel that pressure groups are a threat to democratic government. They distrust 'special-interest groups', arguing that their special pleading circumvents the legitimate authority of elected representatives and unfairly competes with the average citizen who approaches government as an individual. They fear that the special-interest state is more easily corruptible than one that debates and settles policy in the open forum of Parliament...

With the legitimacy of government rooted in a spatial orientation to political communication, and its effectiveness depending on sectoral organization, the modern democratic state contains a tension that is the most fascinating, most disturbing feature of modern political life. Out of it has come the decline, but certainly not the demise, of the political party and the rise of the pressure group, the ideal instrument for sectoral, specialized communication. With the rise of pressure groups has come a tendency for

institutionalized groups—the majority representing business interests—to dominate debate within policy communities. As William Coleman has pointed out, because policy-making has become so diffuse, it is difficult to compel these interests to consider the general welfare or to be accountable to the public. Equally, it is extremely difficult for other interests to participate effectively—let alone on equal terms with business—in public debate.<sup>15</sup> Public interest groups are especially disadvantaged by this imbalance. Such developments threaten democratic discourse, as recent concern over lobbying and over business-interest participation in the free trade debate demonstrates.<sup>16</sup>

During the 1990s, we will hear increased public discussion of these issues. Some reform proposals have already been put forward. In 1987, for example, a parliamentary committee recommended the registration of lobbyists, and in 1988 a weak registration law was passed.<sup>17</sup> In another publication I have argued for lobbyist registration, for strengthening the capacity of parliamentary committees to use and encourage interest group discussion of policy, and for providing more resources to public interest groups.<sup>18</sup> Most recently Coleman has made a similar plea for parliamentary reform and has suggested that Canada follow the lead of small European states and restructure business interests so that the entire spectrum of business can be represented by 'a very few organizations that can give voice to the diversity of interests resulting from territorial and sectoral factors'.<sup>19</sup> He also argues that labour groups should be strengthened so that they will acquire both a capacity to speak to general concerns and an acknowledged responsibility to do so.

Some of these changes are in progress. Parliament, in particular, has used procedural reforms to encourage more open and vigorous policy debate. We can expect the regulation of lobbying to take firmer hold during the 1990s. We may even see greater government support for public interest groups. There is less likelihood that business interests will be reorganized in the fashion that Coleman recommends. Despite similarities between Canada and small European states, Canada is physically a very large and regionally

<sup>15</sup> Coleman, *Business and Politics*, 261–5.

<sup>16</sup> See e.g. John Sawatsky, *The Insiders: Government Business and the Lobbyists* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), and Hyman Solomon, 'Business Got its Feet Wet in Public Policy', *Financial Post* (5 Dec. 1988).

<sup>17</sup> I have given an account of this in 'The Business Card Bill: The Debate over Lobbyist Registration in Canada', in Grant Jordan (ed.), *Commercial Lobbying* (forthcoming).

<sup>18</sup> Pross, *Group Politics and Public Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 261–72.

<sup>19</sup> Coleman, *Business and Politics*, 169.

diverse country. It is, therefore, doubtful whether even a highly democratic organizational structure for business interests can offset the pull of regional tensions within interest communities. Similarly, it is unlikely that the most prominent public interest groups—such as environmentalists, consumer activists, and women's groups—would be willing to voice their concerns solely through the labour movement. In other words, public supervision of pressure group activity will proceed incrementally in Canada during the decade. Whether it will be either sufficient or appropriate is not clear.